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I. INTRODUCTION: THE "CONFUSED CLASS OF CIRCUMFORANEOUS LITIGANTS"
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 and the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 are cornerstones of modern federal
environmental law. The two Acts contain many provisions which have served as
models for later environmental legislation, including unique sections authorizing
citizens to enforce the provisions of these laws through litigation brought in
federal court.' This practice of enforcement through so-called "citizen suits"2
became the norm3 for later environmental legislation.4
The most celebrated feature of these enforcement provisions is the
authorization they give to private individuals to bring suit directly against private
entities and individuals who are allegedly violating air pollution standards, water
pollution standards, or other similar statutory standards. This aspect of the
citizen suit provisions has attracted extensive scholarly commentary and been
1. See Clean Air Act ("CAA") §§ 304(a)(1), 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(a)(1),
7607(b)(1) (1994); Clean Water Act ("CWA") §§ 505(a)(1), 509(b)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. §§
1365(a)(1), 1369(b)(1) (West 1995 & Supp. 1996).
2. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS (1991); JEFFREY G.
MILLER& ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., CITIZEN SUITS: PRIvATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL
POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS (1987); Symposium, Citizen Suits: The Privatization of
Environmental Law Enforcement, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 253 (1993).
3. A debate, however, exists over whether such suits are preferable from a policy
standpoint. Compare David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular
Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the
United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REv. 1552, 1561 (1995) (arguing that
"only extensive use of citizen suits as private attorneys general can safeguard the enforcement
system from collapse and prevent states from using lax environmental enforcement as an
economic development tool") and Michael D. Axline & Patrick C. McGinley, Universal
Statutes and Planetary Programs: How EPA Has Diluted the Clean Water Act, 8 J. ENvTL. L.
& LITIG. 253, 287 (1993) ("Citizen enforcement compensates, to some extent, for EPA's
inadequate resources. Citizen enforcement is also necessary, however, because EPA is an
agency, and like any agency it is subject to capture, self-interested decisionmaking, and
institutional agendas that differ from those of Congress.") with Robert F. Blomquist,
Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean
Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-Dependent Values, 22 GA. L. REV. 337
(1988) (arguing that citizen suits do not promote the intended policy interests) and Michael S.
Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REv. 339 (1990) (Citizen
suit provisions in their present form cannot promote the policy goals they are ostensibly
intended to serve.).
4. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2619 (West 1995 & Supp.
1996); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8
(1994); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1994); Resources Conservation and Recovery
Act; 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994).
5. See, e.g., LISA JORGENSON & JEFFREY J. KIMEL, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS: CONFRONTING THE CORPORATION (1988); Peter A. Alpert,
Citizen Suits Under the Clean Air Act: Universal Standing for the Uninjured Private Attorney
General?, 16 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 283 (1988); Michael D. Axline et al., Stones for
David's Sling: Civil Penalties in Citizen Suits Against Polluting Federal Facilities, 2 J. ENVTL.
1996)
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the subject of a significant amount of litigation.6 Congress, however, also set out
at least two other functions in these statutes: the authorization of judicial review
of actions taken by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")7 and the
empowerment of citizens to force a recalcitrant EPA to act.8 As a means to
implement these two functions, Congress created a "bifurcated" jurisdictional
structure. Thus, under both laws the United States district courts have
jurisdiction over "action-forcing" suits, brought by citizens against EPA's
L. & LITIG. 1 (1987); Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement:
A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L.
REV. 833 (1985); Marcia R. Gelpe & Janis L. Barnes, Penalties in Settlements of Citizen Suit
Enforcement Actions Under the Clean Water Act, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1025 (1990);
Charles N. Nauen, Citizen Environmental Lawsuits After Gwaltney: The Thrill of Victory or
the Agony of Defeat?, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 327 (1989); Patrice Scatena, Gwaltney of
Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation: A New Form of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under
Section 505 of the Clean Water Act?, 19 ENVTL. L. 119 (1988); Beverly M. Smith, The
Viability of Citizens' Suits Under the Clean Water Act After Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1989-90); Robert D. Snook,
Environmental Citizen Suits and Administrative Discretion: When Should Government
Enforcement Bar a Citizen Suit?, NAT'L ENvTL. ENFORCEMENT J., April 1995, at 3; Sharon
Elliott, Comment, Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act: Waiting for Godot in the Fifth
Circuit, 62 TUL. L. REV. 175 (1987); Philip Key, Note, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation: Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Citizen Suits, 19 ENVrL. L. 93 (1988); Diana
L. Lee, Note, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation: Its Implications for
Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 571 (1989); James L. Thompson,
Note, Citizen Suits and Civil Penalties Under the Clean Water Act, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1656
(1987); L. Ward Wagstaff, Note, Citizen Suits and the Clean Water Act: The Supreme Court
Decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 891;
Colleen M. Wolter, Note, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation: The
Supreme Court Disallows Citizen Suits for Wholly Past Violations of the Clean Water Act, 3
ADMIN. L.J. 425 (1989); Joel A. Waite, Comment, The Continuing Questions Regarding
Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act: Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 313 (1989); Lance L. Shea, Note, Gwaltney of
Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation: Balancing Interests Under the Clean Water Act,
25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857 (1988).
6. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 2 (extensively discussing the use of citizen suits).
7. Most federal environmental statutes call for action by the Administrator of the EPA.
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (1994) (Administrator must adopt water quality criteria
reflecting latest scientific knowledge.); 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (1994) (Administrator shall
issue air quality criteria for listed pollutants.). In practice, decisions by the Administrator are
often referred to as "EPA" decisions, and plaintiffs litigating those decisions routinely have
named both the agency and the Administrator as defendants. In this Article, the terms are used
interchangeably.
8. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
("Although the major emphasis throughout the development of section 304 was on its role as
a vehicle for enforcement of established standards, courts have read it to cover the
Administrator's failure to take other steps required of him, such as the promulgation of
implementation plans or standards within a specified time."); O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill,
Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642, 647-48 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("The [Clean Water] Act authorizes citizen
suits against (1) those alleged to be 'in violation' of the Act's limitations, and (2) the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), through its administrator, upon the EPA's failure to
perform a non-discretionary act.").
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Administrator, alleging a failure to perform a "nondiscretionary act" required by
law,9 while the federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review "final
actions" of the Administrator."0
This bifurcated jurisdictional structure" is intended to ensure agency
adherence to statutory requirements by authorizing citizen actions to compel
compliance and to expedite judicial review of final agency actions. Over the past
two decades, however, those purposes have often been lost in a confusing maze
of case law construing the jurisdiction statutes.' 2 Courts have often struggled to
separate agency inaction that is part of a "final action," and which thus is
reviewable only in the court of appeals, from an agency's failure to take
"nondiscretionary" action, which only the district courts can remedy. 3 In the
process, some courts have commented on the disarray presented by their
decisions, for example, by referring to parties as "circling in a Sargasso Sea of
jurisdictional boundaries, out of reach of the substantive review they seek";' 4 as
a "confused class of circumforaneous litigants, wandering perplexedly from
forum to forum in search of remediation"; 15 and as plaintiffs forced to "spin the
wheel ofjurisdictional fortune"' 6 in their attempts to seek judicial review. 7
9. See CAA § 304(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1994); CWA § 505(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a)(2) (1994).
10. CAA § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1994); CWA § 509(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. §
1369(b)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
11. As in the CAA and CWA, the jurisdictional concept of direct review in the court of
appeals has been replicated in other environmental laws. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6976(b) (1994)
(review under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
12. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 538 F.2d 513, 518 (2d Cir. 1976) ("It would
be too much to say that we construe this confusing statute [§ 509(b)(1) of the CWA] with
confidence."). For an early view of the problems created by the statutes, see David P. Currie,
Judicial Review Under Federal Pollution Laws, 62 IOwA L. REv. 1221 (1977).
13. See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 553 F.2d 215, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting
that the jurisdictional provisions of the CAA have been the sources of periodic confusion)
(citing District of Columbia v. Train, 533 F.2d 1250, 1252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 426 U.S.
904 (1976)).
14. NRDC v. Administrator, EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J.,
concurring and dissenting), vacated in part and dismissed in part by 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir.
1991). The "Sargasso Sea" is an area of the North Atlantic Ocean encompassing the Bermuda
islands that is strewn with free-floating seaweed. The sea was first mentioned by Columbus,
who crossed it on his initial voyage in 1492. Many early navigators had the unfounded fear of
becoming entangled with the mass of floating vegetation. 10 New Encyclopedia Brittanica 452
(15th ed. 1997). The Sargasso Sea has been used as a metaphor for difficult legal navigational
issues in a number of judicial opinions. See Albemaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343
(1981) (Rehnquist, J.) (Decisional law in the area of double jeopardy is "a veritable Sargasso
Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator."); Hunter v. State,
430 A.2d 476, 480 n.2 (Del. 1981) (defining the Sargasso Sea in a case that was remanded for
reconsideration in light of Albernaz); State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44, 49-50 n.3 (Mo. 1981)
(quoting definition of the Sargasso Sea).
15. Maine v. Thomas, 874 F.2d 883, 884-85 (1st Cir. 1989).
16. Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator, EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 1292 (5th Cir. 1977).
17. See also Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1992):
The complexity of our exegesis [on jurisdiction] necessarily gives us pause about
its correctness. We see strength in the argument of Longview Fibre that the EPA
1996]
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While the judicial language is colorful, the confusion over the jurisdictional
boundaries in cases of agency inaction has adversely affected the administration
of federal environmental law. One effect is the sheer waste of resources
expended in litigation over the proper forum for a dispute. For example, in some
cases parties have filed lawsuits to protect against possible jurisdictional error
in their choice of court,'8 and in at least one instance a plaintiff moved to dismiss
its own petition in order to secure a judicial determination about the
jurisdictional correctness of that choice. ' 9 Parties who have guessed incorrectly
may find themselves out of court entirely, as the short statute of limitations in the
Clean Air Act ("CAA") and Clean Water Act ("CWA")2 0 can preclude filing a
later action in the proper court or raising issues in subsequent proceedings."'
Most importantly, as instances of EPA inaction have increased over the past
decade,2 the confusion has undermined a primary purpose of the judicial review
statutes. Instead of increasing EPA's accountability through citizen-initiated
construction unwisely fragments the process of review .... [Tlremendous
resources in time and money and considerable legal skill have gone into finding
out the proper address for an appeal, an activity which does not keep water clean
and does not process wood pulp.
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 538 F.2d 513, 518 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The jurisdictional question
is a difficult one. Several courts, including this one, have commented previously on the
jurisdictional and substantive problems presented by the FWPCA [Federal Water Pollution
Control Act] . . ").
18. Roll Coater, Inc. v. Reilly, 932 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that "careful
counsel must respond to the combination of uncertain opportunities for review and § 509(b)(2)
by filing buckshot petitions [for review]").
19. See Lubrizol Corp. v. EPA, 562 F.2d 807, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Petitioner filed actions
in both the district court and the court of appeals, but petitioner "consistently has argued that
original jurisdiction to review the particular regulation at issue... lies with the federal district
courts.. .
20. CAA § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (West 1995) (60 days); CWA § 509(b)(1),
33 U.S.C.A. § 1369(b)(1) (West 1994) (120 days).
21. See, e.g., Westvaco Corp. v. EPA, 899 F.2d 1383, 1387 (4th Cir. 1990) (Westvaco
"candidly profess[ed] its uncertainty about the immediate reviewability of the EPA actions
challenged here, hence its fear that failure to seek review now might preclude its right to have
the action reviewed in later enforcement proceedings .... "); Monsanto Co. v. EPA, 19 F.3d
1201, 1203 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[A]s Monsanto's counsel pointed out in oral argument, § 307
virtually compelled the company to seek an immediate review of the agency's denial of the
waiver or it would lose the defense.").
22. See MARC K. LANDY Er AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE
WRONG QuEsTioNs 245-50 (1990) (describing efforts by the Reagan Administration to curtail
environmental regulation). EPA's actions are part of a larger trend toward inaction by
administrative agencies generally, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. See Patricia
M. Wald, The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 507,
522 (1988) (characterizing this period of regulatory law as "the era of 'nonregulation"').
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lawsuits, the uncertainty has hindered the attainment of that goal.23 In the words
of one judge, the courts sometimes have played a game of "jurisdictional
badminton" with a plaintiff's action between the court of appeals and the district
court.24 In the worst cases, EPA has employed the statutes as a means of avoiding
judicial review of its actions by raising inconsistent arguments over jurisdiction
in different forums.2"
This Article examines the bifurcated jurisdiction provisions in the CAA and
CWA, the two laws that served as the model for much of the later environmental
legislation, and suggests how those provisions should be interpreted in cases of
agency inaction. After first summarizing the pertinent statutes, the Article
identifies the statutory language and concepts in the review provisions that have
proved most troublesome and then discusses the judicial construction of those
provisions. The Article then identifies a set of criteria that can be used to
evaluate the judicial approaches, including congressional intent derived from the
legislative history of the Acts as well as policies necessarily implicated by the
review provisions. Finally, the Article applies the criteria to the statutory
provisions in question and determines which judicial approach to the statutes
best comports with those criteria.26
23. The problem of determining jurisdiction can harm both regulated industry and
environmental plaintiffs who seek judicial review. Industry, for example, may be uncertain
whether preliminary action taken by the agency is reviewable in the district court or the court
of appeals. In general, however, environmentalists rather than industry tend to seek judicial
review when the agency has not acted. Accordingly, the problem of determining the correct
jurisdiction is more pressing for environmental interests than for industry.
24. NRDC v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Wright, J., concurring and
dissenting).
25. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1986) (Swygert, J.,
dissenting):
The EPA's purposeful evasion of its statutory mandate is evidenced by the fact
that it has attempted to insulate its inaction from judicial review. In a virtually
identical action filed in the Northern District of Illinois... the EPA moved the
district court to dismiss CBE's claim that the EPA had failed to perform its
nondiscretionary duty... to promulgate regulations on the ground that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The district judge denied EPA's motion.
After the EPA had taken final action on a revised Illinois [State Implementation
Plan ("SIP")], CBE sought an order from the district court, under Section 304,
compelling the EPA to perform its nondiscretionary duty to commence
rulemaking .... Once again the EPA moved to dismiss CBE's claims, arguing
that jurisdiction belonged in the court of appeals because the EPA had taken final
action with respect to an Illinois revised SIP. The district judge agreed.... CBE
filed the instant action in this court seeking review of similar claims regarding the
Indiana SIP and agreed to settle its district court claims without an adjudication
of the merits. The EPA then argued in this action that jurisdiction properly
belongs in the district court.
Id. at 663-64.
26. Citizen suits are subject to a growing number of other constraints which may prevent
courts from hearing them. Most significantly, the Supreme Court has held that Congress
cannot, consistent with Article III of the United States Constitution, grant universal standing
to citizens under an environmental statute. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992). See, e.g., Harold Feld, Saving the Citizen Suit: The Effect ofLujan v. Defenders of
1996]
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The Article concludes that judicial review should be available after the agency
has completed a cycle of proceedings, such as a rulemaking or other self-
contained procedural process. Of the possible approaches to judicial review, this
approach optimizes the various policy considerations at stake in judicial review
of agency inaction. Most significantly, it assures predictability for litigants,
results in timely review of agency decisionmaking, and promotes agency
accountability. At the same time, if used in a sensitive manner this approach will
not unnecessarily intrude on agency autonomy, another primary policy goal of
the judicial review statutes. Finally, this approach is consistent with the
indications of congressional intent found in the legislative history of the judicial
review provisions of the CAA and CWA, particularly the more extensive history
of the 1990 amendments to the CAA.
II. THE JUDICIAL REVIEW MODEL AND THE CONCEPT OF BIFURCATED
JURISDICTION
The 1990 amendments to the CAA and the 1987 amendments to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA") contained provisions for judicial
review of decisions by the Administrator of EPA. Those provisions established
a "bifurcated" scheme for judicial review in which some decisions are directly
reviewable in the United States courts of appeals, while others are cognizable
only in the district court. The uncertainty in the statutory language, however, has
been the source of considerable confusion over how the bifurcated jurisdiction
is intended to operate.
A. The Clean Air Act
1. The 1970 Amendments
Section 304 of the 1970 Amendments to the CAA authorizes two different
types of suits by private individuals to enforce the Act. First, a private citizen can
bring suit against "any person" (a term defined to include the United States and
other government agencies to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment)
who is alleged to be in violation of an emission standard or limitation, or an order
issued by the EPA Administrator. Second, any person can sue the Administrator
"where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty
under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
2 7
Wildlife and the Role of Citizen Suits in Environmental Enforcement, 19 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
141 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and
Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992). Most recently, the Court has expanded state immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996), a decision which probably means that states cannot be the subject of citizen suits
brought in federal court.
27. CAA § 304, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 12(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1991-92 (1970) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(a)(1), (2) (1994)). The statute read in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), any person may commence a civil action
[Vol. 72:65
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Section 304 of the Amendments thus separated the types of lawsuits authorized
into two classes. The first class concerns enforcement situations in which a
source is violating specified standards or orders, while the second class is
intended to compel action by EPA.28 Section 304 also addressed various
procedural matters pertinent to these classes of litigation, including a
requirement that a plaintiff must give sixty days notice to the proposed defendant
before filing suit.29
In addition, the 1970 Amendments included section 307, which concerned
petitions for judicial review of actions taken by the Administrator. This section
first declared that a petition for review of many of the Administrator's actions
listed in the statute "may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia."3 Section 307 then stated that a petition for review of
the Administrator's action in approving or promulgating a state implementation
plan ("SIP"), or taking other specified actions, "may be filed only in the United
on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
emission standard or limitation under this Act or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator
to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not discretionary with the
Administrator.
28. See Theodore L. Garrett & Sonya D. Winner, A Clean Air Act Primer: Part I1, 22
ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,301, 10,314 (1992) ("[S]ection 304 has been invoked by
a variety of parties, including environmental groups, industry, and even state agencies, to
compel EPA to comply with its nondiscretionary obligations under the Act, including the
promulgation of regulations and the review of SIPs.").
29. CAA § 304, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 12, 84 Stat. 1676, 1706 (1970) (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994)). Pre-filing notice was not required for certain specified types of
violations, and an action could not be brought if the Administrator or state "has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting a civil action." Id. The statute also established venue
requirements, authorized intervention by the Administrator if he or she was not a party to the
action, and specified costs that could be recovered, including attorney and expert witness fees.
Id. It defined the term "emission standard of limitation under this Act" as used in the statute.
Id. Finally, the Amendments waived the usual jurisdictional limits of the district courts with
respect to the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties. Id.
30. CAA § 307(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1708 (1970) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1994)). The statute at that time read in pertinent part:
(b)(1) A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any
national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard
or requirement under section 112, any standard of performance or requirement
under section 111, any standard under section 202 (other than a standard required
to be prescribed under section 202(b)(1)), any determination under section
202(b)(5), any control or prohibition under section 211, or any standard under
section 231 may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. A petition for review of the Administrator's action in
approving or promulgating any implementation plan under section 110 or section
111 (d) may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate
circuit.
1996]
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States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit."'" In authorizing review of
an "action" by the Administrator, the statute notably did not mention whether the
action had to be final, nor did it define the term "appropriate circuit."
2. The 1977 Amendments
The 1977 Amendments to the CAA32 made only minor changes to section 304
which did not substantially affect the citizen suit provisions.33 The Amendments,
however, did change section 307 in several important ways. First, they tinkered
with the CAA's venue restrictions, adding to the list of actions which the 1970
Amendments required to be filed in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. Most importantly, the Amendments added an express
requirement that a challenge must be to a "final action" and amended the statute
to require that challenges to "any other nationally applicable regulations
promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator" must be filed in that
circuit. 4 Review of other actions, such as actions concerning SIPs or actions
31. CAA § 307(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 91-604 § 12(a), 84 Stat. 1707 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1994)). Section 307(b)(1) continued:
A petition for review of the Administrator's action in approving or promulgating
any implementation plan under section 1857c-5 of this title or section 1857c-6(d)
of this title, or his action under section 1857c-10(c)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of this title
or under regulations thereunder, may be filed only in the United States Court of
Appeals for the appropriate circuit.
32. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 303(a)-(c), 91 Stat. 771, 772 (1977) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604 (1994)); Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14(a)(77), (78), 91 Stat. 1404 (1977) (current version
at 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1994)).
33. Most importantly, the Amendments expanded the range of actions subject to a citizen
suit by including violations of Part C of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7470-7492 (1994), which
contained provisions to prevent significant deterioration of air quality, and Part D, the
nonattainment provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 7501-7515 (1994). The Amendments also expanded the
class of specific actions which could be brought. Under the Amendments, any person could
bring a civil action:
(3) against any person who proposes to construct or constructs any new or
modified major emitting facility without a permit required under part C of
subchapter I of this chapter (relating to significant deterioration of air quality) or
part D of subchapter I of this chapter (relating to nonattainment) or who is alleged
to be in violation of any condition of such permit.
CAA § 304(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3) (1994).
34. Section 307(b)(1), as amended in 1977, read as follows:
A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any national
primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard or
requirement under section 112, any standard of performance or requirement under
section I 11, any standard under section 202 (other than a standard required to be
prescribed under section 202(b)(1)), any determination under section 202(b)(5),
any control or prohibition under section 211, any standard under section 231, any
rule issued under section 113, 119, or under section 120, or any other nationally
applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator
under this Act may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. A petition for review of the Administrator's action in
approving or promulgating any implementation plan under section 110 or section
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"locally or regionally applicable," could be filed only "in the United States Court
of Appeals for the appropriate circuit."35 Here too, however, Congress added a
finality requirement: it authorized review of "any other final action of the
Administrator."36 Thus, in the 1977 Amendments Congress limited direct judicial
review in the courts of appeals to "final actions" of the Administrator, a
limitation not expressly included in the 1970 Amendments."
3. The 1990 Amendments
The 1990 Amendments to the CAA specifically addressed the circumstances
in which the district courts could order EPA to act. Congress amended section
304(a) to authorize the district courts "to compel (consistent with paragraph (2)
of this subsection) agency action unreasonably delayed."38 This new provision
marked the first time that Congress explicitly recognized the possibility that the
agency might unduly delay in taking action. 9
11 (d), any order under section 11 (I), under section 112(c), under section
113(d), under section 119, or under section 120, or his action under section
1 19(c)(2)(A), (B), or (C) (as in effect before the date of enactment of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977) or under regulations thereunder, or any other final
action of the Administrator under this Act (including any denial or disapproval
by the Administrator under title I) which is locally or regionally applicable may
be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit.
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence a petition for review of any action
referred to in such sentence may be filed only in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia if such action is based on a determination
of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action the Administrator finds
and publishes that such action is based on such a determination. Any petition for
review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days from the date notice
of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register, except
that if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, then
any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days after
such grounds arise.




37. The Amendments also specified that only certain provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1994), applied to lawsuits brought challenging
rulemakings under the Act. That provision may well have exempted EPA from APA actions
alleging that the agency had "unreasonably delayed" in taking certain actions. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(a) (1994).
38. CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994).
39. Congress also attached a venue provision to that authority: actions to compel such
agency action may be filed only in district courts within the circuit "in which such action would
be reviewable under section 7607(b) of this title." Id. The statute reads as follows:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to compel
(consistent with paragraph (2) of this subsection) agency action unreasonably
delayed, except that an action to compel agency action referred to in section
7607(b) of this title which is unreasonably delayed may only be filed in a United
States District Court within the circuit in which such action would be reviewable
under section 7607(b) of this title. In any such action for unreasonable delay,
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The 1990 Amendments4" also changed section 307. Most importantly, they
provide that "[w]here a final decision by the Administrator defers performance
of any nondiscretionary statutory action to a later time," any person may
challenge that deferral through the judicial review mechanism provided in section
307."' Thus, the Amendments allow deferrals of performance to be challenged
directly in the United States courts of appeals, but only if such deferral is part of
a "final decision. 42
B. The Clean Water Act
1. The 1972 Amendments
Congress modeled the citizen suit and judicial review provisions of the 1972
Amendments to the FWPCA, now known as the CWA,43 closely after the 1970
Amendments to the CAA.44 Section 505 of the Amendments contains a citizen
suit enforcement provision that parallels section 304 of the CAA. It authorizes
citizens to bring a civil action against the United States or other government
instrumentalities who are violating either an effluent limitation or standard
established under the Act, or a state or federal order issued with respect to such
notice to the entities referred to in subsection (b)(1)(A) of this section shall be
provided 180 days before commencing such action.
CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994). In other words, if a plaintiff is seeking a court
order for action which, when final, would be nationally applicable and thus reviewable only
in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the plaintiff may file its suit only in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. The 1990 Amendments also changed slightly
the types of cases that could be brought without giving 60 days notice prior to suit and added
provisions regarding the disposition of penalties paid as a result of suits brought under §
304(a). See CAA § 304(b), (g), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b), (g) (1994).
40. Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 108(p), 110(5), 302(g), (h), 702(c), 703, 706, 707(h), 710(b),
104 Stat. 2469, 2470, 2574, 2681-84 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1994)).
41. CAA § 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2) (1994).
42. The 1990 Amendments make clear that filing a petition for reconsideration does not
affect the finality of the Administrator's action for purposes ofjudicial review, and they make
other minor changes to the list of specific actions by the Administrator made subject to judicial
review in the statute. CAA § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1994). The Amendments also
authorize review of revisions to regulations for enhanced monitoring and compliance
certification programs under § 7414(a)(3), and delete the previous authorization for review of
actions taken under § 7413. Id.
43. The 1977 Amendments declared that the Act was now to be known as the CWA. See
Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 1, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994))
("[T]his act... may be cited as the 'Clean Water Act of 1977."'). For purposes of uniformity,
when this Article refers to the legislation as a whole, it uses the title "Clean Water Act."
44. See Lubrizol Corp. v. Train, 547 F.2d 310, 318 (6th Cir. 1976) ("The judicial review
provision of the Water Act, § 509(b)(1), is quite similar to § 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act...
.The similarity of the Clean Air Act and the Water Act has led courts to refer to provisions of
one act when interpreting its counterpart in the other. See e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d




standard or limitation." The Amendments also authorize a citizen suit in the
United States district court "where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator
to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the
Administrator. '4 6 Thus, like the CAA Amendments of 1970, the 1972
Amendments to the FWPCA authorize citizen suits in the United States district
courts to compel nondiscretionary actions without regard to the amount in
controversy or citizenship of the parties.47
The provisions of the 1972 Amendments to the FWPCA authorizing initial
jurisdiction directly in the court of appeals likewise follow the pattern
established two years earlier in section 307 of the 1970 Amendments to the
CAA.4" The 1972 Amendments listed six types of action by the Administrator of
EPA and then authorized "any interested person" to seek review of them "in the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the United States for the Federal judicial district in
which such person resides or transacts business. ' 49 A ninety day statute of
limitations applied to such review, and if a party did not seek review, it could not
obtain judicial review in a later civil or criminal enforcement proceeding. 0
45. CWA § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1994).
46. CWA § 505(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1994). Section 505(a) of the 1972
Amendments read in full:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may
commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator
to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not discretionary with the
Administrator. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform
such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties
under section 309(d) of this Act.
CWA § 505(a), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 888 (1972) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a) (1994)).
47. Cf CAA § 304(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1706 (1970) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994)); CWA § 505(a), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 888 (1972) (current
version at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994)). Pre-litigation notice is required, and the statute
contains procedural provisions regarding such matters as venue that are similar to those in the
CAA. Cf CWA § 505(b), (c), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 888 (1972) (current version at 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b), (c) (1994)); CAA § 304(b), (c), Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1706 (1970)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b), (c) (1994)).
48. Cf CAA § 307(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1708 (1970) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1994)).
49. FWPCA § 509(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 100-236, 86 Stat. 816, 892 (1972) (current version
at 33 U.S.C.A. § 1369(b)(1) (West Supp. 1996)).
50. FWPCA § 509(b)(1), (2), Pub. L. Nos. 100-236, 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 892 (1972)
(current version at 33 U.S.C.A. § 1369(b)(1) (West Supp. 1996) and 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2)
(1994)).
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2. The 1977 and 1987 Amendments
The 1977 "mid-course correction" Amendments to the CWA did not change
sections 505 and 509. Thus, unlike the 1977 Amendments to the CAA, they did
not expressly require that an EPA action be final before a party could seek
judicial review, although judicial interpretations of the Act ultimately imposed
that requirement as a matter of administrative law.5 The 1987 Amendments52
amended both sections but made only minor changes to the basic citizen suit and
judicial review provisions. 3
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE JURISDICTION STATUTES
The overall framework of the jurisdictional provisions of the CAA and CWA
is deceptively simple: final actions54 are reviewed directly in the court of appeals,
while the district court has jurisdiction to compel EPA to carry out a
nondiscretionary act. The framework's simplicity, however, quickly dissolves
upon closer inspection.
For example, the District of Columbia Circuit opined that "Congress has
provided some sort of rough roadmap for jurisdiction": 5 the courts of appeals
review final actions taken by the Administrator on a fully developed
administrative record, while the district courts have jurisdiction over petitions "to
51. Westvaco Corp. v. EPA, 899 F.2d 1383, 1387 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Our jurisdiction to
review agency action under the CWA is limited to the categories of agency action identified
in 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1), and is further subject to the general limitation that only final agency
action is subject to immediate judicial review."); American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 882 F.2d 287,
289 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that policy statement concerning tolerances for dioxin in permits
for paper mills using chlorine bleaching was not final agency action).
52. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, §§ 308(b), 406(d)(3), 505(a), (b), 101
Stat. 7, 39, 73, 75 (current version in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.); Pub. L. No. 100-236,
§ 2, 101 Stat. 1731, 1732 (1987) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2112 (1994)).
53. The Amendments to § 505 establish requirements of service of the complaint upon the
Administrator and the Attorney General, prevent the entry of a consent judgment until 45 days
after service, Water Quality Act of 1987, § 504, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, 75 (1987)
(current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3) (1994)), and authorize an award of costs and
attorney fees to prevailing or substantially prevailing party, Water Quality Act of 1987, §
505(b)(4), Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, 76 (1987) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d)
(1994)). The Amendments to § 1369 expand the list of specific actions for which judicial
review is authorized by adding the approval or promulgation of an effluent limitation under §
1345, Water Quality Act of 1987, § 406(d)(3) (1987) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §
1369(b)(1)(E) (1994)), or an individual control strategy under § 1314(/), Water Quality Act of
1987, § 308(b) (1987) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(G) (1994)).
54. The CWA does not expressly limit the court of appeals' jurisdiction to "final actions,"
but judicial interpretation has done so. See, e.g., Appalachian Energy Group v. EPA, 33 F.3d
319 (4th Cir. 1994) (To the extent that EPA's action in the case advising that a CWA permit
was required is only a predictor of future action, it is not yet final action subject to review.) and
cases cited supra nQte 51.
55. NRDC v. Administrator, EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated in part and
dismissed in part by 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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require the Administrator to do what the Act demands."56 Thus, the court saw the
jurisdictional choice as dependent upon the existence of a developed
administrative record."7 The "rough roadmap," however, is not very useful in
specific factual situations. Consider a typical scenario in which the Administrator
has compiled a complete administrative rulemaking record on a subject and
decides not to adopt a rule but, by doing so, violates a plain legal command. Is
the Administrator's decision a final action taken on a "fully developed record"
and thus reviewable in the court of appeals, or is it a petition that "requires the
Administrator to do what the Act demands," an action cognizable only in district
court? The statutory language does not provide a definitive answer. 8
Another court cites administrative discretion as the key to understanding
bifurcated jurisdiction. The district court is the proper forum "when the
Administrator is charged with failure to perform a non-discretionary duty," but
a plaintiff must sue in the court of appeals when the Administrator is "charged
with abusing his discretion."59 However, the dichotomy between failure to
perform a nondiscretionary duty and abuse of discretion will not untangle the
review provisions. For example, take one obvious problem: after the 1990
Amendments to the CAA, both the district court and court of appeals have
jurisdiction over nondiscretionary actions. The district court can compel
"nondiscretionary action" by the Administrator,6" while the court of appeals has
jurisdiction over the Administrator's "final decision" deferring performance of
any "nondiscretionary action."'" And reconsider the scenario in which, after
compiling a rulemaking record, the Administrator does not act even though all
the evidence in the record would require action. A test focusing on a supposed
difference between the failure to exercise discretion and abuse of that discretion
does not inform litigants as to whether the district court or court of appeals is the
correct forum.
56. Id.
57. See also Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator, EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 1292 (5th Cir. 1977)
("When Congress has vested this court with original review, it generally has done so in relation
to an administrative process that more easily lends itself to production of a reviewable
record.").
58. See Garrett & Winner, supra note 28, at 10,313:
Technically, the Act appears to require challenges to the approval decision to be
brought in the court of appeals and challenges to the failure to act in the district
court. However, the legal issues involved in both challenges may be inextricably
intertwined, thus raising the possibility of duplication of judicial resources and
conflicting decisions.
59. Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061, 1067 (N.D.W. Va. 1973); see
also Council of Commuter Orgs. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 683 F.2d 663, 665 (2d Cir.
1982) ("In general, a court of appeals may consider challenges to agency action taken by the
Environmental Protection Agency... and a district court is the proper forum for suits to
compel the EPA to take nondiscretionary action and to compel state and local agencies and
officials to comply with requirements of a state implementation plan .... ").
60. CAA § 304(a), Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 707(a), (f), 104 Stat. 2399,2683 (1990) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1994)).
61. CAA § 307(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 707(h), 104 Stat. 2399, 2683-84 (1990)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2) (1994)).
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The difficulties of interpreting the jurisdiction statutes flow from two sources.
First, the terms used in the bifurcated jurisdictional provisions are not self-
defining. In particular, the acts do not explain whether agency "action" can
include a decision by the agency not to regulate in a particular instance even if
a statute imposes a nondiscretionary duty for the agency to do so. Second, under
any conceivable definition, the jurisdictional grants of authority to the district
courts and courts of appeals overlap.
This Part of the Article first examines these conceptual difficulties and briefly
evaluates the possibility that concurrent jurisdiction in the courts of appeals and
the district courts could solve the problem. The discussion then turns to an
examination ofjudicial interpretations of the bifurcated jurisdiction sections. It
analyzes five separate tests which the courts have formulated to determine
whether jurisdiction to review inaction by the Administrator lies in the district
court or the court of appeals.
A. Conceptual Problem I: Agency "Action" and Agency "Final Action"
The terms and concepts used to establish the jurisdictional line between the
district courts and the courts of appeals are not self-defining. Most importantly,
determining when the agency has "acted" has proven difficult. Equally vexing
to courts has been determining whether a particular action, once taken, is "final"
action within the meaning of the statute. 62
Because judicial review in the court of appeals is possible only if the
Administrator has taken "final action,, 63 the Administrator must "act" for
jurisdiction to attach in these courts. If the Administrator has not adopted a rule
or issued an order, it is tempting to conclude that no action has taken place. The
failure to act, however, may have occurred after the agency undertook a
regulatory proceeding in which it compiled and reviewed information to
determine whether the adoption of a rule was warranted,64 or after the agency
reviewed action previously taken by a state as part of EPA's statutory oversight
of state implementation.65 In these instances, the question becomes whether any
62. For discussions of judicial review of agency inaction generally, see E. Gates Garrity-
Rokous, Note, Preserving Review of Undeclared Programs: A Statutory Redefinition of Final
Agency Action, 101 YALE L.J. 643 (1991); Peter H.A. Lehner, Note, Judicial Review of
Administrative Inaction, 83 COLuM. L. REv. 627 (1983).
63. See supra text accompanying note 34.
64. See Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (The
Administrator refused to revise previously promulgated new source performance standards for
coal-fired power plants.).
65. Under the CWA, for example, the Administrator has the right to "veto" state actions on
permits if they are inconsistent with the requirements of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994); see
Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408, 414 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that the
court of appeals could review the Administrator's failure to veto a state permit because the
Administrator had previously "coerced" the State Water Resources Control Board into making
changes in that permit); Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator, EPA, 556 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir.
1977) (concluding that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction where petitioner challenged
Administrator's failure to veto a permit issued by Mississippi Air and Water Pollution Control
Commission and to withdraw the permit authority which the Administrator had delegated to
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decision at the end of such a process-an affirmative approval or a refusal to
take action at that time-ought to be termed an action and thus possibly subject
to review in the court of appeals. 6
Assuming there is agency action, a second important definitional concept is
whether the action is "final." The CAA authorizes review in the court of appeals
of listed agency actions and of "final action taken" by the Administrator. 7
Although the CWA does not directly mention "final" action, courts have required
finality as a condition for jurisdiction in the court of appeals,6" in accordance
with the established principle of administrative law that an agency's action must
be final before a court will review it.
6 9
Consider a scenario like that posed above7" in which the agency has completed
a regulatory proceeding but decided not to undertake a particular course of
conduct at that time. It has, however, specifically left open the possibility of
future action. Although the agency may have acted, has it taken final action so
as to give the court of appeals jurisdiction to review its decision?7'
The complexity of EPA regulatory proceedings compounds the problem of
determining whether the agency has taken "final action." The statutes setting
forth the court's jurisdiction to review EPA action seem to envision a process by
which the agency's decisionmaking will occur in discrete blocks with easily
identifiable beginnings and endings. In fact, however, the administrative process
of implementing federal environmental law, particularly the CAA, has in practice
the Commission).
66. Additionally, of course, a broader definition of what is an administrative "action" will
reduce the discretion that EPA possesses to act without judicial interference, a factor that has
played a significant role in Supreme Court decisions involving judicial review of other forms
of agency inaction. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985) (The agency is far
better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering
of its priorities.). Decision of this question may well be complicated by impacts upon state
autonomy if a federal court of appeals should deem EPA's decision not to interfere to be "final
action." See Mianus River Preservation Comm. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 899, 906 (2d Cir. 1976) ("To
conclude that a State's issuance of such an NPDES permit is 'Administrator's action' subject
to direct review by this Court, would in some cases result in our being required to review issues
involving only a State agency's application and interpretation of purely State law.").
67. CAA § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1994); see Hawaiian Elec. Co. v. EPA, 723
F.2d 1440, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1984) (An action is final if it is definitive, is based on a record
adequate to permit review, and has an immediate impact on an interest of the party seeking
review.).
68. See supra note 51.
69. Under the APA a court may only review "final agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994);
see Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (Census Bureau's decision to allocate
federal overseas employees for census purposes was not "final agency action" under the APA.).
70. See supra text accompanying note 59.
71. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1986) (concluding that
EPA's refusal to act on a state's proposal to amend the SIP was a final order reviewable in the
court of appeals).
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become vastly more complicated.' 2 The EPA often takes a series of sequential
actions to address a common problem,73 and determining when the
Administrator's action is final on any particular issue in an ongoing regulatory
process is problematic, to say the least.74
For example, when EPA has initially determined that the CAA's "prevention
of significant deterioration" provisions applied to a proposed source of air
pollution, courts have concluded that this determination was final action for
purposes of judicial review." That determination, however, simply initiates a
lengthy administrative process which only later will culminate in the imposition
of specific regulatory constraints upon the source. In contrast, when regulated
sources seek judicial review of a decision by EPA enforcing regulatory
requirements against the source, courts are much more reluctant to conclude that
this initial decision is final action for purposes of judicial review,7" fearing that
72. See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env't v. Costle, 515 F. Supp. 264, 270 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
("Perhaps the most striking feature of this litigation is the extent to which EPA's administrative
processing of Illinois' and Indiana's Part D SIP's has diverged from the procedure
contemplated by the Clean Air Act.").
73. For example, in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1983), EPA
first issued an interpretive regulation announcing that it could reclassify areas as nonattainment
under the CAA and then proceeded to reclassify the area in which plaintiffs facility was
located. The court rejected EPA's argument that the plaintiff forfeited its right to judicial
review of the reclassification by not having sought judicial review of the interpretive regulation
within 60 days of its promulgation. Id. at 1306.
74. See, e.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 4 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1993) (EPA action
awarding allowances for emission of sulfur dioxide to electric utilities is "final action.");
Municipal Auth. of St. Mary's v. EPA, 945 F.2d 67, 72 (3d Cir. 1991) ("While the EPA's
approval of the list [of polluted navigable waters subject to the requirements of the CWA's §
304() program] and the ICS ['individual control strategy' for point sources on the list]
technically constitutes the federal agency's final act in administering the 304(l) program, this
is not the final act in the implementation and administration of the program's requirements...
. [T]he existence of [the] permit modification process and the events which have taken place
in this case amply demonstrate that EPA's involvement in the process is, in fact, preliminary
and initial."); Westvaco Corp. v. EPA, 899 F.2d 1383, 1389 (4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting
petitioner's argument that EPA's preliminary disapproval of state submissions under § 304()
was reviewable).
75. See, e.g., Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990) (EPA
determination that a proposed replacement program at an electric utility was subject to both
new source performance standards and prevention of significant deterioration requirements was
reviewed as a final action, though the finality of the determination was not an issue in the
case.); Puerto Rican Cement Co., Inc. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292, 296 (1st Cir. 1989) (The court
has jurisdiction to review EPA's determination that plaintiff could not build a replacement
facility without meeting PSD requirements.); Hawaiian Elec. Co. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1440 (9th
Cir. 1984) (EPA's determination that an electric company's change to higher sulfur fuel was
a "major modification" under the agency's prevention of significant deterioration regulations
was final action.).
76. See, e.g., Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and
Enforcement, 20 F.3d 1418 (6th Cir. 1994) (The structure of the CWA indicated that Congress
intended to prohibit pre-enforcement judicial review of compliance order issued under that
Act.) (citing Southern Pines Assoc. v. United States, 912 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir. 1990)); Solar
Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1082 (3d Cir. 1989) (Since neither risk of sanctions nor
severe hardship flowed from a stop-work order, the order was not final action.); cf Allsteel,
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such determinations will entangle the courts in the agency's enforcement
process.77
These precedents suggest that any test for determining final action78 must be
flexible enough to consider the issue in light of later actions contemplated by the
agency's procedures. 79 However, they also demonstrate the difficulties that
Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 1994) (A stop-work order was final agency action
because it exposed the party to immediate and practical impact.).
77. See, e.g., Solar Turbines, 879 F.2d at 1078 (no pre-enforcement review of a compliance
order); West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975) (The court had no
jurisdiction over the power company's action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
a notice of violation issued by EPA.); Route 26 Land Dev. Ass'n v. United States, 753 F.
Supp. 532, 539 (D. Del. 1990) (An Army Corps of Engineers cease and desist order is not
reviewable.); cf Donner Hanna Coke Corp. v. Costle, 464 F. Supp. 1295, 1299 (W.D.N.Y.
1979). In that case the plaintiff sought review of an EPA order directing it to allow a proposed
inspection of its property. Although EPA initially objected to jurisdiction, it later agreed that
the district court had jurisdiction, and the court found it had jurisdiction over EPA's
counterclaim seeking a mandatory injunction granting EPA access to plaintiff's plant. See also
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1984) (An order
disapproving a delayed compliance order was reviewable since the consequence of that order
is that the polluter must either comply immediately or pay a noncompliance penalty.); David
M. Moore, Comment, Pre-enforcement Review of Administrative Orders to Abate
Environmental Hazards, 9 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 675, 685 (1992) ("EPA has successfully
prevented pre-enforcement review by arguing that its administrative actions are not final.").
78. In determining whether EPA's request for information about certain discharges by a
vinyl chloride manufacturer constituted "final action" under the CAA, the court of appeals in
Dow Chemical v. EPA, 832 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1987), declared that a final agency action "is
one that imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes a legal relationship." Id. at 323 (quoting
Geyen v. Marsh, 775 F.2d 1303, 1308 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985)). A great many actions taken by
agencies, however, arguably "fix" legal relationships, and many of these are not final for
purposes of immediate judicial review. See Burlington N.R.R. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 75 F.3d
685, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[Tjhe Board notes that 'all agency orders fix rights and obligations
in some way or other, and yet not all are final.' ... True enough .... ).
79. The determination of finality also closely relates to the judge-made doctrine of ripeness
which is a cornerstone principle of administrative law. As articulated by the Supreme Court in
its leading case on ripeness, Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), this doctrine
"prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies." Id. at 148. It also protects
agencies from judicial interference "until an administrative decision has been formalized and
its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." Id.
The courts have been inconsistent in defining the relationship of ripeness to finality. Some
courts see the two concepts as separate, with ripeness ensuring that issues are fit for judicial
review, and finality as primarily encompassing concerns over interference with the
administrative process. Burlington N.R.I, 75 F.3d at 690-92 (analyzing the concepts
separately, albeit under an overall heading "Finality and Ripeness"); Public Citizen Health
Research Group v. Commissioner, Food and Drug Admin., 740 F.2d 21, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Others analyze finality as part of the two-part test for ripeness established by Abbott
Laboratories, which requires courts to examine the fitness of the issue for judicial
determination and the hardship to the parties if review is not undertaken. See Western Oil and
Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 1980) (The Abbott Laboratories analysis of
ripeness, "according to the understanding of most courts, depends on the combined weight of
the issue's 'fitness' for judicial resolution and the hardship to the aggrieved party if review is
postponed."); NRDC v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing the "two-pronged"
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practitioners face in determining when judicial review is available because the
agency has taken final action.
B. Conceptual Problem 11: "Nondiscretionary" Action
In addition to the problem of determining what the statutory language means,
under any definition the concepts used in the bifurcated jurisdictional statutes
overlap. An important example is the statutory dichotomy between the type of
inaction that is a "failure to perform a nondiscretionary act," over which the
district court is given jurisdiction, and other inaction that amounts to an abuse
of agency discretion, over which only the court of appeals may have jurisdiction.
Where the agency has done nothing at all or has only taken steps that are not
conceivably final action, the only possible challenge is to allege in the district
court that the agency has failed to perform a nondiscretionary act. In such cases
the question is one of statutory interpretation, with courts undertaking the
sometimes difficult task8" of determining from the pertinent statutory language
alone whether the Administrator must act,8 or whether the decision to act is a
matter of discretion. Litigation has included issues such as whether the Act
specifically establishes a mandatory deadline before which the Administrator
must act,82 whether the court is willing to infer such a deadline,83 and whether the
Abbott Laboratories test). These courts see finality as part of the "fitness" determination.
Citizens for a Better Env't v. Costle, 515 F. Supp. 264, 278 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("Issues are
considered 'fit' for judicial resolution when they can be characterized as 'purely legal' and as
'concrete' and when they are posed by final agency action.").
Still others have found that ripeness and finality are virtually the same thing. Sierra Club v.
Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("The requirement of finality is in essence a
question of ripeness, focussing on the appropriateness of the issues presented for judicial
review. Courts have approached this determination in a pragmatic way, considering 'the fitness
of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration."') (citing Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149). And some cases even take the
position that an environmental determination can be ripe without being final. Dow Chemical,
832 F.2d at 324 n.30 ("Because finality is only one of the four ripeness factors outlined in
Abbott Laboratories, an agency action may be final without being ripe."); see also Greater
Detroit Resource Recovery Auth. v. EPA, 916 F.2d 317, 327-28 (6th Cir. 1990) (EPA letter
was not "final agency action" within meaning of the statute, and thus the district court did not
have jurisdiction, even though the issue was ripe because "[b]oth of the Abbott Laboratories
criteria are fully satisfied.").
80. Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on
the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 69-70 (1995) (recognizing difficulty
in determining whether a particular provision involves a discretionary duty).
81. See Monongahela Power Co. v. Reilly, 980 F.2d 272, 278 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding
as reasonable Administrator's interpretation of CAA § 404(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7651 c(d)(3) of
the CAA as not imposing upon him a nondiscretionary duty to review extension proposals
under the Acid Deposition Control provisions of the Act prior to promulgating regulations
governing the subject); NRDC v. EPA, 770 F. Supp. 1093, 1105 (E.D. Va. 1991) (The CWA
does not require EPA to publish numerical criteria for dioxin; thus no nondiscretionary duty
exists.).
82. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("In order to impose
a clear-cut nondiscretionary duty, we believe that a duty of timeliness must 'categorically
mandate' that all specified action be taken by a date-certain deadline. In such circumstances,
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Administrator's previous administrative conclusions have rendered later action
nondiscretionary. Another frequently litigated point is whether EPA is required
to initiate enforcement action. Here, as in other areas of administrative law,8" the
courts have been hesitant to interfere with the agency's choices as to whether to
enforce and have interpreted statutory language as discretionary even where it
appears mandatory. 6
the only question for the district court to answer is whether the agency failed to comply with
the deadline.") (citations omitted); Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 996-98 (7th Cir.
1984) (If a state fails over a long period of time to submit total maximum daily load limits to
EPA as required, this failure might amount to "constructive submission" of no TMDL's (Total
Maximum Daily Loads), and EPA's failure to act "would amount to failure to perform a
nondiscretionary duty.").
83. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. EPA, No. C-90-1124-JPV, 1990 WL 269123, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 1990) ("The notion that a deadline on the administrator may arise by
inference from another date only applies if the other date is clearly fixed, and only in rare
instances.") (citing Sierra Club, 828 F.2d at 790).
84. See NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320,324,328 (2d Cir. 1976) (Administrator was required
to list lead under § 108 of the CAA where the Administrator admitted that, in his judgment,
lead met the statutory definition of a pollutant having an "adverse effect on public health and
welfare."); NRDC v. Thomas, 689 F. Supp. 246,253 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[Section] 112(b)(1)(A)
imposes on the EPA a mandatory, non-discretionary duty to list any substance found by the
Agency to be a hazardous air pollutant."); Council of Commuter Orgs. v. Metropolitan Transp.
Auth., 524 F. Supp. 90, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (In order for EPA to have a duty to withhold
federal funds, the Administrator must make a discretionary finding that the Governor has not
submitted a state implementation plan ("SIP") which takes into account attainment of the
national ambient air quality standards, but the Administrator had not made such a finding
here.), affd, 683 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1982).
85. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("[Ain agency decision not to enforce
often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its
expertise.").
86. See Dubois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir. 1987) (Although section 309(a)(3)
of the CWA states that "whenever on the basis of any information available to him, the
Administrator finds that any person is in violation... he shall issue an order requiring such
person to comply ... or he shall bring a civil action," the court concluded that the duties
imposed by section 309(a)(3) to investigate or make findings are discretionary.); Sierra Club
v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 490-91 (5th Cir. 1977) (Administrator's duties under § 309(a)(3) are
discretionary despite use of word "shall," and the Administrator thus was under no mandatory
duty to issue an abatement order.). Some courts have been willing to find that under §
309(a)(1), which states that "[v]henever, on the basis of any information available to him, the
Administrator finds that any person is in violation.., the Administrator shall notify the person
in violation.., of such finding," the Administrator has a mandatory duty to issue a notice of
violation. In New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 475 F. Supp. 425, 433 (D. Conn. 1979), the
court held that "[t]he Act, therefore, imposes upon the Administrator a non-discretionary duty
to issue aNotice of Violation once he finds non-compliance with SIP requirements ... ." See
also Greene v. Costle, 577 F. Supp. 1225, 1227-30 (W.D. Tenn. 1983) (Issuance of compliance
order was mandatory.); South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 134
(D.S.C. 1978) (Administrator must issue a compliance order once he or she finds a violation.);
cf Council of Commuter Orgs., 524 F. Supp. at 92 (holding that "[tihe duty to issue notice of
violations [under section 309(a)(1)] arises only after the EPA Administrator makes a
discretionary finding that such violations have occurred").
That notice, however, is not an enforcement step that requires compliance, while a notice of
abatement would be. And once the notice issues, all further enforcement decisions are
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In contrast to these situations, the jurisdictional confusion arises when EPA
undertakes a regulatory proceeding, but it culminates in a refusal to act. On such
occasions, a considerable overlap can exist between the jurisdiction of the
district court to review a failure to perform a nondiscretionary action, and that
of the court of appeals to review a final action, 7 because it is often easy to frame
a legal challenge to agency inaction in terms of an agency's lack of discretion.88
For example, finding scientific facts based on information in an administrative
record in most instances has a discretionary component to it, 9 but in a given
discretionary. West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302, 310 (3d Cir. 1975) ("Issuance of
a violation notice is thus non-discretionary. However, the decision to enforce a violation is
discretionary under 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(b)."); New England Legal Found., 475 F. Supp. at
433.
87. See Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 661 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
("[O]verlap is conceivable, for instance, where the Administrator acts but, in the view of the
challengers, does not act far enough."). The Oljato court further observed that "[i]f an abuse
of discretion were held to be a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act, failure to perform any
duty, discretionary or nondiscretionary, under the Act would be drawn within the scope of
Section 304." Id. at 663 (emphasis in original).
88. Thus, in NRDC v. Reilly, 976 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1992), petitioner challenged a stay
which the EPA had issued for final standards regulating emissions of radioactive particles. The
court of appeals held that the CAA did not give EPA the power to issue the stay. Arguably,
however, EPA could have claimed that the case belonged in the district court, since it was
premised on EPA's lack of discretion in issuing the stay and on the agency's nondiscretionary
duty to issue the regulations. In fact, the district court had previously ordered EPA to issue the
regulations which, after issuance, the agency had later stayed. See Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 551
F. Supp. 785-89 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
Similarly, in Armco, Inc. v. EPA, 869 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1989), EPA sent a letter objecting
to Ohio's approval of removal credits for a steel facility, and the company petitioned for review
of that letter. EPA based its letter on the position that it could not approve removal credits until
the agency has promulgated regulations. The court of appeals found that it lacked jurisdiction,
stating that "[w]e deem the issuance of the sludge removal regulations to be non-discretionary
functions of USEPA" and that the petition was "an attempt to by-pass original district court
jurisdiction in this case." Id. at 981, 982. The court could just as easily have concluded that it
had jurisdiction to review the objection (assuming that it was a final action, see supra notes 62-
74), and that the effect of the removal regulations on the letter was simply a legal issue which
it must consider in its review.
See also Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 700 F. Supp. 1549 (N.D.
Cal.), vacated, 717 F. Supp. 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1988). In rejecting the Port of Oakland's
argument that the Corps of Engineers did not fail to perform a mandatory duty as required by
§ 1365(a)(2) of the CWA in order for jurisdiction to attach, the court reasoned:
While the Corps may or may not have a mandatory duty to make jurisdictional
determinations over sites, once it makes such a determination, it must do so
correctly. The Corps has a mandatory duty to ascertain the relevant facts, correctly
construe the applicable statutes and regulations, and properly apply the facts to
the law .... Whichever party is right on these legal and factual issues, there can
be no question that it is mandatory, and not discretionary, for the Corps' decisions
to be correct.
Id. at 1554.
89. See Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislation Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in
Protective Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 327, 328 (1991):
The traditional decisionmaking structure of... [environmental] statutes identifies
a single factual prerequisite and predicates regulation on the agency's ability to
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situation the facts in the record may admit of only one conclusion." In that
instance what is normally a discretionary decision by the agency arguably
becomes nondiscretionary. 9' If an agency has decided not to act in such a
situation, the courts must decide whether to treat the Administrator's decision as
discretionary, and thus possibly reviewable in the court of appeals as "final
action," or nondiscretionary and thus reviewable only in the district court.92
An erroneous interpretation of law by the Administrator presents another
situation in which there is potential overlap between district and appellate court
jurisdiction. For example, a petitioner may argue that the Administrator erred by
interpreting a statute's coverage to be less than is statutorily mandated.93 Such
demonstrate that fact with a specified measure of proof. This places a premium
on certainty in the decisionmaking process, which, in turn, encourages parties to
debate the inevitable uncertainty.
90. See NRDC v. EPA, 770 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. Va. 1991) (stating that petitioner alleged
that under existing scientific data on the effects of dioxin on water quality, the Administrator
was required to make "triggering" foundational findings that a revision to the dioxin standard
is necessary).
91. See, e.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 249 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting
argument of NRDC that EPA should have regulated additional pollutants "[d]ue to the lack of
any evidence confirming NRDC's assertions of dangers posed to workers' safety").
92. See NRDC v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In this case petitioner challenged
regulations governing the use of lead in gasoline, arguing that the controls on lead included in
the final EPA regulations were deficient. After noting that its jurisdiction to review the
regulations was proper under § 307 of the CAA, the court of appeals observed that "[f]rom
another point of view... [the] suit was directed at the 'failure of the Administrator to perform
[a nondiscretionary duty].' Id at 1357. That duty was the "refusal to promulgate controls
which, given the information available to him on the health effects of airborne lead, he had no
choice but to promulgate." Id The court then noted that although "[t]his characterization may
rest on an overly broad reading of what Congress intended by 'not discretionary,"' EPA had
initially disputed the power of the court of appeals to hear the case, arguing that the district
court under § 304(a) of the CAA of 1970 was the proper forum. Id.
See also Dow Chemical Co. v. Costle, 480 F. Supp. 315, 319 (E.D. Mich. 1978). In this case
Dow contended that the phrase "shall approve any revision" to a state implementation plan
requires the Administrator to perform a mandatory duty and that § 304 of the CAA of 1977
empowers a lawsuit in the district court for failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty. EPA,
in contrast, "contests that § 304 of the CAA does not apply in this situation as the duties of the
Administrator in reviewing a proposed revision to a state implementation plan are discretionary
and require independent judgment."
93. See Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 661 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Here the court observed:
Section 304 [of the CAA] allows challenges to the Administrator's failure to act,
while § 307 speaks of challenges to his actions. While these appear to involve
separate issues, overlap is conceivable, for instance, where the Administrator acts
but, in the view of the challengers, does not act far enough. If nondiscretionary
duties are involved, the challenge might fairly be said to lie under either § 304 or
§ 307.
Id
The confusing overlap between the two is well-illustrated in Delaware Valley Citizens
Council for Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d 256 (3d Cir. 1991). The court first stated broadly that




alleged error could be termed a "failure to perform a non-discretionary act" that
is reviewable in the district court, or it could be part of the agency's "final
action" that is reviewable only in the court of appeals.94
Thus, a petitioner may characterize allegations that the agency erred in
interpreting a statute or that its action lacks evidentiary support in two plausible
ways: (1) as a challenge to a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act, which lies
in the district court, or (2) as a challenge to final action, which lies in the court
of appeals. Even more vexing for purposes of jurisdiction, a petitioner's
challenge to the validity of a single regulation can encompass both types of
arguments.
For example, in a 1992 case an environmental group sought judicial review of
the Administrator's promulgation of regulations governing stormwater
discharges under the CWA.95 The group challenged the agency's decision to
exempt construction sites of less than five acres from the rules. Because
petitioner claimed that the statute did not allow for exemptions, it could frame
the argument in terms of the agency's failure to perform a nondiscretionary act.
But some past court decisions had upheld similar exemptions under the theory
that agencies may adopt de minimis exemptions grounded in administrative
convenience; 96 thus, petitioner also argued that no evidence in the record
supported an exemption of this size-an argument that the Administrator had
abused his discretion. While the court ultimately accepted the latter argument and
concluded that the five-acre limit was arbitrary and capricious,97 the nature of the
two related arguments illustrates the overlap between the jurisdictional language
in the statutes.
Under § 7607 [or CAA § 307], private parties may seek to correct a plan's failure
to meet the law's requirements by a petition for review filed in the courts of
appeals. Section 7607 allows citizens groups to petition... for relief from an
administrative refusal or failure to insist on an implementation plan reasonably
calculated to meet the requirements of the Act ....
Id. at 266. The court thus indicated that even legal failures to include measures in an
implementation plan are reviewable only in the court of appeals. The court then seemed to
backtrack on this position in the very next paragraph, declaring that "[t]he statutory basis for
private actions based on what is in, or is not in, an approved implementation plan is found in
§ 7607, unless the plan fails to meet an existing standard or limitation imposed under the Act."
Id. at 266-67. Arguably, the court was indicating that in some instances both courts might
possess jurisdiction. See also NRDC v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1990) (deciding water
pollution rule, which provided that states must identify discharging point sources for some but
not all of certain listed waters, was invalid because the statute required that those point sources
be identified for all listed waters).
94. See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env't v. Costle, 610 F. Supp. 106, 111 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(noting that "the distinction between 'the failure to act and the failure to act properly' is not
always clear").
95. NRDC v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1992).
96. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that
"de minimis" principle allowed the Food and Drug Administration to find that the level of
migration into food of a particular chemical is'so negligible as to present no public health or
safety concerns).
97. NRDC v. EPA, 966 F.2d at 1306.
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In sum, the terminology used in the jurisdictional provisions is not self-
defining and overlaps. Thus, an agency's decision not to act, made subsequent
to a regulatory proceeding, arguably could be characterized in a number of ways:
(1) as final action reviewable in the court of appeals; (2) as a failure to perform
a nondiscretionary act, reviewable in the district court; (3) as an abuse of
discretion, reviewable in the court of appeals; or (4) as inaction that does not
involve a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act, in which case no court would
have jurisdiction over the matter. In addition, after the 1990 Amendments to the
CAA, a decision not to act may be a "final decision" that defers performance of
any nondiscretionary statutory action to a later time, now reviewable in the court
of appeals,98 or it could merely amount to an "agency action unreasonably
delayed," over which the district court has jurisdiction.9
As the case law discussed below in this Article demonstrates, the key factors
for determining the category into which the inaction falls include whether the
agency has compiled a sufficient administrative record for judicial review;
whether the challenge to the inaction is framed in terms of statutory
misinterpretation, error in the consideration of evidence, or error in the exercise
of policy discretion; whether the agency has promised further proceedings on the
same subject; and whether the inaction is related to other action which the agency
has taken.
C. The Alternative of Concurrent Jurisdiction
The discussion so far has assumed that ifjurisdiction exists to review agency
inaction, it must lie exclusively either in the district court or the court of appeals.
But the importance of clearly defining the jurisdictional boundaries between the
two courts would greatly diminish if, at least in some instances, both courts
possessed jurisdiction over an issue. For example, if a petitioner alleged that the
Administrator had violated the CAA by approving a state implementation plan
("SIP") which did not contain all the legally required components,' 0 both courts
conceivably could have jurisdiction. The petitioner could file in the district court
under section 304 of the Act, since it is alleging that the Administrator failed to
perform the nondiscretionary duty of ensuring that the plan was complete.
Alternatively, the petitioner could file in the court of appeals under section 307,
since the lawsuit challenges the basis for the Administrator's final action
approving the SIP.
A smattering of opinions have recognized the possibility of concurrent
jurisdiction under the bifurcated judicial review provisions,'0 ' but the few courts
98. CAA § 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2) (1994).
99. CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994).
100. See, e.g., City of Seabrook v. EPA, 659 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981) (Plaintiffs alleged
that various parts of the state's implementation plan failed to comply with the CAA.).
101. See, e.g., Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 1973) (Lewis,
J., concurring) (stating that he was "not prepared to agree that the trial court lacked naked
jurisdiction to entertain this action" but agreeing with majority that the court of appeals had
jurisdiction); NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1337 (1st Cir. 1973) (finding that § 304(a) of
CAA of 1970 provided the authorization for suit against the Administrator, whether brought
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explicitly addressing this issue have rejected it." 2 The courts reason that the
distinction in the statutory language between nondiscretionary action and review
of final action,"0 3 as well as the legislative history of the statutes,'1 4 argue against
a conclusion that concurrent jurisdiction is possible. The decisions also cite the
longstanding judicial policy against concurrent jurisdiction' 5 as well as concerns
over avoiding duplication of judicial procedures and inconsistent decisions.0 6
Accordingly, no court has endeavored to solve the interpretive difficulties
posed by the bifurcated jurisdiction provisions by holding that jurisdiction over
agency inaction is proper in both the district court and the court of appeals.
Instead, courts have sought to devise a test that will determine the proper
jurisdiction in which a plaintiff may bring various challenges to agency inaction.
D. Judicial Tests to Determine Jurisdiction over Agency
Inaction
Given the definitional uncertainty and the use of overlapping statutory terms,
the courts have attempted to draw a practical and sensible dividing line between
the jurisdictional domains of the district court and the court of appeals. As one
court put it, "clear and workable guidelines" are needed for these basic
in district court or in a court of appeals under § 307, and concluding that § 307 simply directed
that certain actions authorized by § 304(a) be brought in one forum rather than the other); see
also Montgomery Envtl. Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 595, 596-97 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declaring
that in NRDC v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975), "this court held that the power to award
attorneys' fees under the citizen suit provision, section 304 ... did not authorize such awards
to litigants seeking judicial review of agency action under section 307(b) ... even where the
same litigation could arguably have been framed as a citizen suit in the district court").
102. See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984); Pennsylvania
Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. EPA, 618 F.2d 991, 995 (3d Cir. 1980); Environmental Defense
Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Costle, 515 F.
Supp. 264, 268 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
103. NRDC v. EPA, 512 F.2d at 1355:
[T]he language and history do not provide a basis for holding, as a general matter,
that section 304 encompasses suits against the Administrator for taking steps
alleged to be misguided or uninformed. Review of the Administrator's exercise
of judgment, or 'discretion,' of course, is available under section 307, which
establishes exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of appeals for actions within its
compass.
(emphasis in original).
104. Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("If
an abuse of discretion were held to be a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act, failure to
perform any duty... would be drawn within the scope of Section 304," an outcome which "is
exactly the result Congress intentionally deleted from the Act.") (emphasis in original).
105. Id. at 660 ("The two suggested forms of action are substantively identical, and it is well
settled that bifurcated jurisdiction between District Court and Court of Appeals over identical
litigation is not favored.").
106. Center for Auto Safety v. EPA, 558 F. Supp. 103, 105 (D.D.C. 1983) (concluding that
jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim was vested exclusively in the court of appeals as "duplicative
litigation is generally to be avoided because it needlessly expends limited judicial resources
while creating the risk of inconsistent decisionmaking").
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jurisdictional grants."7 This Part of the Article discusses how courts have
determined whether an agency's decision to do nothing-inaction-is a final
action allowing judicial review in the court of appeals, or is a failure to perform
a nondiscretionary act, vesting jurisdiction only in the district court. The courts
have applied five different tests to this problem, tests which in a given situation
can result in quite different jurisdictional outcomes.
1. The "Embedded in Final Action" Test
In Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. EPA, °8 perhaps the most cited case
addressing the issue of bifurcated jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit considered a paradigm of agency inaction and crafted the
"embedded in final action" test. As required by the CAA, the Indiana Air
Pollution Control Board submitted a revision of its SIP to EPA. The revised plan
established a ceiling on emissions of sulfur dioxide, but it also provided that a
source would be in compliance if its daily emissions, when averaged over thirty
days, did not exceed the ceiling.
EPA approved the revised plan but in doing so stated that it was "taking no
action on the 30-day averaging compliance concept."'0 9 Citing section 307, two
utilities petitioned for review of that decision in the court of appeals, arguing that
the Administrator had no discretion to refuse to act on the averaging provision.
EPA responded that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction because petitioners
were challenging agency inaction-the failure to approve the thirty-day
averaging provision-rather than any final action by EPA. Thus, according to the
agency, this challenge belonged in the district court under that court's
jurisdiction to compel nondiscretionary action." °
The court rejected EPA's argument. Admitting that the utilities' contention
"brings the petition for review within the literal reach" of jurisdiction over
nondiscretionary action under section 304,"1 the court found that jurisdiction
was properly in the court of appeals because the petitioner's complaint about
agency inaction was "embedded in a challenge to the validity of the
implementation plan."".2 The court did not further explain when agency inaction
would be deemed "embedded" in a larger agency final action over which
jurisdiction in the court of appeals was unquestionably proper. It merely declared
that EPA had announced its failure to act in an order based upon an
administrative record, and that if section 304 applied, the petitioners would have
to proceed simultaneously in the district court (challenging the agency's inaction)
and in the court of appeals (challenging the action which the agency had taken),
a wasteful result. The court also noted that the petitioners had requested the court
to invalidate EPA's order approving the revised state plan without the averaging
107. NRDC v. EPA, 512 F.2d at 1357.
108. 733 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984).






process; they did not ask the court to order EPA action on the thirty-day
compliance provision.'
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also adopted the embedded in final
action test in Kamp v. Hernandez"4 and later followed the test in Abramowitz v.
EPA."5 The two cases were factually similar. In Kamp, EPA approved emission
control measures for an Arizona SIP without requiring the state to demonstrate
that the plan would attain and maintain the national ambient air quality standards.
Similarly, in Abramowitz the petitioner contended that EPA violated the CAA by
approving ozone and carbon dioxide control measures for the Los Angeles region
without determining whether those measures would attain the national ambient
air quality standards." 6
In both cases EPA argued that while its approval of the control measures could
be reviewed in the court of appeals, its inaction-the failure to determine
whether attainment and maintenance would occur-was subject to review only
in the district court. The court of appeals nonetheless found jurisdiction over
both aspects of the agency's decision. It reasoned that "when the challenge to
agency inaction 'is embedded in a challenge to the validity of an implementation
plan,' jurisdiction lies in the circuit court reviewing the implementation plan."" 7
113. Id. at 491.
114. 752 F.2d 1444, 1454 (9th Cir.), modified, 778 F.2d 527 (1985).
115. 832 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1987). The author was one of the attorneys for the plaintiff in
this action.
116. Following Kamp, the Abramowitz court found that the agency's inaction-failing to
determine attainment-was embedded in the action that it did take approving the SIP revision,
and that both aspects of the agency's action were reviewable in the court of appeals under §
307. Id. at 1072.
117. Kamp, 752 F.2d at 1454 (quoting Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. EPA, 733 F.2d 489,
490 (7th Cir. 1984)); Abramowitz, 832 F.2d at 1076. Compare, however, a Ninth Circuit
decision handed down just prior to Kamp, Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549 (9th Cir.
1984), which reached a result arguably in conflict with the outcome under the embedded in
final action test. In Trustees, petitioners sought review of permits issued by EPA under the
CWA, requesting that the court direct EPA to promulgate effluent limitation guidelines before
granting individual permits. The argument was that the permits were invalid because adoption
of the guidelines was a prerequisite to issuing the permits. Under Indiana & Michigan Electric,
the claim about the agency's inaction-the failure to issue guidelines-seemingly was
embedded in its challenge to the permits; indeed, this inaction was the claimed reason for
invalidating the final action taken in granting the permit. The court, however, held that the
plaintiffs' argument "is framed in terms of the EPA's failure to comply with a nondiscretionary
duty to promulgate industry-wide rules," and thus jurisdiction was proper only in the district
court under § 505(a)(2) of the CWA of 1972 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (a)(2)
(1994)). Kamp, 749 F.2d at 558.
There is one possible way to square Trustees with Indiana & Michigan Electric, and thus
with the Kamp case in the Ninth Circuit. The court also held that under the CWA, issuance of
the guidelines was not a prerequisite to issuance of the permits, for permits could be issued
"incorporating 'such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the
provisions of this [Act]' when no limitations or guidelines are yet available." Id. (quoting the
CWA of 1972 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1994)). Once the court reached this
conclusion, it was clear that the failure to issue the guidelines could have no effect on the
permit. Thus, the court might then have been able to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction, since the
agency's inaction was no longer legally "embedded" in the action that the agency did take, the
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2. The "Remedy" Test
A second test, adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources v. EPA
("Commonwealth"),"8 determines jurisdiction over suits challenging agency
inaction by focusing on the relief requested by the petitioner. In Commonwealth,
EPA adopted standards of performance for new sources of water pollution in the
coal-mining industry. When the agency announced its decision, however, it
deferred the promulgation of regulations covering one type of discharge from
these same sources." 9 Petitioners challenged this inaction, contending that the
Administrator lacked the authority to defer promulgation of standards for this
type of discharge. 2 '
The court focused on the remedy requested by petitioner. It observed that
petitioner "asked not to suspend regulations, but to order the promulgation of
completely new and different regulations.'' Concluding that "an allegation of
inadequacy of a set of regulations is quite different from an allegation that a
needed regulation was nonexistent," the court held that it lacked jurisdiction
under section 509 of the CWA. According to the court, only the district court
possessed jurisdiction over the latter allegation.'
Thus, under the Commonwealth court's remedy test, appellate jurisdiction over
agency inaction turns on the type of relief requested by the petitioner. For
example, if the petitioner challenges the agency's failure to regulate a class of
sources, jurisdiction will depend upon whether the petitioner seeks to set aside
a part of an adopted regulation or asks the court to order EPA to promulgate
additional regulations."
issuance of the permits.
118. 618 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1980).
119. The regulations would have covered so-called "post-mining discharges," which are
polluting discharges from closed or abandoned mines. Id. at 993-94.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 997.
122. Id. at 996.
123. Thus, the Commonwealth court was able to distinguish an earlier Third Circuit decision
which held that the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the Administrator's decision to
exempt certain of petitioner's competitors from a set of effluent limitations. Id. at 996
(distinguishing American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977)). In this
earlier case, known as "AISIII," petitioners challenged the Administrator's decision to exempt
plants in the Mahoning River Valley region of Eastern Ohio from a set of effluent limitations
establishing the "best practical control technology currently available" for certain
manufacturing processes within the iron and steel industry. Without commenting on any
jurisdictional issues raised by this claim, the court of appeals in AISIII addressed the merits
of the claim, concluding that EPA had not violated the APA in promulgating the regulations.
AISI1, 568 F.2d at 294. The Commonwealth court distinguished this earlier case on the basis
that:
The AISHI petitioners did not allege that the Administrator failed to promulgate
at all but contended that his regulations improperly excluded a group of
competitors to which they should have been extended. Their objection was to the
imposition of the promulgated regulation on them, while their competitors
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Other courts, however, have either expressly or impliedly refused to adopt the
"remedy" distinction found determinative by the Third Circuit. In Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Costle,"4 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed effluent
limitations for existing point sources in the same industry that later would be the
subject of the regulations at issue in Commonwealth. " Petitioners challenged the
exclusion of point source discharges from inactive surface mines during
reclamation and revegetation, and from underground mines after coal production
had ceased. The court of appeals, however, did not even mention a jurisdictional
problem in reaching the merits, concluding that the Administrator's decision to
create the exclusion was correct. It found that the Administrator did not act
arbitrarily in failing to meet the statutory deadline by promulgating regulations
dealing with post-mining discharges, rejecting petitioners' contention that the
court should remand the regulations for prompt inclusion of inactive mines." 6
Additionally, the holding and reasoning of other decisions are inconsistent with
the Commonwealth court's remedy test. They emphasize the need to avoid
piecemeal judicial review, where the court of appeals would review what the
Administrator has done and the district court would review the Administrator's
inaction." 7
remained exempt.
Commonwealth, 618 F.2d at 996-97.
124. 604 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1979).
125. The court in Commonwealth had reviewed performance standards for new sources in
that industry, while Consolidation Coal concerned standards for existing sources.
126. Consolidation Coal Co., 604 F.2d at 251-52. It did note, however, that to the extent that
petitioners were arguing that the Administrator acted illegally on the basis of information not
included in the administrative record, or for the imposition of a judicial deadline for
promulgating the regulations, the case "would more appropriately be brought in a district
court." Id. at 252.
The Third Circuit in Commonwealth first distinguished Consolidation Coal on the basis that
the court was "not confronted with a petitioner's request that the EPA be ordered to promulgate
new or different regulations." Commonwealth, 618 F.2d at 996. That conclusion seems
inaccurate, however, given the Consolidation Coal court's statement that petitioners had sought
a remand of the regulations for inclusion of inactive mines, which would have been a "new or
different regulation." Later in the opinion, the cqurt in Commonwealth more forthrightly noted
that to the extent its opinion was inconsistent with Consolidation Coal, it declined to follow
that holding. Id. at 997.
127. See also Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control Dist. v. EPA, 31 F.3d 1179 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (Without discussing any jurisdictional question, the court of appeals reviewed
petitioner's contentions that final rules failed to include marine vessels in transit among the
regulated sources.); City of Seabrook v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1981). In City of
Seabrook, plaintiffs challenged the Administrator's approval and conditional approval of
revisions to the Texas SIP under the CAA. Plaintiffs argued that because they were
complaining in part of what the Administrator failed to do-that is, to promulgate plan
revisions for Texas-there was no final action and thus no jurisdiction in the court of appeals.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, declaring that it wished to avoid a ruling that "would result in an
impractical process of piecemeal review that Congress could not have intended in §§ 304 and
307." Id. at 1373. Although the court did not mention Commonwealth, it clearly rejected the
reasoning of that decision.
Additionally, the district court's decision in Maine v. Thomas, 690 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Me.
1988), aff'd, 874 F.2d 883 (Ist Cir. 1989), is also inconsistent with Commonwealth, although
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Interestingly, two years after the Seventh Circuit adopted the embedded in final
action test,18 that court seemed to restrict that test's scope by making its
application turn on the remedy requested. In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA,129
EPA took three separate steps. The agency (1) disapproved a proposed revision
to the Indiana SIP (1980 APC-3), (2) suspended consideration of a related plan
amendment (1979 APC-9), and (3) later approved part of a third plan revision
(1981 APC-9). It also, however, disapproved part of this third revision because
it did not contain "reasonably available control technology" as required by the
CAA.13
0
The court found that the steelmaking company's challenge to EPA's first
action suspending consideration of 1979 APC-9 was reviewable under section
307, citing Indiana & Michigan Electric without elaboration.' It also considered
the steel company's challenge to EPA's third action, the disapproval of 1981
APC-9. However, another petitioner, an environmental group, had challenged
this third action, the approval of 1981 APC-9, on the basis that the approved plan
revision was not sufficiently stringent. The environmental group argued that the
revision should be treated as an interim rule until a later rule including more
stringent provisions was promulgated.' 2
The court of appeals found that if EPA's refusal to act as the citizens requested
was a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act, then only the district court would
have jurisdiction over this claim. The court distinguished Indiana & Michigan
Electric, characterizing it as a case in which the order was challenged because
the agency "failed to do something it was duty-bound to do."' In Bethlehem
Steel, however, the order "has no consequences" harmful to the environmental
group; the group just "wants more in the future."' 3 4 If the EPA disapproval had
"tainted the remedial parts of the [EPA] order in the group's eyes," then the case
would have been different and the court of appeals could have heard it under the
dominion of Indiana & Michigan Electric."'
once again that earlier decision is not mentioned directly. EPA had earlier completed a
rulemaking on protection of visibility in federal parks and wilderness areas in which it
specifically reserved for future phases of certain categories of regulations. Several years later,
plaintiffs filed suit in the district court to compel promulgation of those additional regulations.
The district court, however, found that it had no jurisdiction because the prior deferral of the
additional regulations was a "final action" and reviewable only in the court of appeals under
§ 307 of the CAA. Id. at 1111. Under the "remedy" test, because plaintiffs were not seeking
to set aside the earlier regulations and were requesting only promulgation of new ones,
jurisdiction would lie in the district court.
128. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. EPA, 733 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984); see supra text
accompanying notes 108-15.
129. 782 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1986).
130. Id. at 650.
131. Id at 649.
132. Id. at 654.
133. Id. at 655.
134. Id.
135. Id. The court also stated that the administrative record contained nothing about the
feasibility of the additional steps requested by the citizens group. Id.
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3. The "Rulemaking Cycle" Test
The next three tests stem from one piece of litigation, NRDC v. Administrator,
EPA. '36 In a part of the opinion vacated when the environmental petitioners
subsequently moved for voluntary dismissal of their petition after the case had
been decided, the three judges on the panel explicated very different approaches
to deciding the question of judicial jurisdiction to review agency inaction.
In NRDC v. Administrator, the Administrator had adopted revisions to the
national ambient air quality standard for particulates. Initially, a draft of the
proposal released for public comment had indicated that the Administrator was
proposing to defer a decision on whether to adopt a standard for fine particles
that would address visibility impairment. The draft also stated that the
Administrator was continuing to evaluate alternative approaches to the reduction
of acid deposition.' 37 At the adoption of the final rule revising the particulate
matter standards, the Administrator announced that he would "proceed with
consideration of a visibility based standard in parallel with work on acid
deposition.' ' 38 Accordingly, on that same day EPA published an advanced notice
of proposed rulemaking "soliciting public comment on the appropriateness of a
separate secondary fine particle standard designed to protect visibility."'39 The
advanced notice, however, did not propose a particulate matter standard to deal
with acid deposition. 4 0
An environmental group sought review of the Administrator's decisions
regarding visibility and acid deposition in the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia Circuit, and the court issued three separate opinions. In a concurring
and dissenting opinion, Judge Edwards concluded that jurisdiction was properly
in the court of appeals under section 307(b) because both parts of the agency's
decision, that dealing with visibility and that concerning acid deposition,
constituted final action. In his view the fact that EPA had completed the standard
rulemaking cycle and reached a conclusion was determinative and final.
Although EPA had failed to decide in the final rule whether it would regulate
particulates to protect visibility and to prevent acid deposition, the agency
nonetheless had taken final action on those subjects within the meaning of
section 307.'
136. 902 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam), vacated in part and dismissed in part by
921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
137. Id. at 966.
138. Id. at 982 (citing Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standard for
Particulate Matter, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,646-47 (1987)).
139. Id. (citing Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Particulate
Matter, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,647 (1987)).
140. Id.
141. The court stated:
EPA's failure to take action in a final rule, either by postponing a decision or
failing altogether to address an issue raised in comments, does not turn a petition
for review into an action for failure to comply with a mandatory duty such that the
district court alone has jurisdiction.
Id. at 992. Judge Edwards carefully noted that his conclusion about jurisdiction did not imply
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While the court in NRDC v. Administrator undertook judicial review after EPA
had concluded an informal rulemaking, the logic of the "rulemaking cycle" test
is not necessarily limited to rulemaking proceedings. The focus of Judge
Edwards's opinion is on two facts: (1) the agency had completed a rulemaking
by issuing a final rule after a notice and comment period, and (2) the agency had
clearly indicated that it had considered the disputed issues during the rulemaking
process. 4 2 Thus, the rulemaking cycle test could apply outside the context of
rulemaking, provided that the agency had completed a set of procedural steps,
had afforded the parties an opportunity to make their positions known on issues,
and had actively considered the disputed issues before deciding not to act.
In his opinion Judge Edwards reasoned that the various courts of appeals "have
been consistent in saying that jurisdiction always lies under section 307 after the
agency has completed a rulemaking and the challenge is to that rulemaking."'43
This statement, however, is overbroad. For example, in jurisdictions following
the embedded in final action test to review a rulemaking,'44 the inaction
challenged must be embedded in EPA's affirmative action for jurisdiction to
attach in the court of appeals. If the inaction is not embedded, then jurisdiction
to review the inaction would not attach even if the agency had completed a
rulemaking cycle and had considered the issue during that cycle.'45 Similarly,
under the remedy test, 46 a court of appeals will have jurisdiction if the petitioner
seeks to set aside a specific part of the rule adopted, but not if it seeks to compel
further rulemaking. In contrast, the rulemaking cycle test would place all such
issues under the jurisdiction of the court of appeals as long as they were
considered during the rulemaking process.'47
Other courts have adopted approaches consistent with the rulemaking cycle test
without directly articulating it.'48 However, the principal case cited by Judge
a decision about the substantive merits of the court's review, for the agency's decision to defer
adoption of a particulate standard was not necessarily inconsistent with the agency's legal
obligations under the CAA. Id. at 993.
142. Id. at 989.
143. Id. at 991.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 108-17.
145. In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Silberman explicitly noted that Judge
Edwards's approach "goes far beyond the notion that our appellate jurisdiction covers issues
'embedded' in a final rule." NRDC v. Administrator, 902 F.2d at 996 n. 1.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 118-35.
147. For example, in Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. EPA, 618 F.2d 991 (3d Cir.
1980) ("Commonwealth"), the leading case adopting the remedy test, the court found no
jurisdiction where petitioners attacked the agency's refusal to regulate discharges from inactive
mines when it adopted final rules for a category of point sources. In contrast, under a
"rulemaking cycle" approach, the court would presumably find that the court of appeals has
jurisdiction to review that inaction.
148. For example, in Vermont v. Thomas, 850 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1988), Vermont adopted
provisions for its SIP which addressed the problem of regional haze. When EPA reviewed
those provisions pursuant to the CAA, it issued a final ruling taking "no action" on those parts
of the SIP aimed at controlling regional haze. Without discussion of any jurisdictional
question, the court of appeals reached the merits and affirmed EPA's decision. In doing so, it
rejected petitioners' claim that EPA's "no action" ruling deprived Vermont of a definitive
decision on the merits of the proposal, an argument that plainly cast EPA's decision in terms
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Edwards in support of the test, Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, '49 is not fully consistent
with the rulemaking cycle approach. In Sierra Club petitioners sought review of
EPA's decision, at the end of a rulemaking, that refused to place strip mines on
the list of air pollution sources subject to regulations governing fugitive
emissions. Explaining that it had not made a final decision on the issue, EPA
declared that it would consider the matter further over the next several months. 5 '
Plaintiffs challenged EPA's decision to defer adoption of the rules. The court
of appeals first decided that it had jurisdiction under section 307 of the CAA
because the petition challenged EPA's list of sources as promulgated and the
inclusion of strip mines was clearly an issue in the rulemaking. I' Then, however,
the court narrowed the issues it would review, declaring that the question of
whether the CAA required EPA to regulate strip mines was not before it. s2
Instead, the court examined only the agency's reasons for deferring action in
order to determine whether the delay was inconsistent with the agency's
discretion under the applicable statutory scheme.' 3 In other words, although
Sierra Club at first appeared to endorse a full "rulemaking cycle" approach, it
limited the scope of the available review by excluding arguments that the CAA
required EPA to regulate strip mines.
of agency inaction. Id. at 104.
Similarly, in Maine v. Thomas, 874 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1989), yet another case dealing with
regional haze, appellant sued in the district court to compel EPA to promulgate regulations
combating regional haze. Earlier, the agency had concluded a rulemaking in which it deferred
the adoption of rules on this subject. In ruling that the district court lacked jurisdiction because
the agency was not under a nondiscretionary obligation to act, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals explained that had plaintiff challenged EPA's inaction at the conclusion of the initial
rulemaking, the court of appeals would have had jurisdiction to consider the matter. Id. at 887.
Judge Edwards cited both of these cases in his concurring opinion in NRDC v. Administrator,
902 F.2d at 962.
Other decisions also support the rationale of the "rulemaking cycle" test. In NRDC v.
Thomas, 689 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 885 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1989), the district
court reviewed the Administrator's decision that he lacked sufficient information to determine
which pollutants were hazardous under former § 112 of the CAA. The court noted that this
decision might have been found to be an abuse of discretion on review before a court of
appeals, thus implying that the Administrator's decision was "final action" that was reviewable
in the court of appeals under § 307(b). Id. at 258; see also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782
F.2d 645, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1986) (Swygert, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder the clear language of
section 307, even when the sole claim is that agency action is invalid because the agency [rule]
did not go far enough, that claim properly belongs in the courts of appeals.").
149. 715 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The decision is critiqued in Jacqualee Story,
Administrative Agency Inaction: Misapplication of the Finality Doctrine-Sierra Club v.
Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1983), 59 WASH. L. REV. 993 (1984).
150. Sierra Club, 715 F.2d at 655.
151. Id. at 657.
152. Id. at 657 n.29. The court also noted the Sierra Club's argument that the court should
treat the delay by EPA as "equivalent to a decision not to regulate and subject to review as
such." ld. It then concluded, in reasoning that is less than clear, that because the Sierra Club
admitted it had no other evidence to place before the agency in the future, this issue "collapses"
into the question that the court would review: whether the omission of strip mines from the
rulemaking list was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 657-58 n.29.
153. Id. at 659.
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Thus, although the Sierra Club had argued in the rulemaking that the CAA
required EPA to regulate strip mines, if the Sierra Club wished to raise this issue
in litigation, it presumably could have done so only in the district court under
section 304. In contrast, Judge Edwards found such legal issues reviewable when
he reached the merits in NRDC v. Administrator. 15 4 The approach of the Sierra
Club court thus is narrower than the rulemaking cycle test advocated by Judge
Edwards.'55
In sum, the rulemaking cycle test advocated by Judge Edwards would give the
court of appeals jurisdiction over all legal questions that were placed at issue in
a rulemaking (or other similar) proceeding, regardless of whether that proceeding
ended in action or inaction by the agency. As we shall now see, however, the test
is not fully followed in the District of Columbia Circuit. Under the rulemaking
cycle test, the court in NRDC v. Administrator would have concluded that it had
jurisdiction over both the visibility and acid deposition issues, but Judge Wald
concluded that the court had no jurisdiction over the visibility issue.
4. The "Constructive Final Action" Test
A fourth approach to jurisdiction over agency inaction is found in Judge
Wald's opinion in NRDC v. Administrator. Judge Wald reasoned that agency
inaction can sometimes be deemed "constructive final action" and thus within the
jurisdiction of the court of appeals. The focus of the test is on the facts
underlying the actual stage of the agency's decisionmaking, rather than on
completion of a rulemaking cycle.
Under the constructive final action test, an explicit decision not to revise a
national ambient air quality standard would be considered final and would fall
within the court of appeals' jurisdiction.'56 Although such a decision not to act
is subject to later revision, for purposes of a given rulemaking it is constructively
final. Alternatively, at the end of a given rulemaking the agency "may stand
mute, indicating neither that a revision is contemplated nor that a decision
154. In NRDC v. Administrator, EPA, 902 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam), vacated
inpart and dismissed inpart by 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991), Judge Edwards noted that EPA
had identified visibility impairment and acidic deposition as "known adverse effects."
Accordingly, he concluded that the Administrator "was required" by § 109 of the CAA to select
a level to protect the public from visibility impairment and acidic deposition. He would have
remanded the matter to the agency and instructed it to propose and finalize regulations
addressing visibility impairment and acidic deposition. Id. at 994. Thus, given the agency's
admission in an earlier proposal that visibility impairment and acid deposition had "welfare
effects," id. at 981, Judge Edwards showed no hesitancy in reviewing whether the CAA
required the agency to regulate those two effects.
155. The discussion in Sierra Club of the appropriate remedy for a violation is also puzzling.
The court reviewed the administrative record and determined that the record was "inadequate
to support EPA's action." Sierra Club, 715 F.2d at 661. Despite this determination, it next
concluded that "at this point" it could not find that the agency had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously, id, a conclusion which presumably means that petitioner was not entitled to any
relief. However, the court then remanded the matter to EPA to "reconsider" whether strip mines
should be added to the list. Id.
156. NRDC v. Administrator, 902 F.2d at 983.
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against revision has been reached."' 5 7 Here, too, Judge Wald would deem the
action final, reasoning that the result of such agency inaction is not different than
a situation where the agency states that a revision of the standards is
inappropriate."5 8 Thus, in each situation-an explicit determination not to revise
or agency "muteness" at the completion of rulemaking-Judge Wald would reach
the same outcome as the rulemaking cycle approach, though by other means.'59
Judge Wald, however, parts ways with the rulemaking cycle approach in a third
situation: when at the conclusion of rulemaking, the agency indicates that it is
still actively considering taking action. By explicitly leaving open a window for
possible future action, the agency's decision not to act is, under her approach,
not constructively final. Thus, under the constructive final action test, the
circumstances of the particular situation will dictate whether the agency's
inaction amounts to final action, with jurisdiction proper in the court of appeals,
or is merely a step on the way toward future final action, in which case the court
of appeals lacks jurisdiction. 6 '
Judge Wald then applied her test to the visibility and acid deposition issues at
issue in the NRDC v. Administrator case. As to visibility, she emphasized that
the agency "remains technically engaged in at least the foreplay of [the] formal
rulemaking" cycle because, at the time EPA completed the rulemaking, it had
published a separate advanced notice of proposed rulemaking to address
visibility. 6' Thus, because EPA announced that it was still actively considering
future action, it did not take final action for purposes of judicial review.
Judge Wald reached the opposite conclusion with respect to acid deposition,
however, concluding that the agency's decision was final and subject to
immediate judicial review in the court of appeals. The distinguishing factor here
was EPA's statement that it had deferred taking action indefinitely on acid
157. Id.
158. Id. at 984.
159. Judge Wald also indicated that jurisdiction in the court of appeals would attach where
(1) there is evidence that the agency is simply not presenting its views honestly and is hiding
a final decision not to act behind a wall of silence, or (2) the agency "may have failed to act
with regard to one or a few interconnected parts of an overall plan," ia,--the embedded in final
action approach.
160. Id. Judge Silberman's dissent in the case termed this approach as one of "constructive
final action." Id. at 995. He also categorized Judge Edwards's rulemaking cycle approach as
a constructive final action approach. Id. The term, however, better fits Judge Wald's approach,
for she focuses on facts to determine under what circumstances preliminary agency inaction
should be deemed a "constructive" final decision. Judge Edwards's approach, on the other
hand, is process-oriented and would make all issues final that were considered during the
rulemaking proceeding.
161. Id. at 986. Judge Wald distinguished Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, the principal decision
which Judge Edwards cites in his concurring opinion to support the rulemaking cycle approach,
on the ground that the agency in that case had actually decided not to include strip mines on
the list of sources. Id. at 986 n.9. In contrast, she concluded that in the present case the issuance
of the advance notice of proposed rulemaking "suggests that EPA is moving, however glacially,
towards a final decision." Id. (emphasis in original). But in Sierra Club, just as in NRDC v.
Administrator with respect to visibility, EPA had explicitly stated that it was continuing to
consider whether to add strip mines to the list. See Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653, 655
(D.C. Cir. 1983); see also supra text accompanying notes 141-47.
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deposition because it lacked the adequate scientific understanding. Furthermore,
when it refused action, EPA was already ten years beyond the statutory deadline
established for agency action by the CAA. 62 Given this deadline, Judge Wald
concluded that EPA's inaction "is effectively a final decision not to revise in this
NAAQS revision cycle."' 163
Thus, under the constructive final action test, whether EPA has taken final
action depends on the totality of circumstances underlying the agency's
decisionmaking and upon the statutory obligations, including deadlines for
action, imposed upon it. This approach is consistent with a few other decisions
in which courts have concluded that long delays can turn the agency's inaction
into constructive final action for purposes ofjudicial review. 64
5. The "Actual Final Decision" Test
Finally, a fifth test takes a literal approach to determining when final action has
occurred and accords significantly more deference to the agency's refusal to act.
In NRDC v. Administrator, 6 Judge Silberman rejected both the constructive
final action and rulemaking cycle tests. He emphasized that the statutory term
"final action" literally suggests that agency inaction is not reviewable at all,
66
and that jurisdiction in the court of appeals is "anchored in an actual... final
decision."' 67 Under Judge Silberman's approach, which I term the "actual final
decision" test, "when the agency has failed to decide, no matter how 'close' the
agency is to [making] that decision,' 65 the matter is unreviewable 69
162. Id. at 988.
163. Id "NAAQS" refers to National Ambient Air Quality Standards. The opinion goes on
to state that "[t]he agency's protestations of its open mind and continuing study are, without
more, insufficient evidence that in this rulemaking, EPA's decision is anything but one not to
establish an acid deposition standard as a result of this review and revision cycle." Id.
164. See, e.g., Scott v. Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 996 (7th Cir. 1984) ("We believe that, if
a state fails over a long period of time to submit proposed TMDL's, this prolonged failure may
amount to the 'constructive submission' by that state of no TMDL's."); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("At some point administrative
delay amounts to a refusal to act, with sufficient finality and ripeness to permit judicial
review."); Alaska Center for the Env't v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422, 1429 (W.D. Wash. 1991);
see also Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Commissioner, FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 32 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (citing Environmental Defense Fund, 428 F.2d at 1093, and concluding that when
delay is extremely lengthy or when exigent circumstances render it equivalent to a final denial
of petitioners' request, "the court can undertake review as though the agency had denied the
requested relief and can order an agency to either act or to provide a reasoned explanation for
its failure to act").
165. NRDC v. Administrator, EPA, 902 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated in part and
dismissed in part by 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
166. Id. at 995.
167. Id. at 997.
168. Id.
169. Judge Silberman did recognize two limited exceptions to this general approach. First,
review is allowable "when we thought the record indicated that the agency has cloaked a final
decision-even a decision not to act-from the public." Id. at 995. The authority cited for this
exception was Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1983), a decision which Judge
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Applying the approach to both the visibility and acid rain proceedings
conducted by EPA, Judge Silberman found both unreviewable. In the case of
visibility, EPA had taken preliminary action in the form of a lapsed advanced
notice of proposed rulemaking, and since it was unknown how the agency would
act in the future, no final action had occurred. 170 Furthermore, the acid deposition
proceedings were "virtually indistinguishable from the visibility standard.' 17'
Because the agency was not "standing idle" on the matter but was "moving,
albeit slowly, towards a final decision,' 7. the court of appeals lacked
jurisdiction.
Judge Silberman's approach thus focuses on the agency's characterization of
where it stands in the regulatory process and what it has formally decided, rather
than on what procedures the agency has completed. It is closely related to Judge
MacKinnon's dissent in Sierra Club, 17 which found that EPA had not taken final
action on regulating strip mines when it omitted strip mines from rules which it
had adopted. Judge MacKinnon reasoned that "[t]here is absolutely nothing in
the record to support a statement that the Administrator has made any such
decision" on strip mines," emphasizing that the agency was prudent in deciding
to compile additional data "before it embarks on imposing controls and
regulations in what is essentially a new field, that is, the nationwide regulation
of the emission of dust (fugitive emissions) from strip mines.' 75 In both cases,
the agency's characterization of where it stands in its decisionmaking process
would control for purposes of judicial review.
IV. IDENTIFYING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
As the discussion in the previous Part demonstrates, the courts have adopted
an array of approaches to determining whether inaction is reviewable and, if so,
whether the district court or the court of appeals possesses jurisdiction. The
decisions, however, have often left practitioners bewildered about where to file
an action and have given rise to a significant amount of litigation over
jurisdiction.
The various judicial approaches to the bifurcated jurisdictional review
provisions must be measured against two sets of criteria. First, the legislative
history of the jurisdictional provisions reveals certain indications of Congress's
intent in enacting them. This Part of the Article examines the legislative histories
of the CAA and CWA to determine congressional intent. Second, the
jurisdictional provisions plainly implicate a number of policies which the courts
Silberman termed a "stretch." NRDC v. Administrator, 902 F.2d at 995. See supra text
accompanying notes 141-47. He also seemed to recognize the validity of the "embedded in
final action" approach by noting that the "constructive final action" and "rulemaking cycle"
approaches go "far beyond" that notion. NRDC v. Administrator, 902 F.2d at 996 n.1.
170. NRDC v. Administrator, 902 F.2d at 997.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 998.
173. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
174. Id. at 661.
175. Id. at 662.
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have found important to determining their meaning, policies which this Article
identifies in the following Part.
A. The Original Provisions
The legislative history of the jurisdictional provisions included in the CAA
Amendments of 1970 and the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 is relatively
limited. 76 The history almost entirely centers on the 1970 changes to the CAA,
as Congress explicitly modeled the jurisdictional provisions in the 1972
Amendments to the Water Pollution Control Act on the earlier CAA
amendments. 77 Despite the paucity of history, however, some conclusions can
be drawn.
Section 304 originated in the Senate, as the House bill proposing clean air
legislation contained no authorization for citizen suits.'78 The legislative history
of the Senate's consideration of this section focuses almost entirely on the
provision allowing citizens to bring enforcement suits against private polluters,
rather than on the judicial review provisions in which the agency would be the
defendant. The original provision in the Senate bill did not limit the district
court's jurisdiction to suits alleging the Administrator's failure to perform
nondiscretionary action. Rather, the Administrator was subject to suit for the
"failure of the Secretary to exercise ... any duty established by this Act,' 79 a
provision not limited to situations in which the Administrator lacked any
discretion. The legislative report accompanying the bill passed by the Senate
merely stated that citizens could bring suit against the Administrator to force
action, and that those suits were not limited to enforcement of emission
limitations. 8 '
176. The legislative history has been compiled for all amendments to the CAA and CWA
since 1970 that are relevant to the interpretation of the jurisdictional provisions. See
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 (1993) [hereinafter 1990
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1977 (1978) [hereinafter 1977 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY];
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970 (1974) [hereinafter 1970
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 (1973) [hereinafter 1972 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY].
177. H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. at 133 (1972), reprinted in 1972 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 820 ("Section 505 closely follows the concepts
utilized in section 304 of the CAA.").
178. H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91 st Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1970), reprinted in 1970 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 205.
179. S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 304(a) (1970) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1970
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 614 (Suit may be brought "where
there is alleged a failure of the Secretary to exercise (i) his authority to enforce standards or
orders established under this Act; or (ii) any duty established by this Act.").
180. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1970), reprinted in 1970
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 438-39 ("The Committee bill would
provide in the citizen suit provision that actions will lie against the Secretary for failure to
exercise his duties under the Act, including his enforcement duties."); id. at 64-65, reprinted
in 1970 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 464-65 ("The actions may be
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Various interested parties objected to the breadth of the wording in the bill,
fearing that it would authorize a flood of citizen suits against the Administrator
which could interfere with the administration of the Act.' Thereafter, the
Conference Committee amended the citizen suit provision to refer only to "any
act or duty ... which is not discretionary.'.. A floor sponsor of the bill indicated
that suits brought against the Administrator are limited to actions in which the
plaintiff alleges that the Administrator "fail[ed] ... to perform mandatory duties
imposed by statute."'8 3
This amendment was intended to narrow the scope of citizen suits in the
district court. The final phrase---"any act or duty . . . which is not
discretionary"-could encompass a wide variety of situations in which parties
contend that either the evidence on an issue or the statutory language deprives
the Administrator of discretion. The comment on the floor, however, seems to
brought against any person... where there is an alleged violation of any of its provisions, or
against the Secretary where he fails to enforce any standards or orders established under the Act
or to compel him to exercise any duty imposed upon him under the Act.").
Although the legislation did not restrict suits against the Administrator to actions that were
intended to enforce specific standards against pollution sources, some of the discussion
assumed that citizen suits against the Administrator were only intended to compel such
enforcement actions. See Letter from Elliott Richardson, Secretary, Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, to Hon. Jennings Randolph, Chairman, Committee on Public Works
(Nov. 17, 1970), reprinted in 1970 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at
215 (referring to "the authorization of citizen suits against the Secretary to force him to take
enforcement action in a particular case" and asserting that such actions would "distortf
enforcement priorities that are essential to an effective national control strategy").
181. See Memoranda Attached to Letter from Thomas C. Mann, President, Automobile
Manufacturers Ass'n, to Hon. Edmund S. Muskie (Aug. 27, 1970), reprinted in 1970
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 725 ("No reason has been suggested
why, in the absence of citizen suits, the Secretary would fail to perform his duties under the Act
... ."), 729 ("A mere enumeration of some of the types of private suits which might be filed
against the Secretary requiring his exercise of any 'duty' under the Act illustrates the
complexity and interference with the administrative process inherent in this authorization.").
182. H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1970), reprinted in 1970 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 183. Even after this amendment, members of
Congress continued to view the citizen suit provision chiefly in terms of what effect it would
have on government enforcement actions against private polluters:
A provision which has received a lot of attention deals with citizen suits. The
legislation will permit such suits against polluters as well as against the
Administrator. However, citizen suits against the Administrator will be limited to
those duties which are mandatory under the legislation and the suits will not
extend to those areas of enforcement with regard to which the Administrator has
discretion.
116 CONG. REc. 42,520 (1970) (statement of Mr. Staggers), reprinted in 1970 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 112.
183. See 116 CONG. REC. 42,393 (1970) (statement of Mr. Spong), reprinted in 1970
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 147 ("The conference substitute
retains the Senate provision for citizen suits against violators, although suits against the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency are limited to actions in which there
is an alleged failure by the Administrator to perform mandatory duties imposed by the
statute.").
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indicate that Congress intended the amendment to have a narrower purpose: to
limit citizen suits to situations where a statute on its face requires the
Administrator to act. Under this construction, citizen suits would not be viable
when a plaintiff alleges that (1) given the requisite scientific evidence, the
Administrator could reach only one conclusion about a factual issue, and (2)
based on this conclusion, the statute then admitted of only one course of action.
The legislative history of the 1972 Amendments to the Water Pollution Control
Act contains few references to the jurisdictional provisions, and these references
largely emphasize that section 505 of the proposed legislation was closely
patterned after section 304 of the CAA Amendments of 1970. 184 The history,
however, does indicate that a citizen may not sue when the Administrator's
actions are discretionary and that the citizen suit provision was intended only for
situations in which the Administrator is compelled by law to act." 5 This history
thus seems to confirm that Congress intended for the district court's jurisdiction
over citizen suits to encompass only situations in which the court interprets the
statute to determine whether it requires the Administrator to act. It would not
authorize the court to decide whether the evidence before the Administrator, if
interpreted in a certain way, might then give rise to a nondiscretionary duty to
act.
One broader point evident from the history of the 1972 CWA Amendments,
however, is the congressional intent to expand public participation in the
regulatory process through the use of citizen suits. Tracking statements made in
the legislative history of the 1970 CAA Amendments, 8 6 the history of the 1972
Amendments stresses encouragement of public participation in the
184. The closeness between the two sections even extends to the legislative history, where
some of the language explaining the citizen suit provisions in the Conference Report on the
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments is identical to that found in the Conference Report
on the CAA two years earlier. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 80-81 (1971),
reprinted in 1972 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 1498-99.
185. This limitation was clearly explained in a statement before Congress by Rep. Staggers:
Citizen suits may be instituted against the administrator only for failure to act
where he must. In other words wherever he is given discretion in the act, he may
not be sued. He may be sued only for those matters imposed in the bill upon the
administrator as a matter of law.
116 CONG. REC. 42,522 (1970), reprinted in 1970 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 176, at 117.
186. 116 CONG. REc. 42,382 (1970) (statement of Mr. Muskie), reprinted in 1970
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 127 (The bill extended the concept
of public participation to the enforcement process. The citizen suits authorized in this
legislation would apply important pressure. Although the Senate did not advocate these suits
as the best way to achieve enforcement, it was clear that they should be an effective tool.); see
also Statement of Sen. Muskie, 116 CONG. REc. 42,387 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie),
reprinted in 1970 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 138 ("[T]his bill
provides for other participation by citizens in various ways. We regard that as a key element
in the successful prosecution of air pollution goals which this bill undertakes."); 116 CONG.
REC. 33,117 (1970) (statement of Mr. Cooper), reprinted in 1970 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 176, at 387 ("The committee bill also breaks new ground in extending
public participation, an essential element throughout the act, to enforcement proceedings.").
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implementation of the new water pollution controls.' 7 One cannot, of course,
give too much credence to general statements emphasizing public participation
when deciding on specific interpretations of sections 304 and 505, but the
statements do suggest that an unduly narrow construction of citizen rights to
bring suit under both Acts might conflict with this congressional goal.'
B. The 1977.Amendments
The legislative histories of the 1977 Amendments to both the CAA and CWA
add almost nothing to the understanding of the jurisdictional review provisions.
As noted above,' 9 the Amendments did not make any important substantive
changes regarding jurisdiction to sections 505 and 509 of the CWA. The House
bill amending the CAA, House Bill 6161, did amend section 307 of the Act to
add the important final action limitation, and the Senate acceded to that
amendment in Conference Committee.'90 The legislative history, however, does
not explain what Congress intended by this new language.' 9 '
187. See, e.g., Senator Cooper's statement at the Senate Debate:
A ninth major element of the bill before us is the provision for public
participation throughout all procedural activities established under the bill. Public
participation is encouraged in the establishment of control requirements, the
development of information, as in the enforcement process through citizen suits,
a provision first applied in the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. Perhaps more
than in any other Federal program, the regulation of environmental quality is of
fundamental concern to the public. It is appropriate, therefore, that an opportunity
be provided for citizen involvement.
117 CoNG. REC. 3,821 (1971), reprinted in 1972 AbIENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 176, at 1306.
188. One of the few courts to recognize this point was the Second Circuit in Friends of the
Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976). The court stated that in enacting § 304, "Congress
made clear that citizen groups are not to be treated as nuisances or troublemakers but rather as
welcomed participants in the vindication of environmental interests." Id. at 172. The court then
declared: "[T]hus the Act.seeks to encourage citizen participation rather than to treat it as [a]
curiosity or a theoretical remedy." Id.; see also NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (Citizen suits "reflected a deliberate choice by Congress to widen citizen access to the
courts, as a supplemental and effective assurance that the Act would be implemented and
enforced.") (citations omitted).
189. See supra text accompanying note 51.
190. Compare H.R. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 305(c)(1), (2) (1977), reprinted in 1977
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 2436, with CAA Amendments of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, Title III, § 305(c)(1), (2), § 307(b)(1), 91 Stat. 685, 776, reprinted
in 1977 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 282.
191. The legislative history of the amendments to § 307 is almost entirely taken up with
discussions of specific procedural requirements for EPA rulemakings which became subsection
(d) of that statute. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 26,618 (1977), reprinted in 1977 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 557. The closest thing to an explanation for the
"final action" provision is found in the House Report accompanying H.R. 6161. This report,
however, merely declares that the bill "is intended to clarify some questions relating to venue
for review of rules or orders under the act." H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 323
(1977), reprinted in 1977 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 2790. It
does not explain why the provisions regarding final action were included. Id. The report also
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C. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
1. Senate Committee Consideration
In contrast to the relatively sparse legislative history discussed above,
Congress directed considerable attention to the jurisdictional provisions of
sections 304 and 307 in crafting the 1990 Amendments to the CAA largely in
response to criticism that the review provisions had insulated the agency's failure
to act from judicial review."9 The legislative activity93 began in the Senate when
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee reported Senate Bill 1630
out of committee on November 16, 1989. 4 Senate Bill 1630 proposed to amend
section 304(a) by authorizing suit in the district court "where there is alleged a
failure to act that violates one or more of the standards set forth in § 307(d)(9),
or constitutes unreasonable delay."'95 Since one of the standards in section
307(d)(9) of the CAA is whether the action was found to be "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,"
1 96
the bill would have allowed the district court to review agency inaction for abuse
of discretion, thereby changing the existing rule which placed jurisdiction to
review for abuse of discretion solely in the court of appeals.
Additionally, the bill provided that a failure to act "does not include a written
decision not to take action which the Administrator designates, within such
decision, as a final action within the meaning of § 307(b)(1)."'97 The bill also
would have authorized the district court to "compel agency action unreasonably
delayed."'9 8 It stated that where the Act mandates the Administrator to take
specified action when certain preconditions are met, the court's power to compel
explains that it approved certain suggestions put forth by the Administrative Conference of the
United States. Id. at 2791.
192. For a discussion of the effect of the 1990 Amendments on enforcement, see Michael
S. Alushin, Enforcement of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,21 ENVTL. L. 2217 (1991);
David T. Buente, Citizen Suits and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Closing the
Enforcement Loop, 21 ENVTL. L. 2233 (1991); Permitting and Enforcement Under the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, [April 1991] 21 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,178.
193. For such summaries of the legislative history of the 1990 Amendments, see James
Miskiewicz & John S. Rudd, Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the Clean Air Act After the
1990 Amendments, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 284-85 n.1; Permitting and Enforcement
Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, [April 1991] 21 ENvTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
at 10,178-80 nn.1, 5 (1991); The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 1721 (1991).
194. S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1989), reprinted in 1990 AMENDwMNTs
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 7906.
195. Id, at 537, reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at
8287.
196. CAA § 307(d)(9)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (1994).
197. S. REP.No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 537 (1989), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 8287.
198. Id, at 538, reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at
8288.
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that action "shall not depend . . . upon whether the Administrator . . .has
published in the Federal Register a proposed or final determination that the
threshold preconditions are met."' 99
Finally, Senate Bill 1630 proposed to amend section 307 by providing that
"[w]here a final decision by the Administrator undertakes to perform any action,
but defers such performance to a later time," any interested person could
challenge that deferral under section 307(a)(1). 2"0 Alternatively, in lieu of using
section 307,.a person could bring an action "at any time" in the district court
under section 3 04(a)(2) to compel performance of such deferred action.2"'
It should be noted that, under the language of this amendment, jurisdiction in
both the court of appeals and the district court was founded on whether the
Administration had made a final decision that "undertakes to perform" an action.
Thus, the language seemed to require that the Administrator first agree that
action is warranted but then defer that action to a later time. In this instance, a
plaintiff could sue either in the court of appeals or in the district court.
The Report of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on Senate
Bill 1630 addressed the meaning of these proposed changes. 2 2 The report
indicated that with respect to the provisions relating to agency inaction, "the
citizen suit provision of the Act will encompass the full range of inaction covered
by the Administrative Procedure Act."2 3 Where the agency did not concede it
had a duty to act, a citizen suit could challenge the agency by alleging that (1) its
refusal is not in accordance with law ("for example, that it violates an
unqualified and specific 'shall' command in the Act") or (2) its refusal is
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 2" Furthermore, the fact that EPA
199. Id.
200. Id. at 539, reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at
8289.
201. Id. In addition, the bill would have established a procedure by which interested persons
could petition the Administrator to issue, amend, reconsider, or repeal any regulation or order,
and it required the Administrator to respond to the petition according to a statutory timetable.
Id. It specified that judicial review of any final action by the Administrator "shall be in
accordance" with the APA. Id. at 573-74, reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 176, at 8323-24. Finally, the bill would have explicitly defined certain
types of administrative enforcement orders issued by EPA as "non-final" for purposes of
judicial review under § 307. Id. at 531, reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 176, at 8281.
202. The provisions of the bill as reported which dealt with judicial review of agency
inaction were substantially identical to those in the bill as introduced. See S. 1630, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 302, 309(b), (d), (h) (1989), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 176, at 9197-99, 9202-05.
203. S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 374, reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 8714. The report further noted that the term "failure
to act" was taken directly from the definition of "agency action" in § 551(13) of the APA. Id.
204. Id at 375, reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at
8715. The report noted that examples of the "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion"
categories "would include circumstances where the failure to act is not rationally based, ignores
clear evidence, or where it frustrates the purposes and goals of the Act by failing to correct
deficiencies in air pollution standards or regulations." Id. (The district court could not only
compel actions unreasonably delayed, it could "design remedies to address EPA failures to act
[Vol. 72:65
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW AGENCY INACTION
failed to make "threshold determinations or findings" would not restrict the
district court's power to order action by EPA.2"5 The report stated that if the
plaintiff prevailed, the Committee wanted the court to "define the scope of
EPA's duty and specify the particular actions EPA must take to fulfill that duty
within the court-imposed deadline."2 6
The report then explained that where a lawsuit over inaction "would effectively
require a court to overturn final action previously taken by the EPA," jurisdiction
over the challenge would lie in the court of appeals under section 307(b)(1).117
The report cited Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.,2 8 which adopted the
"embedded in final action" approach to judicial review of agency inaction.2 9 The
report further noted that where EPA procedures culminated in a "formal decision
not to take action," review would lie in the court of appeals.2 0
The report on Senate Bill 1630 discussed the district courts' power to compel
agency action "where EPA has already commenced a proceeding directed at the
final action sought by the plaintiff, but . . . failed to complete it within a
reasonable time." '' The report noted that EPA's failure to publish "threshold
determinations or findings in the Federal Register, either in proposed or in final
form, ' would not prevent the court from compelling EPA to act.
Finally, the report discussed the situation where a final decision "addresses
only part of an air pollution issue, and defers the balance of the issue for
resolution at a later time."2 3 In such situations, the amendments were intended
to give citizens the option of suing either under section 307(b)(1) in the court of
that are arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law.").
205. Id. The amendment was intended to overrule the holding in State of New York v.
Thomas, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 733 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984). The decision is discussed supra in the text accompanying
notes 108-13.
209. S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 374 (1989) (citing Indiana & Michigan Elec.
Co., 733 F.2d at 490), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176,
at 8714.
210. Id Specifically, the report stated that such a situation would constitute a denial within
the meaning of the APA and "would likewise be reviewable in the court of appeal under section
307(b)(1)." Id. Since denials under the APA normally would be reviewable in the district court,
however, the report may have implied that both the district court and the court of appeals
would have concurrent jurisdiction. As noted above, the bill did expressly authorize concurrent
jurisdiction over one class of cases: where the Administrator made a "final decision"
undertaking to perform an action but deferring such performance to a later time. Id. at 375,
reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTs LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 8715.
211. Id at 375, reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at
8715.
212. Id, The report states that this amendment was intended to overtum the decision in State
of New York v. Thomas, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
213.Id.
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appeals or under section 304(a)(2) in the district court. If the latter, the sixty-day
time limit found in section 307 would not restrict the suit.214
As reported from the Senate, the proposed amendments included in Senate Bill
1630 would have comprehensively revised the law of agency inaction under the
CAA. Most significantly, they would have greatly expanded the district courts'
jurisdiction over agency inaction by enlarging section 304's coverage beyond the
limited situation of a clear statutory command for administrative action.
Jurisdiction would have expanded to cover the "full range of [agency]
inaction, '215 including situations where the agency's failure to act was arbitrary
and capricious. Furthermore, by stating that the district court's jurisdiction does
"not depend" on whether the Administrator has published "threshold
preconditions" to action in the Federal Register, the Senate report implies that
a plaintiff could prove those preconditions in the district court.21 6 Finally, in such
cases the court would have had explicit authority to define the scope of the
agency's obligation to act.217
The proposed changes to the court of appeals' jurisdiction were less clear.
Senate Bill 1630 would have granted the court jurisdiction over a "final
decision" in which the Administrator undertakes to perform an act but then
defers action until a later time.21 8 In practice, however, such cases are rare. In
most cases, the Administrator simply defers making a final choice, and the court
of appeals is left to determine whether this deferral is final action within the
meaning of section 307. The proposed changes to section 307 did not address this
latter situation.
The report stated that, if EPA procedures culminated in a "formal decision" not
to take action, the court of appeals could review it.219 But the language in the bill
itself was not this broad; it referred only to the situation where the Administrator
issued a "written decision not to take action which the Administrator designates,
within such decision, as a final action."" 0 Thus, while the legislative history (that
is, the report) declared that the court of appeals would have jurisdiction over any
formal decision not to take action, the bill referred only to a "written decision not
to take action" which the Administrator had designated as final action. Situations
in which the Administrator designates his or her inaction as final action, and thus
invites judicial review of that inaction, are far less likely to occur.
214. Id. The report noted that EPA would have a duty to conclude the rulemaking
proceedings enumerated in § 307(d)(1) within a reasonable time, and that the agency must
promptly respond to petitions by citizens for action in final, judicially reviewable form.
215. Id. at 374, reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at
8714.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 375, reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTs LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 176, at
8715.
218. Id at 374, reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 176, at
8714.
219. Id.
220. S. 1630, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 309(b)(1) (1989), reprinted in 1990 AmENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 8714.
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Significantly, Senate Bill 1630 introduced the term, "final decision" into the
debate over proposed changes to jurisdiction. In contrast with "final action,"
which can be read to imply that the Administrator must act before jurisdiction
will attach, a final decision seems to require only that the Administrator decide
whether or not to act.
The changes proposed in Senate Bill 1630 had one other significant provision:
they expressly included the concept of concurrent jurisdiction. A plaintiff could
challenge a final decision undertaking to perform action, but then deferring that
action, either in the court of appeals or the district court.22 Thus, the bill for the
first time endorsed the concept that the trial and appellate courts' jurisdiction
under the CAA overlapped to some degree. But nothing in the legislative history
defined the meaning of the term "final decision" or explained how it might differ
from the statutory term "final action." Thus, while the authorization for
concurrent jurisdiction was clear, the circumstances under which that jurisdiction
would exist were not.
2. Senate Floor Consideration
After Senate Bill 1630 was reported from Committee, negotiations between
Senate leaders and the White House produced a proposed substitute for the
legislation that had passed out of committee. 2 2 Except for minor wording
changes, the so-called "Baucus-Chafee Substitute" retained the proposed
amendments to section 304 concerning suits to compel action when the agency
had unreasonably delayed or simply failed to act.2 Similarly, the substitute kept
221. S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1989), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTs
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 8715.
222. S. AMEND. No. 1293, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 7339.
223. The amendments to § 304(b) included in the bill as reported by committee read as
follows:
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure to act that violates
one or more of the standards set forth in section 307(d)(9) [including whether the
action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law], or constitutes unreasonable delay, provided however that
a failure to act does not include a written decision not to take action which the
Administrator designates, within such decision, as a final action within the
meaning of Section 307(b)(1) ....
S. 1630, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. § 609(b)(2) (1989), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 8287. The substitute bill would have amended §
304(b) to authorize suits:
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure to perform any act
or duty under the Act which is not discretionary with the Administrator, including
failures to act that violate one or more of the standards set forth in section
307(d)(9), or that violate the duty to object to issuance of a permit as -set forth in
section 354(b), or that constitute unreasonable delay, provided however that a
failure to act does not include a written decision not to take action which the
Administrator designates, within such decision, as a final action within the
meaning of section 307(b)(1) ....
S. AMEND. No. 1293, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. § 608(b)(2) (1990), reprinted in 1990
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the proposed amendments to section 307(b) that authorized suit to compel
performance of deferred actions in which the Administrator had "undertake[n]
to perform an action." '224 It also retained the provisions allowing citizens to
petition the Administrator to act. The most significant change was the elimination
of the provisions in the original Senate Bill 1630 granting concurrent jurisdiction
to the district courts and courts of appeals over such litigation.225
On the Senate floor, however, Senator Nickles offered a comprehensive
amendment to the enforcement and citizen suit provisions of the CAA. 6 Backed
by the Justice Department,227 Senator Nickles argued that the bill would authorize
citizens to sue the Administrator in district court for discretionary actions and
foresaw a deluge of such actions.22 Senator Nickles's proposed amendment
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 7845-46.
The substitute bill added the phrase "where there is alleged a failure to perform any act or
duty... which is not discretionary," while the original Senate Bill 1630 spoke of a "failure to
act" violating one of the standards set forth in § 307(d)(9). The substitute, however, still
seemed to expand the district courts' jurisdiction to allow review of agency action for abuse
of discretion, in contrast to its previous jurisdiction, which was limited to the failure to perform
an act or duty which was not discretionary. As hoted above, the legislative history of this latterjurisdiction indicates that it was to encompass only situations in which the Administrator had
violated a plain statutory command. This change in the nature of the violation which forms the
basis for the district court's jurisdiction also is reflected in the title of the proposed amendment
This part of the original Senate Bill 1630 was entitled only "Unreasonable Delay"; the Baucus-
Chafee Substitute enlarged the title to read "Unreasonable Delay and Nature of Violation."
224. S. AMEND. No. 1273, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 608(d),(e) (1990), reprinted in 1990
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 7847-48.
225. Id., reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 7847.
226. S. AMEND. No. 1373, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 167, at 6406-30.
227. See Letter from Dick Thornburgh, Attorney General, to Sens. George J. Mitchell and
Robert Dole, 136 CONG. REC. S3180 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990), reprinted in 1990
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 6370-71:
[T]his language [in S. 1630] would impair EPA's ability to implement the Act.
... Whereas current law provides citizens with the ability to sue EPA for failure
to take nondiscretionary actions, the proposed language would give plaintiffs•...
an unprecedented new power to use litigation to compel EPA to take action which
is discretionary. . . . Instead of setting priorities and allocating resources
according to congressional directives, orderly rulemaking procedures, and sound
enforcement discretion, EPA and DOJ priorities will be set by individual litigants
and courts all over the country, without regard to national concerns.
228. As Senator Nickles stated:
If there is ever a lawyers' heyday amendment it is the Baucus-Chafee approach.
The Baucus-Chafee approach allows citizens groups to sue EPA for making
discretionary actions. And we are going to have EPA second guessed on every
single decision they make on permits because there is some environmental group
or other group that thinks that some permit should not be issued for whatever
reason. They are going to sue EPA every single day.
Comments of Sen. Nickles, 136 CONG. REC. S3189 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990), reprinted in
1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 6393; see also Comments of
Sen. Heflin ("[T]he Baucus-Chafee Amendment would give plaintiffs an unprecedented new
power to use litigation to compel EPA to take action, even where the act does not require EPA
to take such action .... [T]hey could go straight to the district court, and the district court
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addressed the situation where preconditions were required before the
Administrator came under a mandatory duty to act, such as when a statute
requires the Administrator to find that a risk or fact exists before mandating the
Administrator to act. In those situations, the amendment authorized citizens to
sue when the Administrator took final action on the preconditions but did not
formally publish notice of that action in the Federal Register."9
The amendment would have sharply narrowed the scope of the original bill's
authorization of citizen suits in district court when the failure to act was
"arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Under the Nickles Amendment,
suits challenging such inaction would be proper only when the Administrator had
taken final action but did not formally publish notice of that action. This
situation, however, would occur only in very limited circumstances, if at all, and
is unrelated to the problem that the original bill sought to address: occasions
where, despite the available evidence, the Administrator refused to take any final
action.
In rebuttal to the criticisms of Nickles and the Justice Department, the bill's
sponsors argued that the citizen suit provisions of Senate Bill 1630 applied only
to nondiscretionary actions23° and were needed to correct court decisions which
never reached the merits of the agency's inaction' This defense, however, was
would have the power to order EPA to take actions that Congress has expressly entrusted to
EPA's discretion."), 136 CONG. REC. S3170 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990), supra note 176, at 6344.
Senator Heflin also argued that plaintiffs "would not have to seek timely court of appeals
review of the Agency's decision to defer the regulatory action, as is required under the current
Clean Air Act." Id.
229. The amendment stated in pertinent part:
Where a provision of the Act mandates that the Administrator shall take specified
action when certain preconditions are met and the Administrator has taken final
action finding such preconditions, the court's power to compel the specified
action under paragraph (2) shall not depend upon whether the Administrator has
published notice of such final action in the Federal Register.
S. AMEND. No. 1373, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 609(b) (1990), reprinted in 1990 AMDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 6427. The amendment also attempted to authorize
suit for unreasonable delay by amending § 307(d)(1) to state that action under it "shall be
subject to the provisions of section 706(1) of title 5 of the United States Code." Id. § 609(d),
reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 6428.
230. 136 CONG. REC. 5357 (1990), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 176, at 6446 ("The language in amendment 1293 [the Baucus-Chafee substitute]
merely states that suits will lie if the agency again delays unreasonably in its execution of a
nondiscretionary duty.").
231. Senator Lieberman commented:
Recently, however, a series of court decisions have limited the scope of citizen
suits and created a situation that allows EPA, in my opinion, to escape judicial
secrutiny [sic]. As a result of those decisions, the ability of State and citizen
groups to compel EPA to comply with the clear mandates of the act are uncertain.
In many of these cases, the courts never reach the question of whether or not the
agency's inaction violated the law. Instead, the cases became mired in disputes
that concerned the court's jurisdiction ....
.... But Congress should guarantee that the courts will have the power to at
least hear the merits of the claims of the citizens.., and to determine whether
EPA is fulfilling its responsibility under the law ....
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not accurate since Senate Bill 1630 would have given the district court
jurisdiction over more than just "nondiscretionary actions." It would have
authorized the court to review the agency's inaction for "abuse of discretion" and
to determine whether the agency's failure to act was arbitrary and capricious in
light of the evidence.
Ultimately, the amendment proposed by Senator Nickles was defeated on an
extremely close vote.23 2 The Senate as a whole then adopted the Baucus-Chafee
substitute233 and approved Senate Bill 1630 as so amended.234
3. House Consideration
In contrast to the Senate's lengthy consideration of provisions regarding
agency inaction, the House virtually ignored the issue. On May 17, 1990, the
Committee on Energy and Commerce reported on House Bill 3030, which
contained lengthy amendments to the CAA.235 The bill did not include any
provisions relating to citizen suits for agency inaction.236
When House Bill 3030 reached the floor, however, the Committee offered a
series of amendments that members had negotiated after the bill passed out of
Committee,237 and Congress ultimately enacted two of these into law. First, the
amendments proposed to amend section 304(a) by authorizing the district courts
136 CONG. REC. 5276 (1990), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 176, at 6353.
232. 136 CONG. REC. S3241 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1990), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 167, at 6450-51 (47-50 vote). Senator Dole later re-
proposed the amendment under his own name, but the amendment (Amendment 1456, see 136
CONG. REC. S3885 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 176, at 7264) failed by a 49-51 vote. 136 CONG. REC. S3796 (daily ed.
Apr. 3, 1990), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 7155.
During debate on the measures, after Senator Specter argued that the bill allowed the district
court to review discretionary decisions of the Administrator, Senator Chafee offered to delete
the language "including failures to act that violate one or more of the standards set forth in
section 307(d)(9)." 136 CONG. REC. S3242 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1990), reprinted in 1990
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 6454. Senator Nickles, however,
declared that more than a single deletion was needed. 136 CONG. REC. S3243 (daily ed. Mar.
27, 1990), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 6456
("There are several sections in the current Baucus-Chafee language that would allow citizens
groups to sue EPA over discretionary activity other than just 307(d)(9), so I would encourage
you, if you are trying to clean that up, to look at those other sections as well."). The offered
deletion, however, apparently was never implemented.
233. 136 CONG. REc. S17434 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 7177.
234. 136 CONG. REc. S17434 (1990), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 176, at 7248-49 (89-11 vote).
235. See H.R. REP.NO. 490, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 3021-3710.
236. See 136 CONG. REC. S16953 (Oct. 27, 1990), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 3162 (statement of Rep. Dingell).
237. See 136 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1990) (statement of Rep. Dingell), reprinted in 1990
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 2716.
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to compel agency action unreasonably delayed?38 Second, the amendments
provided that "[w]here a final decision of the Administrator defers performance
of any nondiscretionary statutory action to a later time," a plaintiff could
challenge that deferral in the court of appeals pursuant to section 307(a)(1).23 9
These proposed jurisdictional amendments differed from the Senate version in
three important ways. First, the amendments limited the district court's
jurisdiction. The amendments did not include the provision in Senate Bill 1630
that authorized the district court to compel action where the Administrator's
refusal to act was arbitrary or capricious. Thus the district court could now only
compel action unreasonably delayed.
Second, the proposed amendments to section 307 previously included in Senate.
Bill 1630 considered the situation where the Administrator "undertakes to
perform an action but defers such performance to a later time."24 The House
amendments eliminated the requirement that the Administrator "undertake" to
perform the action; instead, jurisdiction would attach if the Administrator issued
a final decision which "defers performance of any nondiscretionary statutory
action to a later time."24'
Finally, Senate Bill 1630 would have placed jurisdiction over such deferreds
in the district court under section 304. In contrast, the House amendments
proposed to lodge it solely in the court of appeals under section 307.242
On the House floor, Congresswoman Collins was the only Representative to
offer comments directly addressing the amendments to sections 304 and 307.
She noted that in the past EPA had used the CAA's jurisdictional provisions to
"blunt the effectiveness of the citizen suit as a tool for enforcing Congress'
mandates" and that the amendments were intended "to redress the more important
jurisdictional problems" that had arisen under the Act.243 She further emphasized
238. H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 608(f), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 2349-50. The amendment also provided that if the
Administrator's final action would be the adoption of nationally applicable regulations that
would be reviewable only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
then a plaintiff could bring suit to compel such action only in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 608(h), reprinted in 1990
AMENDMENTs LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 2350.
239. Id., reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 2350.
240. S. 1630, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 608(b), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 176, at 4736.
241. Id., reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 2350.
242. The House amendment declared that "any person may challenge the deferral pursuant
to paragraph (1)." S. 1630, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 608(h) (1990), reprinted in 1990
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 2350. Paragraph one, of course, is
part of § 307, which sets forth the court of appeals' jurisdiction in such cases.
243. 136 CONG. REC. 11,918 (statement of Rep. Collins), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 2766. Congresswoman Collins continued:
In case after case-especially throughout the 1980's-the EPA has successfully
fought citizen cases on procedural grounds, never even reaching the merits of the
cases. The EPA argued that it was irrelevant whether it was blatantly violating a
clear congressional directive because the citizen suit provision, as written, simply
did not permit the court to hold the agency responsible. As was observed in a
1986 case, Bethlehem Steel Corp. versus EPA in my home State of Illinois: "It
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that the amendments authorized challenges both to unreasonable delay2. and to
deferral of a performance by the Administrator.245 With respect to agency
inaction, Congresswoman Collins was blunt: "The courts must also have the
power to determine whether the EPA is violating the law by failing to act.,
246
The House adopted the amendments247 and then approved House Bill 3030 as
amended.248 Finally, the House voted to strike out all provisions of Senate Bill
1630 and substitute them with the provisions of House Bill 3030, thus ensuring
that a conference committee would have to resolve the differences between the
House and Senate versions of the legislation.249
4. The Conference Decisions and Final Passage
The Conference Committee accepted the provisions related to agency inaction
that were included in the House version of Senate Bill 1630, and these were
ultimately enacted into law.25' Because Congress concluded work on the bill very
late in the session, the Conference Report is merely forty pages long despite the
length of the final bill.25 ' The principal legislative history of the Conference
Committee's decisions consists of a joint statement released by the -Senate
managers of the legislation, and of statements made by Senator Nickles on the
floor of the Senate.
seems apparent from the EPA's conduct that its main objective is to preclude--or
at least delay as long as possible-judicial review of these claims."
Id.
244. Congresswoman Collins stated:
First, it makes clear that if the EPA unreasonably delays action, the EPA cannot
defend itself on procedural grounds that the court has no jurisdiction. In recent
years, big problems have resulted from the Administrator unreasonably delaying
action. Often, individuals affected by the EPA's stalling techniques have not been
allowed to bring lawsuits because the Administrator claimed the issue was still
being reviewed by the EPA. The committee amendment will ensure that Federal
courts can compel action by the EPA that has been unreasonably delayed.
136 CONG. REc. 11,918 (statement of Rep. Collins), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 2766.
245. Id. The language states:
[Ihe amendment clarifies that a deferral of performance by the EPA can also be
challenged in court. Thus, when action is taken, but the action in effect defers
performance of a statutory duty to a later time, the Federal courts will have
jurisdiction to compel prompt performance of that duty.
246. Id.
247. 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 176, at 2769.
248. Id. at 3013-16.
249. Id. at 3019.
250. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 101 Stat. 2683-84 (1990) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7604,
7607 (1994)), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 76, at 697-
98.
251. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 347 (1990), reprinted in 1990
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 1785-1805.
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The "Chafee-Baucus Statement of Senate Managers" '252 included two
observations on the provisions of the final bill that concern citizen suits
challenging agency inaction. First, it explained that,
[B]y adopting the House language that confirms the availability of citizen
suits when EPA defers a nondiscretionary action, the conferees in no way
intend to weaken existing case law that holds-in language not limited to
deferrals of nondiscretionary duties-that an EPA deferral is final action
subject to challenge in the federal courts of appeals under section
307(b)(1). 253
Second, the statement warned that "adoption of the House language in no way
limits the universe of EPA actions subject to unreasonable delay suits. 254
Senator Nickles, who had vigorously opposed the language in the Senate bill
on the grounds that it subjected the Administrator's discretionary decisions to
citizen suits, 255 also commented on the conferees' agreement. He noted that, in
252. Chafee-Baucus Statement of Senate Managers, 136 CONG. REC. S16,933 (daily ed. Oct.
27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Chafee), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 176, at 880. The statement first notes that although the conference report includes
some 800 pages of legislative language, due to time constraints it contains less than 40 double-
spaced pages of explanatory text. Id. at 880. The statement then continues:
To help rectify this problem, we have prepared a detailed explanation of five
important titles. The explanation is in the form of a traditional statement of
managers. It has not been reviewed or approved by all of the conferees but it is
our best effort to provide the agency and the courts with the guidance that they
will need in the course of implementing and interpreting this complex act.
Id.
Some courts have used this statement in determining Congressional intent. See
Environmental Defense Fund v. Browner, 1995 WL 91324, at *7 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 10, 1995)
(Because Senator Baucus was the sponsor and manager of Senate Bill 1630, and the chair of
the subcommittee that reported the bill, "his comments are entitled to substantial weight as
evidence of congressional intent."). But see NRDC v. Browner, 57 F.3d 1122, 1128 (D.C. Cir.
1995) ("Even assuming it is probative of congressional intent, this statement lacks the
deliberate and definite quality of persuasive legislative history.").
253. Chafee-Baucus Statement of Senate Managers, 136 CONG. REC. S16,933 (daily ed. Oct.
27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Chafee), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 176, at 946.
254. Id at 947. The managers also stated that although the Conference Committee decided
not to adopt the language in the Senate bill that would have established a time frame for EPA
response to citizen petitions, thaf decision "is in no way an endorsement of the numerous
delays that have characterized the agency's actions on a number of key air pollution issues."
Id. Instead, they declared, the final provisions reflect the conferees' judgment that EPA's
conduct "is better addressed by the more flexible case-by-case approach inherent in
'unreasonable delay' suits." Id.
The statement also declared that language addressing pre-enforcement judicial review of
administrative orders was unnecessary. It noted that § 307(b)(1) defines the term "final action"
only by a non-exclusive list of particular kinds of actions. According to the managers, however,
since three federal circuits had already held that "except with respect to judicial review of
administrative penalty assessments and orders, there is no opportunity for preenforcement
review," no new statutory language addressing the issue was necessary. Id. at 947.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 216-20.
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general, the "more intrusive citizen suit provisions of the Senate" had been
removed and replaced with the "less intrusive provisions of the House. 256
In sum, although the Senate bill proposed significant changes to the courts'
jurisdiction over actions challenging the Administrator's failure to act, the final
bill narrowed those changes considerably. Ultimately the only change to district
court jurisdiction was to allow an action for "unreasonable delay," the traditional
action authorized by the APA.257 Congress rejected the sweeping changes,
proposed by the Senate in the original Senate Bill 1630, which would have
authorized jurisdiction in the district court where plaintiffs alleged that a failure
to act was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The change to the court
of appeals' jurisdiction was more significant, but ultimately it too was narrower,
covering only a final decision that deferred performance of a nondiscretionary
statutory action.
D. Six Conclusions from the Legislative History
Six conclusions from the legislative history are relevant to determining the
respective jurisdictions of the district courts and courts of appeals to review
agency inaction. The first two stem from the history of the 1970 Amendments to
the CAA, while the latter four originate in the history of the 1990 Amendments
to that Act.
1. "An Act or Duty Which Is Not Discretionary"
The first conclusion from the legislative history concerns the meaning of the
key statutory phrase "an act or duty . . . which is not discretionary,"258 the
language which determines the jurisdiction of the district court under the 1970
CAA Amendments. In a particular circumstance, there may be several reasons
why an agency is under an obligation or duty to act which is nondiscretionary.
The obvious example is when the statute, on its face, requires the Administrator
to act regardless of the factual circumstances. Alternatively, the statutory
language may authorize action but stipulate that the action is to occur only after
the Administrator finds that certain preliminary facts exist. Another possibility
is that, while the statutory language gives the Administrator discretion to act, the
evidence before the Administrator may be so one-sided that consideration of it
can lead to only one rational conclusion: the Administrator must act.
256. 136 CONG. REC. S16,991 (statement of Sen. Nickles), reprinted in 1990 AM MNDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 1062. The one exception that he noted concerned
citizen suits seeking civil penalties for past violations.
257. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1994); see, e.g., Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("Resolution of a claim of unreasonable delay obviously may require a number of factual
determinations and may also entail a balancing of competing considerations."); Nader v.
Federal Communications Comm'n, 520 F.2d 182, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, administrative agencies have a duty to decide issues presented
to them within a reasonable time and reviewing courts have a duty to 'compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed."').
258. CAA § 307(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1994).
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The question is whether Congress intended to authorize jurisdiction in the
district court to compel agency action in all three types of situations, or only in
some of them, and the history of the 1970 CAA Amendments answers this
question. The language in section 304 was included in an amendment to the
original bill, and the floor sponsor of this amendment indicated that it was
intended to cover situations in which the Administrator "fail[ed] to perform
mandatory duties imposed by statute." Similarly, Congress utilized almost
identical language for the district court's jurisdiction in the 1972 Amendments
to the FWPCA, and the history of that legislation indicates that the district court
has jurisdiction over those acts or duties "imposed upon the administrator as a
matter of law." Thus, Congress intended to grant the district court jurisdiction
over situations in which a statute on its face imposes a nondiscretionary duty to
act. By implication, congressional silence on other aspects of jurisdiction means
that jurisdiction would not extend to situations in which the court must first find
that certain facts exist before it can conclude that the agency's obligation to act
is nondiscretionary nor to situations where manifestly one-sided evidence should
force the Administrator to act. 9
The legislative history of the 1990 Amendments confirms this understanding
of section 307(a)(2)'s meaning. The bills considered prior to passage of the 1990
Amendments explicitly proposed broadening the district court's review powers
to include review for abuse of discretion, review previously proper only in the
court of appeals. The Senate Committee report first noted that the proposed
amendment would authorize review to determine whether the action was or was
not in accordance with law--"for example, that it violates an unqualified and
specific 'shall' command in the Act." The report, however, then noted that it also
would authorize review when the alleged failure to act was arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion, that is, where conclusions from the evidence before the
Administrator, rather than just a command in the statute, formed the basis of the
legal compulsion to act.26 Moreover, by indicating that the district court's
jurisdiction "shall not depend" on whether the Administrator has published a
determination that certain "threshold preconditions" to action exist, the bill
strongly implied that plaintiffs could prove those factual preconditions to the
district court. Then, once the preconditions were proven, the plaintiffs could
argue that in light of them, the Administrator was under a nondiscretionary duty
to act.
Congress, however, deleted the language in the bill that would have broadened
the district court's jurisdiction. Except for the new provision allowing the district
court to remedy unreasonable delay, Congress retained the original language of
259. Of course the other two situations mentioned above--ones in which there is a factual
precondition to the Administrator's action or in which all facts in a record lead to a single
conclusion-also arguably require action by the Administrator "as a matter of law." For
example, one might say that where a plaintiff proved a factual precondition to the
Administrator's action, the Administrator then is compelled to act "as a matter of law."
Congressional silence on the other two situations is not absolute proof that Congress intended
them to be outside the scope of district court jurisdiction. The language in the history, however,
does not mention situations in which the legal compulsion is attached to certain facts.
260. See supra note 82.
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the CAA with respect to the district court's jurisdiction over nondiscretionary
actions. By rejecting the broad language, Congress indicated its intent to retain
the previous understanding of the district court's jurisdiction over
"nondiscretionary actions" as covering only violations of plain statutory
commands.26'
2. "Clear-Cut" Violations
Second, a handful of opinions have declared that citizen suits to compel agency
action under sections 304 and 505 are limited to "clear-cut violations,"2 2 or as
one court termed it, "specific non-discretionary clear-cut requirements." '263 While
most courts expressing this principle have not used it to decide the case, 2 some
have employed it in order to justify a narrowing construction of citizen suit
rights.265
The legislative history does reveal that Congress narrowed section 304 from
its original form, which would have authorized suits to compel any "duty," so
that the final language only authorized suits to compel nondiscretionary action.2"
Furthermore, as demonstrated above,267 Congress intended this jurisdictional
authorization to cover only actions compelled by statute. Beyond that, however,
the legislative history does not indicate whether the category of actions subject
to citizen suits must be "clear-cut" or whether the category is more limited than
261. Numerous cases have undertaken this type of purely statutory review. See, e.g.,
Fairview Tp. v. EPA, 773 F.2d 517, 525 (3d Cir. 1985) ("District court jurisdiction over
citizens' suits depends on the existence of a duty alleged to be nondiscretionary with the
Administrator .... The viability of appellants' citizens' suit therefore depends on whether
DER had 'been delegated sufficient authority to administer the ... program' so that the
Administrator had a nondiscretionary duty to approve or disapprove the Step III grant
application within forty-five days of receipt from DER.").
262. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting NRDC v. Train,
510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
263. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 766 (10th Cir. 1980)
(addressing the citizen suit provisions of the CAA).
264. For example, the decision in Mountain States was primarily based on the standing of
petitioners.
265. See, e.g., Monongahela Power Co. v. Reilly, 980 F.2d 272, 276 (4th Cir. 1992). The
court framed the issue as "whether the statute imposed upon the Administrator a
nondiscretionary duty to process extension applications before he promulgated final regulations
implementing the statutory program." It then noted that the term "nondiscretionary" is one that
"has been construed narrowly." Id. at n.3 (citing, among other cases, Mountain States, 630 F.2d
at 766; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1978); and
Wisconsin's Elivtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 395 F. Supp. 313, 321
(W.D. Wis. 1975)). Mountain States was cited for the proposition that citizen suits were limited
to "specific non-discretionary clear-cut requirements." See also Defenders of Wildlife v.
Browner, 888 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (D. Az. 1995) ("Congress intended to limit the number of
citizen suits which could be brought against the Administrator and so consciously struck a
balance to minimize disruption of the CWA's complex administrative process.") (citing
Kennecott, 572 F.2d at 1353).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 179-82.
267. See supra text accompanying note 183.
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those actions otherwise encompassed within the term "nondiscretionary
actions." '268 In short, the legislative history does not support a conclusion that the
term "nondiscretionary" should be construed narrowly.
269
268. When the use of the principle that the violation must be "clear cut" is traced to its
origins in the case law, no convincing legislative history is cited to support it. In Mountain
States, 630 F.2d at 766, the court of appeals declared that "Congress thus restricted citizens'
suits to actions seeking to enforce specific non-discretionary clear-cut requirements of the
Clean Air Act." The court generally cited Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th
Cir. 1973), but that decision nowhere finds that a "clear-cut" limitation exists. Indeed, one
conclusion of the Anaconda decision was that plaintiffs attempt to enjoin EPA promulgation
of an SIP should be denied because the case was not ripe for review. Id. at 1305.
Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court stated
that "Congress provided for district court enforcement under section 304 in order to permit
citizen enforcement of 'clear-cut violations by polluters or defaults by the Administrator,"'
citing NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also NRDC v. Thomas, 689
F. Supp. 246, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aft'd, 885 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Sierra Club,
828 F.2d at 791, concerning "clear-cut violations"). The 1975 Train decision did make this
statement. It did so, however, after examining the legislative history and concluding that
"because of the obvious danger that unlimited public action might disrupt the implementation
of the Act and overburden the courts, Congress restricted citizen suits to actions seeking to
enforce specific requirements of the Act." Train, 510 F.2d at 700.
This statement is generally accurate, for as noted above, Congress amended the legislation
to limit suits to compelling only nondiscretionary action, rather than to compelling the exercise
of "any duty." A statement that the actions must "enforce specific requirements of the Act,"
however, is not quite the same as concluding thata "clear-cut" violation is required. Indeed,
the Train court's actual statement, which referred to "clear-cut violations by polluters or
defaults by the Administrator" (emphasis added), is ambiguous as to whether the adjective
"clear-cut" was even intended to modify the word "defaults" or was solely modifying the word
"violations." It is that category of actions, defaults by the Administrator, that are at issue in
agency inaction cases, not violations by polluters.
269. This issue was discussed most recently in Monongahela Power Co., 980 F.2d at 276
n.3. The principal cases cited by the court for its conclusion that the term should be construed
narrowly were: Mountain States, 630 F.2d at 766; Kennecott, 572 F.2d at 1355; and
Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, 395 F. Supp. at 321. As discussed above in footnote 268, Mountain
States cites an earlier precedent, Anaconda, 482 F.2d at 1301, which does not support the
conclusion. The Kennecott decision cites Wisconsin's EnvtL Decade, but the latter case also
does not support any conclusion about the scope of jurisdiction to compel nondiscretionary
actions. It states only that:
Mhis particular provision [that is, section 304 of the CAA as amended 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857h-2 (1994)] was intended to provide relief only in a narrowly-defined class
of situations in which the Administrator failed to perform a mandatory function;
it was not designed to permit review of the performance of those functions, nor
to permit the court to direct the manner in which any discretion given the
Administrator in the performance of those functions should be exercised.
Wisconsin's Envil. Decade, 395 F. Supp. at 321. The Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade court's
statement is generally accurate, as the legislative history does talk about compelling
"mandatory functions." But, correctly recognizing the class of situations to which the statute
applies, nondiscretionary actions, does not support a conclusion that the legislative history calls
for construing this class of situations narrowly. Indeed, the decision in Wisconsin's Envtl.
Decade does not even examine any legislative history in its discussion.
One of the few cases reaching a more accurate conclusion as to the congressional intent is
Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Thus,
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3. "Final Decisions" Versus "Final Actions"
Third, and most significantly, the language of the 1990 Amendments,
considered in light of the legislative history, indicates that Congress intended to
broaden the court of appeals' jurisdiction over agency inaction. The Act now
gives the court jurisdiction "[w]here a final decision by the Administrator defers
performance of any nondiscretionary statutory action to a later time. 270
As discussed in detail above, 271 the courts had experienced difficulty
determining when final action occurs within the meaning of section 307 in those
situations where the agency chose not to act. The 1990 Amendments, however,
do not use the term "final action" in the changes to the court of appeals'
jurisdiction; rather, the Amendments give the court of appeals jurisdiction over
any "final decision" that defers performance of a nondiscretionary statutory
action. The phrase "final decision" is broader than the term "final action," which
implies that the agency has acted. A final decision, in contrast, can take place
without action. The reference to a "decision" is inconsistent with the previous
emphasis by some courts that the agency must "act" before jurisdiction attaches
in the court of appeals.272 It also indicates that Congress wished to avoid the
previous debate over what constitutes final action.
In sum, the language that Congress ultimately passed in the 1990 Amendments
significantly broadens the court of appeals' jurisdiction. The court is no longer
limited to reviewing final actions; it can now look at any final decision that fails
to implement a nondiscretionary duty.
4. "Formal" Decisions Versus "Final" Decisions
While the language that Congress ultimately adopted in the 1990 Amendments
refers to decisions rather than actions, it nonetheless retains the requirement that
the decisions be final. The legislative history documents the significance of this
choice, for Congress considered omitting a finality requirement. While Senate
Bill 1630 referred to a final decision, the committee report on Senate Bill 1630
spoke of aformal decision not to take action.2 73 The omission of any reference
to a "final" decision in this report might have indicated that Congress not only
consistent with the statutory language, the legislative history of the citizen suit provision
reflects Congress's intention to grant broad authority for citizen enforcement.") (emphasis in
original).
270. CAA § 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2) (1994).
271. See discussion of tests supra text accompanying notes 107-75.
272. For example, in offering the "actual final decision" test, discussed above, Judge
Silberman emphasized that the statutory term "final action" suggests, literally, that agency
inaction is not reviewable at all. NRDC v. Administrator, EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 997 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (Silberman, J., concurring and dissenting), vacated in part and dismissed in part by 921
F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
273. S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1989), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 8714.
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intended to authorize judicial review of agency decisions, as opposed to actions,
but also that those decisions need not even be final.
To adopt a construction that finality is not required, however, would ignore the
plain meaning of the statutory language. Thus, while Congress no longer intends
that the agency takes final action, it must make a decision that is final for
jurisdiction in the court of appeals to attach.
5. The Elimination of the "Undertaking to Perform"
Requirement
Another wording change that preceded the final adoption of the 1990
Amendments bolsters the conclusion that agency action is no long~r required
before the court of appeals may exercise jurisdiction. As discussed above,274
Senate Bill 1630 originally proposed to give jurisdiction to the court of appeals
only where the Administrator had "undertake[n] to perform an action." '275 On its
face, this language would cover only the relatively small number of situations in
which the Administrator decided to undertake an action but simply deferred its
commencement. This jurisdictional grant would not apply to refusals to decide
whether to act, such as when the Administrator is silent on an issue raised in a
proceeding or expressly defers a final decision. Nor would it cover those
situations in which the Administrator made an express, final decision not to act.
But these situations, of course, were the ones that presented the most difficulties
to the courts of appeals in determining whether the Administrator had taken the
final action necessary for the court of appeals to exercise jurisdiction.
Congress, however, deleted the language requiring an undertaking of action
before the bill's final passage.276 This deletion indicates even more strongly that
Congress intended for the court of appeals to have jurisdiction to review a
broader range of agency inaction, as long as it was embodied in a final decision.
The legislative history highlights the significance of this deletion. The
committee report on Senate Bill 1630 declared that any such "formal decision not
to take action" is reviewable in the court of appeals, 7 while Senate Bill 1630
spoke only of a final decision which deferred performance until a later time-a
much narrower class of circumstances. Thus, the report on Senate Bill 1630
indicated that the Senate Committee which approved it intended to broaden the
court of appeals' jurisdiction over agency inaction to an even greater degree than
the bill's express language reflected.
274. See supra text accompanying note 200.
275. S. 1631, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 609(d) (1989), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTs
LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 8289.
276. Interestingly, the report of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, which
reported S. 1630 to the Senate floor, attributed a broader meaning to the proposed changes to
§ 307 than the bill's actual language indicated. The report states that under the bill, if "EPA
procedures" culminate in a "formal decision not to take action," the court of appeals could
review it. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. In so stating, the report differs from the
language actually in the bill.
277. Id.
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The Amendments that Congress ultimately enacted, however, largely did
implement what this legislative history suggested was the Committee's intent.
The final language, which is now in section 307, authorizes the court of appeals
to review any final decision which "defers performance of a nondiscretionary
statutory action." The Amendments retained the significant reference to a
decision rather than an action, but they also broadened the types of decisions
reviewable. No longer did the bill limit those decisions to ones which the
Administrator had undertaken to perform but had deferred performance; rather,
the statute now encompassed any final decision in which the Administrator
deferred performance of a nondiscretionary statutory duty. 8
The deletion of the "undertaking to perform action" language is important for
another reason. The language in the Amendment as enacted into law refers to a
final decision which "defers performance of any nondiscretionary statutory
action to a later time. 279 One possible reading of this language is that, for
jurisdiction to attach in the court of appeals, the Administrator must (1)
recognize a duty to perform, and (2) explicitly defer performance of that duty
within the decision itself. In other words, if the decision does not expressly state
that the Administrator will take action at a later time, the court of appeals has no
jurisdiction.
Such an interpretation, of course, would greatly limit the number of situations
in which a final decision was reviewable in the court of appeals. But this
interpretation seems unduly narrow when viewed in light of the deletion of the
"undertake to perform" language. By deleting the "undertaking to perform"
requirement, Congress indicated that it was unnecessary for the Administrator
to recognize the requirement to act and to promise its performance. An
interpretation of the present language that requires that a decision recognize a
duty to perform and explicitly defer it for appellate jurisdiction to attach would,
in effect, reinstate the deleted language. In doing so, it would deprive the change
278. One other question is whether the term "nondiscretionary statutory duty" is intended
to limit the court of appeals' jurisdiction to situations in which a statute alone requires the
agency to act. In other words, does the language intend to exclude those situations where the
Administrator's decision has become nondiscretionary because of facts included in the
administrative record? If that were the case, then the district courts' jurisdiction and the court
of appeals' jurisdiction would cover precisely the same types of situations. The only difference
would be that if the Administrator decided not to act after completing a proceeding and
compiling a record, suit would be proper only in the court of appeals.
The answer appears clear that Congress did not intend such a narrow construction. To the
extent that the courts of appeals had found jurisdiction to review agency inaction under prior
law, their review determined whether the agency's action was nondiscretionary in light of both
the statute and the administrative record. See, e.g., Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071, 1079
(1987) (ordering the Administrator to reject the state implementation plan for the South Coast
Air Basin in light of the administrative record). The 1990 Amendments were intended to
broaden, not contract, that prior jurisdiction.
279. CAA § 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2) (1994).
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in the bill's language of meaning, despite the fact that courts have found such
deletions significant in determining congressional intent.8
To avoid this result, a better interpretation would not require that the
Administrator expressly defer performance of a nondiscretionary statutory duty
in a final decision. Rather, if the effect of that final decision is to defer
performance, then jurisdiction to review that deferral would exist in the court of
appeals.28'
6. The Rejection of Overlapping Jurisdiction
Lastly, the Amendments explicitly raise the question of overlapping
jurisdiction. While the district court retains its jurisdiction over a failure to
perform any act or duty which is not discretionary with the Administrator, the
court of appeals now has jurisdiction over a final decision that defers
performance of any nondiscretionary statutory action. The question thus arises
whether Congress intended the two types of jurisdiction to be exclusive, or
whether a petitioner can choose to bring the litigation in either court.
Although the answer is not entirely clear, the better view is that Congress did
not intend to authorize concurrent jurisdiction. The principal support for this
conclusion is that the original Senate Bill 1630, as reported by the Committee on
Public Works and the Environment to the Senate floor, expressly authorized
concurrent jurisdiction. It would have amended section 307(b) to state that where
the Administrator had undertaken to perform an action in a final decision but
deferred performance to a later time, a party could challenge that deferral either
in the court of appeals under section 307(a) or in the district court under section
304(a)(2). 82
280. See, e.g., Stewart v. Ragland, 934 F.2d 1033, 1037 n.6 (9th Cir. 1991) ("When
legislators delete language, we may assume that they intended to eliminate the effect of the
previous wording.").
281. Of course a party seeking to raise this issue on judicial review would have to exhaust
their administrative remedies by raising the issue before the Administrator as well. If the party
did not raise the issue in this fashion, then it could not be said that the final decision deferred
performance if that decision otherwise was silent on the issue. If that were the situation, no
evidence would exist that the Administrator ever had considered the issue, and such
consideration is a prerequisite to a decision deferring it to a later time.
282. Senate Bill 1630 stated in pertinent part: "(3) Where a final decision by the
Administrator undertakes to perform an action, but defers such pierformance to a later time, any
interested person may either challenge the deferral pursuant to paragraph (1) or bring an action
at any time under section 304(a)(2) to compel such performance." S. 1630, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 609(d) (1989), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTs LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176,
at 8289.
The Committee report summarized:
The amendments address situations where an EPA final decision addresses only
part of an air pollution issue, and defers the balance of the issue for resolution at
a later time. In those situations, the amendments will provide that citizens have
the option of suing either under section 307(b)(1) in the Federal courts of appeals
(within sixty days of the EPA final action that announced the deferral) or under
section 304(a)(2) in the district court (without any statutory time limit).
S. RErP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 375 (1990), reprinted in 1990 AMENDMENTS
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However, all later versions of the legislation that ultimately became the 1990
Amendments deleted the authorization for concurrent jurisdiction. The so-called
"Baucus-Chafee Substitute" for the original Senate Bill 1630 allowed citizens to
challenge final decisions which undertook action but deferred performance only
under section 304(a)(2),283 while the House Amendments, which ultimately
became law, authorized a challenge only under section 307 in the court of
appeals."' Congress's refusal to enact an explicit provision authorizing
concurrent jurisdiction over agency inaction in both the district court and the
court of appeals strongly argues against an interpretation that such concurrent
jurisdiction now exists.
E. Summary of the Legislative Intent
To summarize, prior to the 1990 Amendments to the CAA, the legislative
histories of that Act and of the CWA did not provide much assistance in properly
construing the jurisdictional provisions. The only significant point that can be
derived from the amendments prior to 1990 is that Congress likely intended that
the district court's authority to compel an "act or duty which is not discretionary
with the Administrator" should extend only to those acts and duties plainly
commanded by explicit statutory language. This interpretation significantly
narrows the range of s'ituations in which a suit in the district court would be
proper. For example, where the Administrator,'s obligation does not arise until
after he or she has engaged in discretionary fact-finding, the district court cannot
order the agency to engage in that fact-finding or decide the facts itself in lieu of
the agency.
In contrast, the legislative history of the 1990 Amendments to the CAA
contains significant indications about the meaning of the jurisdictional provisions
in that Act. The most important lesson from this most recent history is that, by
expressly authorizing judicial review of final decisions by the Administrator that
defer certain actions, Congress did not intend to limit judicial review only to
final actions taken by the Administrator. Congress, however, also refused to
authorize any review in the district court of agency inaction on the basis that such
inaction was an abuse of discretion as opposed to a violation of a plain statutory
command. Moreover, the insertion and subsequent deletion of a provision that
would have given the district courts and the courts of appeals concurrent
jurisdiction over certain challenges to agency inaction indicates that Congress
rejected the concept of concurrent jurisdiction.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 8715.
283. CAA Amendments of 1989, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 608(d) (1990), reprinted in 1990
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 7847.
284. CAA Amendments of 1990, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 608(h) (1990), reprinted in 1990
AMENDMENTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 176, at 2350.
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V. IDENTIFYING AND PRIORITIZING THE POLICIES
IMPLICATED BY THE BIFURCATED JURISDICTION
PROVISIONS
This Part of the Article identifies a series of policies which an analysis of the
jurisdictional statutes must consider. The policies are varied; they concern the
impact of various aspects ofjudicial review upon the courts, upon the agency that
is the subject of the review, and upon the litigants. Because of their variation, no
single interpretation of the bifurcated review provisions can satisfy all of them.
A closer look at the policies, however, reveals that they are not of equal weight
and can be prioritized. In particular, while the policy goals of assuring agency
accountability and protecting agency autonomy appear to be in conflict, the
analysis demonstrates that the agency's need for autonomy is not equally
cognizable in all instances.
A. Identifying the Policies
Because the legislative history offered relatively little indication of what
Congress intended to accomplish in enacting the bifurcated jurisdiction statutes,
particularly before the enactment of the 1990 Amendments to the CAA, the
policies that those provisions implicate play a decisive role in their interpretation.
The jurisdictional provisions implicate six separate policies originating in
concerns over judicial economy and case management as well as in general
principles of administrative law that the courts must consider. Two of these
policies, conserving judicial resources and recognizing limitations on the fact-
finding and remedial capabilities of appellate courts, concern the impact that the
review provisions have on the judiciary. Two others, protecting agency
deliberations and assuring agency accountability, address the relationship
between the statutes and the administrative functions performed by EPA. Finally,
the last two policies, assuring both predictability in the judicial review process
and timely review of EPA decisions, seek to ensure that litigants' interests are
protected.
A proper interpretation of the review provisions requires the exploration of
each of these policies. Thereafter, the various tests used by the courts, set out at
length above in this article,285 can be measured against those policies.
1. Conserving Judicial Resources
Judicial economy is the policy that the courts most frequently recognize in
deciding questions about jurisdiction to review agency inaction under the CAA
and CWA. That policy has two components. First, the courts want to avoid
piecemeal review of EPA actions in which a district court reviews part of an
overall agency action, with the remainder of that action reviewed directly in the
285. See supra text accompanying notes 107-75.
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court of appeals.28 6 If both courts are considering related issues or are reviewing
part of what is effectively a single administrative record, substantial duplication
ofjudicial efforts will occur.28 7
Thus, in E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,28 an important decision
which established the Administrator's power to set technology-based effluent
limitations by regulation under the CWA, the Supreme Court premised its ruling
partly on the avoidance of unnecessary judicial duplication. The Court found that
it would be "highly anomalous" if EPA's 1983 "best available technology"
regulations and the new source performance standards were directly reviewable
in the court of appeals, while the 1977 "best practicable control technology"
regulations based on the same administrative record were reviewable only in the
district court.289
A second component of the policy goal of judicial economy is to avoid
requiring parties to file separate, sequential requests for judicial review of what
286. See Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1313 (9th Cir. 1992)
("[B]ifurcation of review is undesirable."); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645, 661
(7th Cir. 1986) ("[B]ifurcated review of essentially identical claims is not favored .... ");
Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. EPA, 733 F.2d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Judicial economy
would be disserved by having different aspects of the same order reviewed in two different
courts at once."); and City of Seabrook v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1371, 1373 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct.
1981) ("The suggestion that the district court can order the Administrator to do the things he
has failed to do in the SIP approval process while the court of appeals is reviewing what the
Administrator has actually done would result in an impractical process of piecemeal review
... ."). Piecemeal review also can occur if review of closely related matters is split between the
federal courts and the state courts. See Roll Coater, Inc. v. Reilly, 932 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir.
1991) ("Review of the EPA's approval [of lists under § 304() of the CWA] in district court,
and of the state's submissions and modifications in state court, would bifurcate proceedings
in a way Congress wanted to avoid.").
287. Center for Auto Safety v. EPA, 558 F. Supp. 103, 105 (D.D.C. 1983) (Jurisdiction is
proper exclusively in the court of appeals because "[t]he two actions are essentially identical,
and duplicative litigation is generally to be avoided because it needlessly expends limited
judicial resources while creating the risk of inconsistent decisionmaking."); see also P.H.
Glatfelter Co. v. EPA, 921 F.2d 516, 518 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Review by this court at this
preliminary stage would lead to piecemeal review and undermine future state administrative
and judicial proceedings."); Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 660 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) ("The two suggested forms of action are substantively identical, and it is well settled
that bifurcated jurisdiction between District Court and Court of Appeals over identical
litigation is not favored.").
288. 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
289. Id. at 127-28; see also Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193, 196-97
(1980) ("Under the contrary construction of the Court of Appeals, denials of NPDES [National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] permits would be reviewable at different levels of the
federal-court system depending on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the State in which
the case arose was or was not authorized to issue permits."); Virginia Elec. and Power Co. v.
Costle, 566 F.2d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he regulations issued under § 316(b) are so
closely related to the effluent limitations and new source standards of performance of §§ 301
and 306 that we think it would be anomalous to have their review bifurcated between different
courts.").
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is effectively a single, ongoing agency proceeding?" As one court put it, an
interpretation in which parties must "pester the court" with petitions for review
should be avoided.29' Rather, to the extent possible, the interpretation of the
jurisdictional provisions should clearly identify when a plaintiff must file a
petition for review. It should avoid the need for duplicative or sequential filings
intended solely to avoid a judicial ruling that the plaintiff should have sued
earlier and that, because it did not, the statute of limitations now bars the
action.
292
2. Recognizing Limitations on Fact-Finding and on the
Exercise of Remedial Powers at the Appellate Level
A second important judicial policy arises out of the distinct functions
performed by trial and appellate courts. Judicial review directly in the court of
appeals is proper only when the agency has compiled an administrative record
that will form the basis for the court's review, and therefore, when no need for
judicial fact-finding exists. 293 The court of appeals should not be put in the
290. American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 882 F.2d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he more that we
pull within [§ 1369(b)(1)], the more arguments will be knocked out by inadvertence later
on-and the more reasons firms will have to petition for review of everything in sight.").
291. Roll Coater, Inc. v. Reilly, 932 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1991) (Review of EPA's
approval of lists under § 304(o of the CWA, and review of state submissions and modifications
to permits in the state court, "would also induce firms to pester the district courts, for under
§ 509(b)(2) any firm that forgoes available review is forever barred.").
292. This policy is also predicated on the idea that the agency should not have to defend
various parts of its decisionmaking in sequential petitions for review. Public Citizen Health
Research Group v. Commissioner, Food and Drug Admin., 740 F.2d 21, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
("[T]he integrity of the administrative process is threatened by piecemeal review of the
substantive underpinnings of a rule.").
293. See Asbestec Constr. Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765, 769 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Since an
administrative order reviewable under § 7607(b) may be filed only in the courts of
appeals-which are not designed and are ill-equipped to serve as fact-finding forums-this
factor strongly militates against finding the instant order a final one."); Modine Mfg. Corp. v.
Kay, 791 F.2d 267, 270 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Where the agency has already compiled an
administrative record... district court fact-finding is unnecessary, and district court review in
such a situation is both a needless and time-consuming duplication of the ultimate appellate
consideration." (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729 (1985))); Indiana
& Michigan Elec. Co. v. EPA, 733 F.2d 489, 490 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The ground for giving
jurisdiction over agency-inaction cases to the district courts rather than the courts of appeals
is that when an agency fails to act there may be no record for the court of appeals to review.");
NRDC v. EPA, 673 F.2d 400, 405 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[T]he great advantage the district
courts have over the courts of appeals-their ability to use extensive factfinding
mechanisms-is not relevant here. There is not even an arguable need to engage in technical
fact-finding when judicial review is concentrated on an agency record and policy
determinations."); Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator of EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 1292 (5th Cir.
1977) ("When Congress has vested this court with original review, it generally has done so in
relation to an administrative process that more easily lends itself to production of a reviewable
record."); Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 1118, 1128 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Congress must
have intended that judicial enforcement of implementation plans be instituted in the district
courts where a factual record can be developed.").
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position of having to find facts not based in a record; the district court is the
proper forum for such a task.294
In addition to concern over the courts of appeals' inability to find facts in
deciding the merits of the action, the courts have cited judicial capacity to
enforce remedial orders as a consideration in deciding jurisdiction. For example,
if a petitioner successfully challenges the Administrator's failure to adopt
regulations, the petitioner may request the court to order the Administrator to
adopt the required regulations within a reasonable period of time. The parties
often will dispute what period is reasonable, or the agency may later be charged
with contempt for failing to comply with the court's order.295 An appellate court
may conclude that it is ill-suited to referee these types of factual disputes.
Finally, a third policy concern, albeit one mentioned less frequently in the
opinions, emphasizes that it is appropriate to place review in the court of appeals
b'ecause appellate courts sometimes become intimately familiar with the work,
practices, and needs of specific agencies.296 The theory297 is that where a statute
such as section 307(b) of the CAA gathers all nationally applicable regulations
for review in one circuit court of appeals, that court will acquire substantial
knowledge and understanding of EPA's operations.298 .This knowledge, in turn,
294. Some courts also have noted that if the district court reviews an administrative record,
the parties likely will not be satisfied with review only at that level. Rather, given the important
issues and large costs of compliance often at stake in environmental litigation, they are quite
likely to appeal an adverse ruling as a matter of course. For example, in Lubrizol Corp. v.
Train, 547 F.2d 310, 317 (6th Cir. 1976), the court stated that:
District court review of these regulations would be time consuming and
duplicative since the decision of the district court will generally be appealed to
a court of appeals which will simply review the same administrative record and
assess the agency action anew without special deference to the district court's
opinion.
295. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 602 F. Supp. 892, 900-04 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (finding
the Administrator in contempt for failing to promulgate final standards for radionuclides).
296. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 284 (1978) (noting that
§ 307(b)(2)'s "twin congressional purposes of insuring that the substantive provisions of the
standard would be uniformly applied and interpreted and that the circumstances of its adoption
would be quickly reviewed by a single court intimately familiar with administrative
procedures"); United States v. Ethyl Corp., 761 F.2d 1153, 1156 n.7 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Adamo, 434 U.S. at 284).
297. The theory of benefits is fully explored in Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in
Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REv. 329, 330-32 (1991).
298. The advantages of specialized courts have been thoroughly examined. See, e.g., David
P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for
the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1975); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Specialized
Adjudication, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 377; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts:
A Choice?, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 745 (1981); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the
Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990).
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will inform the courts' review of the agency's actions299 and will also produce
expeditious opinions."0
Modem environmental regulation, however, is notorious for its complexity.30 '
Judicial review in a particular case will focus on narrow issues of statutory
interpretation, will require a close reading of specific regulations, and will entail
consideration of technical information principally relevant only to the precise
point at issue. Often courts cannot easily generalize this knowledge and put it to
use in subsequent litigation on different issues. Furthermore, even if courts can
do so, familiarity with the agency and its workings is not an unmitigated good,
as the court may lose a neutral perspective in its dealings with a particular
agency. 2 Accordingly, this policy concern is not particularly powerful in the
context of the bifurcated jurisdiction provisions.3 3
3. Protecting Agency Autonomy
A third relevant policy is preserving the agency's ability to set its own
priorities and agenda within the limits of its discretion under the statutory
scheme. In recent years Congress has increasingly mandated specific deadlines
for agency actions without allocating sufficient resources for the agency to carry
out those assigned tasks.30 4 Additionally, it has set forth the actions which the
299. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 22, at 514 (Because the court's relationship to government
counsel is relatively close due to repeat appearances, the resulting dialogue is more candid than
one between strangers.).
300. Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative Law, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 1193, 1228 (1992).
301. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (deferring to EPA
interpretation of the CWA because "EPA's understanding of this 'complex statute' is a
sufficiently rational one.. .. "); United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 444 U.S. 1035, 1038 (1980)
(Rehnquist J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (The provisions of the CAA "swim before
one's eyes."); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 17
F.3d 521, 525 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding "no reason to doubt the validity" of the government's
description that the "enormity of the 1990 amendments [to the CAA] beggars description" and
that Congress "took what was widely perceived as an 'unapproachable piece of legislation' and
tripled the Act's length and 'geometrically increased its complexity'...").
302. Bruff, supra note 300, at 1219 (suggesting that, because the District of Columbia
Circuit specializes in complex statutes such as the CAA, the Circuit "has drifted into an active
role of enforcing the 'spirit' of these statutes," and that a generalized court "may provide a
better buffer between government and the regulated").
303. See-also Alex Kozinski, Remarks Concerning Professor Bruffs Proposals, 39 UCLA
L. REv. 1249 (1992) (suggesting that inconsistency among circuits is "not such a bad thing"
because "[e]xperience gained from diverse parts of the country may teach an agency that its
initial attempt at implementing a statute can be improved").
304. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 829-30 (describing the increased
use of statutory deadlines). A 1985 study found that EPA was subject to 328 statutory
deadlines, a list unquestionably increased by the 1990 CAA Amendments. Environmental and
Energy Study Inst. & Environmental Law Inst., Statutory Deadlines In Environmental
Legislation: Necessary But Need Improvement 11 (Sept. 1985).
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agency is to take in considerably more detail than is found in earlier
environmental statutes." 5
Critics have argued that such legislative micro-management of administrative
activities is counterproductive a0 6 and that the agencies need more latitude to
establish regulatory priorities, to assign resources according to those priorities,
and even to reinterpret statutes that prove administratively impossible to
implement.3 7 They also suggest that judicial orders requiring the agency to
perform a nondiscretionary act can require the expenditure of limited agency
resources on some regulatory tasks which, in terms of overall environmental
protection, are far less important than others facing the agency.0 ' Statutory
deadlines, which are often the subject of action-forcing litigation brought under
environmental legislation, do have the benefit of establishing priorities for the
305. See, e.g., Craig N. Oren, Detail and Delegation: A Study in Statutory Specificity, 15
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 143, 145 (1990) (discussing the increased use of specificity in
environmental legislation); Robert V. Perceival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office
Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Autumn
1991, 173, at 173 (discussing the Reagan Administration's "regulatory relief' program which
resulted in congressional amendment of "the already action-forcing environmental laws" to
constrain EPA's discretion even more severely).
306. Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46
ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1994) (increased oversight efforts by the White House led, in turn, to
attempts by Congress to "catch up," and this "cycle of competition" has harmed regulatory
policy through the use of secrecy and micro-management).
307. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOL. L. Q. 233,
306 (1990) (citing advantages to having courts cure symbolic legislation through instrumental
interpretation); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency
Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN.
L. REV. 7, 28 (1991) ("The now widespread phenomenon of unrealistic and inconsistent
judicial commands to agencies is attributable to two factors-malleable doctrines and growth
in the highly decentralized federal judiciary.").
308. R. Shep Melnick paints an almost totally negative picture ofjudicial review:
Judicial review has subjected agencies to debilitating delay and uncertainty.
Courts have heaped new tasks on agencies while decreasing their ability to
perform any of them. They have forced agencies to substitute trivial pursuits for
important ones. And they have discouraged administrators from taking
responsibility for their actions and for educating the public.
R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 245, 246
(1992); see also Bruff, supra note 300, at 1209 ("Because each agency is centrally organized,
it has an overall grasp of its programs and priorities that is unavailable to a court reviewing one
of its decisions. Consequently, judicial review constantly risks impairing agency operations.");
Robert L. Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law
and Politics, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991,249, at 301 (Complying with judicial
review is costly, and perfecting a record that will survive judicial review can, among other
results, reduce total agency work product and force agency resources into less productive forms
of regulation.). But see ROSEMARY O'LEARY, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE EPA 144 (1993) ("This study indicates that, contrary to the general picture painted
by many of today's judicial scholars, the partnership of courts and public agencies has many
positive attributes.").
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agency as well as mitigating political pressure on the agency not to act.30 9 At the
same time, if the deadline is unrealistic, as many EPA deadlines are"O given the
resources available to the agency, the deadline can force the agency to make a
hasty decision or to divert resources into litigation."'
Any question about the appropriate extent of such agency autonomy is not
susceptible to a categorical answer. Suggestions that the agency can simply
ignore statutory mandates because of a claimed lack of resources run the risk that
the agency will base resource allocation decisions on short-term political
expediency or disagreement with statutory goals, rather than on sound planning
designed to maximize priorities based upon valid environmental considerations,
such as risk to health. Moreover, the proposal that the agency should be able to
ignore a statutory mandate would reject the fundamental tenet that Congress
establishes the work agenda of agencies it has created through statutory
mandates.
The debate over the agency implementation of statutory mandates, however,
does serve to focus attention on the pervasive problem of lack of resources
needed to carry out all of the EPA mandates. The chronic shortage of agency
resources means that EPA faces important strategic allocation choices. Courts are
ill-equipped to second guess those choices; they must carefully consider whether
their decisions will unduly impinge upon this aspect of the agency's autonomy.
Several courts have recognized this need to respect agency autonomy in
interpreting the final action requirement of the bifurcated jurisdictional review
provisions."'
4. Assuring Agency Accountability
In tension with the policy of avoiding undue interference with agency
autonomy is the principle that agencies must be accountable to the public for
their actions. 3 On the most basic level, accountability requires that EPA must
309. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory
Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 53 (1989).
310. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, 54 LAW&CONTENP. PROBS. 311,313 (1991) ("Congress has repeatedly
demanded that the agency perform impossible tasks under unrealistic deadlines.").
311. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 304, at 835-36; Shapiro & McGarity, supra note
309, at 53-54.
312. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. EPA, 618 F.2d 991, 997 (3d Cir.
1980) (reading a "finality requirement" into § 509 of the CWA, and noting that "unlimited
interlocutory review could seriously impede the performance of EPA's rulemaking functions").
313. Accountability is a primary goal of a basic tenet of administrative law, the
nondelegation doctrine. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (positing that the first function of the
nondelegation doctrine is to ensure that popular choices of social policy "are made by
Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will"). Indeed, much
of modem administrative law centers on concerns over the exercise of administrative discretion
and posits, as a principal goal, the idea of greater agency accountability for actions. See also
Thomas 0. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAw & COMTEMP.
PROBS. 57, 58 (1991) ("Most bureaucratic entities pursue institutional power with the same
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not affirmatively employ the bifurcated jurisdictional review provisions as a
means of avoiding legitimate judicial scrutiny into the agency's compliance with
nondiscretionary statutory requirements 1 4 Several courts, however, have
concluded that EPA has employed the review requirements for just this
purpose,3"' and redressing this type of agency conduct was a theme of the
legislative history of the 1990 Amendments to the CAA.
3 16
More generally, accountability also requires that, at some point after the
agency has been given sufficient time to consider an issue and has reached a
conclusion about it, the agency's work must be subject to judicial review. A line
must be drawn between reflective consideration and analysis of issues by the
agency in light of available resources, and unwarranted delay inspired not by lack
of resources but simply by lack of will or political disagreement with the
obligations imposed by statute. Concerns over unjustified agency delay underlie
the provisions of the former APA still in force today authorizing courts to
remedy "unreasonabl[e] delay[]" in agency decisionmaking,317 and those
concerns apply equally to judicial review under the CAA and CWA.
5. Assuring Predictability for Litigants
A fifth policy implicated by the judicial review provisions is the predictability
of judicial review from the litigants' standpoint. Extensive litigation over the
collateral issue of which court has jurisdiction to hear a case not only squanders
judicial time, it also wastes the litigants' resources by increasing the cost of an
already-expensive litigation process." 8 Thus, in interpreting the bifurcated
jurisdiction provisions, the courts must consider whether a particular
interpretation will allow parties to determine easily the court in which they
should bring a case.
vigor that they shun accountability.").
314. Fluomoy, supra note 89, at 380 ("If EPA has free reign to decide when it has sufficient
evidence to act, statutes mandating action are a sham."). There is, of course, considerable
debate about the scope of the courts' role in determining whether such a nondiscretionary duty
arises. In recent years, the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837
(1984), has instructed lower courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. As
a result, instances in which courts find statutory violations have lessened. Glicksman &
Schroeder, supra note 308, at 304 (noting a "move toward a much more modest sense of what
the law is, and of what the statute commands"). The question at issue with respect to agency
inaction is whether, if such a nondiscretionary duty exists even under an expanded view of the
agency's right to determine its statutory obligations, the agency can be held accountable for
violating that duty.
315. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645, 663 (7th Cir. 1986) (Swygert,
J., dissenting) ("The EPA's purposeful evasion of its statutory mandate is evidenced by the fact
that it has attempted to insulate its inaction from judicial review.").
316. See supra text accompanying note 243.
317. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1994).
318. See Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1992) (observing
that "[w]e can tell from the briefs and arguments in thisClean Water Act case that tremendous
resources in time and money and considerable legal skill have gone into finding out the proper
address for an appeal, an activity which does not keep water clean and does not process wood
pulp").
[Vol. 72:65
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW AGENCY INACTION
Interestingly, few courts have expressly recognized any concern over the need
for certainty on the part of litigants. In Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., a case
interpreting the finality requirement in section 307, the Supreme Court did note
that because of uncertainty over judicial jurisdiction to review the agency's
action, the petitioner had filed both a petition for review in the court of appeals
and a complaint in the district court.3 19 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit also has noted the need for "clear and workable guidelines" for
judicial review.32 ° Most courts, however, have focused on the policies pertaining
to judicial resources that more directly implicate the courts,32 leaving it to the
litigants to pick up the pieces from the judicial interpretations. As a result, the
courts have paid insufficient attention to the impact of their decisions on the
litigants seeking review, and confusion over the bifurcated review provisions has
proliferated.
6. Assuring Timely Review
The last policy that must be considered is assuring timely judicial review of
EPA decisions. In many cases where administrative agencies have acted after
compiling a record, Congress has nonetheless required plaintiffs first to seek
review in the district court rather than directly in the court of appeals.322 Standing
in contrast to this practice, the direct appellate review provisions of the CAA and
CWA, together with the short time frames in which plaintiffs must seek review,
are intended not only to avoid duplication ofjudicial efforts3 23 but also to secure
expeditious review so that any errors are quickly brought to the agency's
attention.324 That intent is consistent with the overall emphasis in both Acts of
requiring EPA to address environmental hazards expeditiously.325 If application
319. 446 U.S. 578, 584 (1980).
320. See NRDC v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1975), in which the court noted
that awarding attorneys' fees under the theory advanced by petitioner "could also impede the
development of clear and workable guidelines for the administration of sections 304 and 307
as the Act's basic jurisdictional grants." The court, however, then observed that "[d]isarray
among existing decisions suggests that such guidelines will not be easily arrived at in any
event." Id at 1357 n.32.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 286-92.
322. Review is generally in the district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994). Some more
specialized agencies with elaborate administrative processes have statutes providing for direct
review in the court of appeals. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1994) (direct review of decisions
under the Immigration and Nationality Act); 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1994) (direct review of
decisions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission under the Federal Power Act); 29
U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1994) (direct review of decisions of the National Labor Relations Board);
47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1994) (direct review of decisions of the Federal Communications
Commission).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 286-303.
324. NRDC v. EPA, 22 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Congress has declared a
preference for prompt review in § 307(b)(1).).
325. See Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 659 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
("[I]n the Clean Air Act the Congress was particularly concerned with rapid review of the
promulgated standards, and so imposed the especially short 30-day [now 60-day] filing
period.").
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of the bifurcated review provisions causes delay while courts sort out the proper
jurisdiction for litigating and perhaps conclude that plaintiffs must begin anew
in another forum, that delay undermines the policy.
B. Prioritizing the Policies
The discussion above sets forth the relevant policies that are important to
construing the jurisdictional reach of the statutes authorizing judicial review of
agency environmental decisions. Those policies, however, are not of equal
weight. A closer examination of them in the context of judicial review of
environmental statutes reveals that they may be prioritized in terms of
importance. Those priorities, in turn, simplify the task of determining which
approach to judicial review best promotes the policies underlying the review
statutes.
1. The Court-Centered Policies
The concern about conserving judicial resources is significant, for judicial
consideration of environmental issues in litigation is time-consuming. The
complexity of the major federal environmental laws, such as the CAA and CWA,
is now established beyond question; numerous courts have attested to the
difficulty of construing them.326 Moreover, the technical details posed by
environmental issues are equally daunting.3 27 Resolution of an issue can require
consideration of cost-benefit analysis,328 risk analysis,329 advanced scientific
326. See supra note 17.
327. Bruff, supra note 300, at 1204:
Regulatory proceedings can readily produce administrative records of 10,000
pages or more, filled with conflicting material on technical issues of fact and
policy. A judge must struggle just to understand the technical issues-evaluating
the soundness of their resolution by the agency and deciding how far to probe are
harder still.
328. See, e.g., American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(explaining that in regulating the manufacture and sale of fuel or fuel additives, the agency
must "consider all relevant medical and scientific evidence, including other feasible means of
achieving emission standards, and also consider available scientific and economic data,
including a cost benefit analysis comparing emission control devices that use the prohibited
fuel and those that do not"); NRDC v. EPA, 937 F.2d 641, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding
cost-benefit analysis used by EPA in excluding "fugitive dust" from surface coal mining
regulations in identifying major facilities subject to "prevention of significant deterioration"
regulations); Rybacheck v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1289 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Mhe EPA is required
to consider the costs and benefits of a proposed technology in its inquiry to determine the [best
practicable control technology].") (quoting Association of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d
794, 805 (9th Cir. 1980)).
329. See, e.g., Leather Indus. of Am., Inc. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(reviewing EPA's adoption of a "risk-based concentration cap"); NRDC v. Administrator,
EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated in part and dismissed in part by 921 F.2d
326 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding the Administrator's determination of the primary air quality
standards for particulates based solely on risk to health); Flournoy, supra note 84, at 329
(observing a "common model" of environmental statutes "directing the Environmental
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inquiry,33 ° and decisionmaking under various levels of uncertainty.33' And
because compliance with environmental regulation is costly, much of the
litigation over it is multi-party in nature, further adding to its time-consuming
nature.
All of these factors suggest that the courts should seek to avoid any
interpretation of the review provisions which might require both the district court
and the court of appeals to consider related aspects of one underlying regulatory
proceeding. In such instances, the costs to the judicial system are real and large.
The second judicially centered policy, avoiding judicial fact-finding at the
appellate level, is entitled to some credence, but in terms of judicial review of
agency inaction, it is not greatly significant. The case law demonstrates that, in
practice, the courts of appeals have been asked to review agency inaction only
after the agency has completed some sort of administrative proceeding and then
failed to act. In such instances the parties have been accorded the opportunity to
submit pertinent facts and argue their positions to the agency, and the court of
appeals will have an administrative record to review.
Judicial fact-finding is a larger concern only where the court of appeals
concludes that the agency violated an obligation to act and is asked to fashion an
injunctive-type remedy. The only facts at issue here, however, relate to the
timetable in which the agency must act, with the agency arguing that it needs
more time and the party seeking action arguing that the agency needs less time.
The dispute is principally over the resources reasonably available to the agency
to carry out its statutory obligation.
In this context, any concern over an appellate court's inability to find facts in
deciding disputes over resources available to the agency is more theoretical than
real for three reasons.332 First, a dispute over the timetable needed to carry out the
statutory obligation will not arise in every case. The party seeking agency action
may not seek a judicial timetable for agency action, or the parties may agree on
Protection Agency ... to impose regulatory restrictions if it determines that an activity or
substance within the statute's scope poses a risk of harm to health or the environment").
330. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (Court
must be at its most deferential when the agency is making predictions, within its area of special
expertise, at the frontiers of science.); NRDC v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1404 (4th Cir. 1993)
("Once again, we are confronted with an area dominated by complex scientific inquiry and
judgment.").
331. See, e.g., New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("We are
particularly deferential when reviewing agency actions involving policy decisions based on
uncertain technical information."); Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. EPA, 912
F.2d 1525, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting the "considerable uncertainty and controversy"
surrounding allegations about the detrimental effects of acid rain); NRDC v. Administrator,
EPA, 902 F.2d at 971 (Administrator did not act arbitrarily in drawing conclusions from the
uncertain and conflicting data.).
332. Indeed, appellate courts have ordered rulemaking as a remedy in some environmental
cases. See, e.g., Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 687, 695 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998
(1990) (ordering EPA to promulgate federal implementation for counties in Arizona).
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a timetable for carrying out the agency's obligations.333 In both situations, the
court is not required to make judgments about what actions the agency is capable
of taking.
Second, even when these types of issues are fully litigated at the district court
level in other situations, they tend to be decided by paper motion rather than
through live testimony."" The court of appeals is certainly capable of reading and
deciding such motions; it does so routinely on other aspects of appellate
litigation.335 The court of appeals also has the ability to appoint a special
master.336
Finally, the court of appeals has the option of completely avoiding the factual
problems associated with the remedial stage of the litigation. The court could
undertake review of the agency's inaction and conclude that the agency violated
a mandatory obligation to take action. However, it could limit its remedy to a
declaration that the agency is required by law to take action. The agency would
then be under an obligation to act within a reasonable time-frame, and a party
could then file an action in the district court seeking an order that set forth an
explicit timetable.
Thus, while the courts must be concerned about the likelihood that an
interpretation of the relevant statutes will require the court of appeals to decide
factual issues, that outcome is not likely in the instance of agency inaction under
federal environmental law. Accordingly, this concern is not entitled to great
weight in interpreting the relevant statutes.
2. The Agency-Centered Policies
The policies of protecting agency autonomy and insuring agency accountability
are both legitimate in the situation of agency inaction. The agency may
appropriately demand respect for its autonomy in deciding how best to utilize its
resources, particularly in an era of increasingly stringent budgets. Moreover, an
333. See Sierra Club v. Browner, Civ. A. Nos. 93-124 (NHJ), 93-125, 93-197, 93-564, 1994
WL 750290, at *6 (D.D.C., Sept. 20, 1994) (Mem. Op.) (finding that proposed timetable in
consent decree under which EPA would promulgate regulations regarding marine vessel
loading emissions was fair and reasonable).
334. See, e.g., American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 72 F.3d 907, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(deciding various attorney's fee applications and noting that "[p]etitioners have provided
support for the reasonableness of their rates through affidavits and a survey of rates"); Sierra
Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165, 172-73 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (discussing declarations submitted
by plaintiffs and EPA).
335. See, e.g., Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Dept. of the Interior, No. 93-3878, 1993 WL
642401 (6th Cir. 1993) (in which a motion for a stay of a preliminary injunction was granted
in part and denied in part).
336. See Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 1994):
To the extent that the petition may raise factual questions, they could be dealt
with by remand to the agency or by appointment of a special master. See Harrison,
446 U.S. at 594 ("[Ain appellate court is not without recourse in the event it finds
itself unable to exercise informed judicial review because of an inadequate
administrative record.").
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agency's claims that it must continue to deliberate because of an uncertain
scientific basis for action are entitled to credence, especially where the judicial
branch is not equipped to easily determine the validity of those claims.
At the same time, administrative accountability is also essential for an
endeavor so closely associated with protection of the public health. The need for
accountability is heightened where indications exist that an agency is taking an
unduly long period to consider issues or is employing lengthy procedures as a
shield to avoid carrying out explicit statutory mandates. As noted above,337 some
judges have suggested that EPA has engaged in such conduct.
The two policies of autonomy and accountability plainly conflict. In the
context of judicial review of agency inaction, deference to agency autonomy can
easily lead to lack of accountability. The opposite is also true: increased judicial
scrutiny designed to assure accountability can unduly impinge upon agency
autonomy?3 Some middle ground is necessary so that judicial review can serve
both policies.
The criticism that EPA is overly "micro-managed" by statute would seem to
suggest that judicial review should be structured to maximize the agency's
autonomy, even if that autonomy is enlarged at the expense of agency
accountability. Under such an approach, judicial review of agency inaction
would be limited so that the courts would minimally interfere with the agency's
decisions. Before taking such a step, however, it is important to consider
carefully the functions that a court performs in undertaking judicial review of
various types of EPA decisions, for judicial review of agency inaction varies
markedly in the potential for interference with the agency's legitimate
expectations of autonomy.
At one extreme, the agency's refusal to act may occur after it has examined
complex scientific evidence and concluded, based on this examination, that no
action at this time is warranted.339 The agency may bolster this decision by
arguing that it is considering various other alternative regulatory avenues in order
to address the environmental problem at issue.34 At the other extreme, the
agency's factual conclusions about the scientific evidence or its policy choices
337. See supra text accompanying note 24.
338. Chief Judge Wald articulated the competing concerns well:
If an agency is outrageously dragging its feet or ignoring its statutory mandate
from Congress, why shouldn't that behavior be just as reviewable as, say, the
decision of an agency to flout its mandate and repeal existing rules in the name
of deregulation? Nevertheless, there is a strong counterargument that judges are
not capable of reviewing agency inaction involving, as it often does, allocation
of discrete sources and policy priorities, at least where the relevant statute
provides no standards by which to evaluate the agency's decision not to act.
Wald, supra note 22, at 522.
339. See, e.g., NRDC v. Administrator, EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated
in part and dismissed in part by 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (recounting EPA's defense of
its decision not to regulate particulates on the grounds that it was awaiting a "coherent,
scientifically based strategy" for relating the visibility effects of fine particles with the acid
deposition phenomenon).
340. Id. (discussing how the agency evaluated various approaches to acid deposition).
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may not be in question; rather, the plaintiff simply alleges that the agency's
inaction has violated a plain statutory command to act.
34
'
The agency's claim to autonomy, and thus to insulation from judicial review
of its inaction, is strongest when the court is reviewing either its assessment of
scientific evidence or its policy choices. The court's inability to understand fully
the scientific evidence renders its interference with the agency's scientific
choices problematic. The possibility that judicial review may adversely affect the
agency's ability to carry out its regulatory functions suggests that any review of
administrative inaction which touches on these areas should be very deferential
to the agency's judgments.
It is quite another thing, however, to insulate the agency from judicial review
of its failure to carry out a statutory command where the scientific facts are
undisputed and the only policy choice in question concerns the wisdom of the
statutory requirement itself, rather than administrative policy choices about how
to carry it out. If, in this instance, courts ignore plain statutory mandates out of
deference to the agency's autonomy, they have effectively rejected the
fundamental tenet of administrative law that Congress, through statutory
mandates, establishes the regulatory agenda of the agencies which it has
created. 42 A regime ofjudicial review which immunizes the agency's refusal to
implement a Congressional mandate from judicial oversight deprives the mandate
of meaning, for in doing so, the court effectively has allowed the agency to
equate its lawmaking choices with those of the legislative branch of government.
Extending agency discretion to these lengths is inadvisable, and judicial review
of an agency's refusal to conform to plainly expressed legislative will provides
a necessary check on its power.
Moreover, judicial review of agency inaction, particularly if it violates a plain
statutory requirement, does not excessively affect the area of autonomy to which
the agency is legitimately entitled. While statutory directives are more specific
now than in the past,343 they still leave significant areas of administrative
discretion. For example, the agency may still possess considerable discretion in
allocating resources to implement the statutory command and in setting the
timetable for implementing the regulatory scheme. Additionally, if the agency
believes that the statute is unwise, it can use the implementation process as a
means of convincing Congress that the statute is counter-productive and should
be changed.3"
Finally, EPA's history suggests that its claims for respect of its autonomy, at
least in some instances, are suspect. At various points in its history the agency
341. See, e.g., Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 1987) (reviewing
petitioner's allegation that EPA violated explicit statutory requirements in the CAA by not
disapproving an SIP).
342. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMrNISTRATIVE LAW 15 (1993)
("Assuring that a primary legislative power remains in Congress is the task of the delegation
doctrine.").
343. See supra notes 304-05.
344. For example, the agency has convincingly argued that it should not have to write
"federal implementation plans" for the many instances in which states have failed to submit
timely plans under the CAA.
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has been subject to illegitimate pressures to ignore the plain statutory direction
set out in the CAA and CWA.345 For example, EPA as an agency has suffered
from overtly political interference in its functioning, particularly through
executive branch extra-statutory oversight of the agency's decisions. If statutes
limit the availability of review when the agency refuses to act, the outcome is not
necessarily an increase in agency autonomy that will result in improved
decisionmaking. Instead, it may mean that extra-legal pressures on the agency
which stem from political expediency rather than agency expertise operate
outside the sphere of judicial correction.346
In sum, the suggestion here is that in the construction of the judicial review
statutes, while courts should exercise considerable deference in reviewing agency
inaction based on the agency's scientific expertise or policy judgments, it is
entirely appropriate for courts to determine whether the agency's inaction
violates a purely statutory command. In the latter case, the need for agency
accountability is more important than protecting its autonomy. Rather, it is within
the process of exercising discretion in implementing the statutory command that
courts should elevate the importance of agency autonomy and grant greater
judicial deference to the agency's resource- and policy-based choices in
implementing the statute. Thus, to the extent possible in interpreting the statutes
authorizing jurisdiction, the court should defer only to the agency's choices of
implementation mechanisms, resource-allocation, and emphasis in risk
regulation.34 7
Some argue that, in undertaking judicial review of agency inaction within this
type of framework, the courts usurp power that properly belongs to the executive
branch of government.3 48 That argument, however, is misplaced. Such criticisms
of the judicial role in reviewing EPA actions ignore the fact that Congress, not
the courts, sets the statutory deadlines and mandatory requirements. A court
cannot choose among them, for it has no legitimate criteria by which to determine
whether to order the agency to implement one particular statute but not order the
agency to enforce another mandatory statute which the agency also has not
implemented. A court must treat all mandates equally, or it will be subject to the
same criticism legitimately directed at EPA in the past: that the agency has
345. See Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 308, at 267.
346. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 309, at 56 (observing how groups relied on
deadlines under the Occupational Safety and Health Act to force a reluctant agency to act).
347. That deference also should manifest itself in the court's determination of the time-frame
in which it will order the agency to comply with the statutory mandate. See McGarity, supra
note 313, at 78 (noting that external reviewing institutions like the courts judge an agency by
its ability to do what Congress tells it to do within a reasonable time, "if not necessarily within
the extremely ambitious deadlines to which Congress occasionally subjects EPA"). The agency
may avoid a statutorily set timetable by showing it is impossible or infeasible to issue the
regulations within that time frame. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165, 172 (N.D. Cal.
1987). A few courts, albeit a minority, have held that in mandating EPA to issue regulations,
the court must accept EPA's proposed schedule if EPA demonstrates that it is proceeding in
good faith. Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 569 (D.D.C. 1986);
Illinois v. Costle, 12 Envtl. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1597 (D.D.C. 1979).
348. See Melnick, supra note 308.
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chosen the requirements it wished to implement on political rather than legal
grounds.
Thus, the two conflicting policies of accountability and autonomy are best
served not by interpreting the jurisdictional review statutes to exempt agency
inaction from judicial review, but by building into the scope of review an
increased measure of deference for the agency's legitimate autonomy in scientific
analysis, resource allocation, and policy adoption.349 If the agency completes a
process but refuses to act, the twin concerns over autonomy and accountability
are met if the court concludes that jurisdiction for judicial review exists but also
recognizes that it should intrude on the agency's choice not to act only where the
record contains no support for that choice or the agency has violated a plain
statutory command. Finally, structuring judicial review in this manner also will
encourage the agency to document in the record its reasons for refusing to act,35
an effort that will increase the legitimacy of the agency's administrative
processes.
3. The Litigant-Centered Policies
Unlike the agency-related policies of autonomy and accountability, the two
relevant litigant-related policies-assuring predictability in determining the
appropriate court for judicial review and assuring timely review-generally work
in harmony. If the law is clear about the choice of court for judicial review of
agency inaction, that certainty will avoid much of the delay inherent in collateral
litigation over jurisdiction. It will also avoid the unnecessary costs associated
with that collateral litigation.
In general, the policy of assuring timely review of administrative action is
promoted if, where possible, review is placed directly in the court of appeals,
since the extra step of review in the district court is avoided."' Where review
must begin in the district court, however, the policy of timeliness is still served
by maximizing the parties' ability to predict the proper court. Timeliness is also
349. Increased deference for agency rulemaking has been suggested as a means of freeing
the rulemaking from current judicially imposed constraints. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some
Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1426 (1992); see also
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of
Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1285 (1989) (suggesting that doctrines which move the
legal environment closer to the goal of a politically accountable administrative state are those
which accord significant deference to agencies but leave courts positioned to confine agency
action within constitutional and statutory boundaries). One need not subscribe to this
generalized theory, however, to conclude that in the context of judicial review of agency
inaction in these circumstances, an increased measure of deference to the agency is appropriate.
350. See Wald, supra note 22, at 528 (noting the increase in the number of cases in which
courts "[do] not... tell an agency that its methodology or procedures were wrong.., but
rather... tell an agency that it has not sufficiently explained why it chose the course it did-in
short, 'go back and rewrite your reasons').
351. Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing judicial economy as
a major basis for the CAA's jurisdictional scheme, "to wit, the risk of duplicative or piecemeal
litigation, and the risk of contradictory decisions" (quoting NRDC v. Reilly, 788 F. Supp. 268,
273 (E.D. Va. 1992))).
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served where the statutory structure of judicial review avoids the situation in
which both the district court and court of appeals simultaneously consider issues
involving the same administrative record or the same statutory scheme. In such
situations, it is very likely that the loser in the district court will file an appeal.
When such an appeal occurs, neither the agency's implementation of its
actions-if it prevails-or its consideration of issues on remand-if it does
not-will begin until the appeal is resolved. Accordingly, the benefits of
timeliness intended by authorizing direct review in the court of appeals are lost.
VI. UNTANGLING THE KNOT: TOWARD A MORE
SYSTEMATIC REGIME OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
This final Part of the Article examines the various tests that the courts have
used in construing the bifurcated jurisdiction provisions in light of the policy
considerations and indications of legislative intent identified in the discussion
above. The purpose of this analysis is to determine which of the judicial tests
most closely accords with those policies and that intent.
The sheer number of policies relevant to the jurisdictional statutes makes it
difficult for any single approach to satisfy them all. Further complicating the
analysis are the conflicting goals of some of the policies and the fact that, as
discussed above, the policies do not merit equal treatment. In contrast, applying
the legislative intent is easier. The most important indications of legislative intent
are few, principally appearing only in the history of the 1990 Amendments, and
do not apply to the CWA's jurisdictional provisions, which Congress has not
recently changed.
Accordingly, the analysis first undertakes the more complex task of examining
the various judicial approaches to review of agency inaction to determine which
of them maximizes adherence to the relevant policies. After completing this
analysis, the discussion then turns to the legislative history to determine whether
the optimum approach from a policy standpoint is consistent with the indications
of legislative intent found in that history.
This Part concludes that two tests, the rulemaking cycle and constructive final
action tests, best accommodate the relevant policies implicated by the
jurisdictional review provisions. The rulemaking cycle test, however, is distinctly
superior to the constructive final action test in terms of consistency with
legislative intent. Thus, this Part concludes that courts should apply the
rulemaking cycle test, but they should do so in a manner which exhibits
sensitivity towards the agency's needs for autonomy. Finally, the Article suggests
an interpretation of the judicial review statutes that is consistent with the
rulemaking cycle test but that would avoid a conflict with the congressional
intent rejecting concurrent jurisdiction in both the district court and the courts
of appeals.
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A. Application of the Relevant Policies
1. "The Embedded in Final Action" Test
As noted above,352 the embedded in final action test is the most widely cited of
the judicial tests for determining finality of agency action. It allows the court of
appeals to review agency inaction that is embedded in a challenge by the
plaintiffs to broader agency action. This approach, however, seriously conflicts
with several of the relevant policies that underlie the judicial review statutes.
The most significant problem with the approach is its lack of predictability for
litigants. The difficulty arises because the courts have not defined-and cannot
define with any particularity-when a specific determination is embedded in a
larger agency action that is final for purposes of judicial review. The word
"embedded" implies that the inaction must be sufficiently related to other,
presumably broader action which the agency did take. In other words, the
inaction must be a subset of activity related to a broader category of agency
decisionmaking which, on balance, contains more action than inaction. If it does,
the court of appeals can assume jurisdiction over the entire "final action" under
section 307 of the CAA.
In practice, however, the test is unpredictable, for many types of agency
inaction can be categorized as part of a broader action taken by the agency. For
example, when the Administrator takes no action on a single part of a proposed
revision to an SIP under the CAA, that inaction may be closely related to a
broader decision either to approve or disapprove the entire plan.353 In other
instances, however, the inaction is sufficiently separable from the action that it
will not be treated as embedded in the action.354
The embedded in final action approach does not provide any criteria for
differentiating between the two situations. As a result, the determination that the
inaction is embedded in a larger agency final action is an empty conclusion rather
than the end result of the application of a set of criteria that renders a predictable
conclusion. Application of the embedded in final action test thus devolves into
case-by-case adjudication with little predictability for new or unusual situations.
For example, in the seminal case adopting the test, Indiana & Michigan
Electric Co. v. United States EPA,355 the SIP submission at issue included a
352. See supra text accompanying notes 108-17.
353. For example, in Alabama Power Co. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 450, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1994),
petitioners asserted that "EPA's decision not to allow utilities to obtain conditional approval
in advance of certain alternative 'emissions averaging' plans was arbitrary in light of its
decision to allow for conditional approval of such plans" in regulations governing other types
of emissions. The court reviewed the allegation without any concern about jurisdiction.
354. See, e.g., NRDC v. Administrator, EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Wald,
C.J., concurring), vacated in part and dismissed in part by 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(observing that the visibility standard was not "embedded" in an overall secondary air quality
standard, but was "entirely separate" from another secondary standard).
355. 733 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984).
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thirty-day averaging provision which EPA did not act upon in approving the
overall submission. The court found that EPA's inaction on the thirty-day
averaging provision was final for purposes ofjudicial review but did not explain
why it had reached that conclusion. One explanation is that the SIP revision was
submitted as a uniform package, and thus any inaction on part of that package
was embedded in the larger decision on that package. This interpretation,
however, is inconsistent with the result in a later Seventh Circuit case, Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. United States EPA,356 in which the court rejected jurisdiction over
a citizens group's challenge to the approval of an SIP revision on the ground that
it did not go "far enough." The inaction in that case seemingly was just as
embedded in the final action approving the SIP revision as that in Indiana &
Michigan Electric Co., and both plaintiffs were arguing that the SIP approvals
did not comply with a statutory requirement.
Another possible explanation for the Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. result
is that through its inaction on the thirty-day averaging provision, EPA effectively
approved an SIP revision that differed from the one which the state had
submitted. However, while this distinction might explain the result in Indiana &
Michigan Electric Co., other cases do not limit the test to this category of
circumstances.357
Thus, the meaning of the embedded in final action test is unclear, and the test
cannot be sufficiently generalized so that plaintiffs could definitively determine
the proper forum for their actions. Furthermore, because the test forces plaintiffs
to litigate over the correctness of the forum, the test hinders the goal of securing
timely review of agency determinations. If a'plaintiff chooses incorrectly, the
plaintiff either must begin anew in the proper forum-so long as the sixty-day
statute of limitations in section 307 does not prevent the filing of a new action.35
And to avoid the latter possibility, a plaintiff may choose initially to file in both
the district court and the court of appeals.
Moreover, the test in many instances guarantees that one and possibly even two
courts will have to review extensive administrative material to decide the
jurisdictional questions. For example, a plaintiff may file a challenge in the court
of appeals to the part of an agency rulemaking that is unquestionably final as
well as to the agency's refusal to act on another issue in that rulemaking. To
apply the embedded in final action test and determine its jurisdiction over the
latter claim, the court of appeals cannot simply read the petition for review.
Rather, to understand the agency's action, the court of appeals will have to
review the part of the administrative record that concerns both claims. If the
court ultimately determines that the inaction was not embedded, it would then
dismiss the claim despite the extensive efforts that it had made to understand
fully the issues it raises.
The embedded in final action test is relatively neutral with respect to the policy
goals of ensuring agency accountability and protecting agency autonomy. This
356. 782 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1986).
357. See Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1987); Kamp v. Hemandez, 752 F.2d
1444 (9th Cir. 1985).
358. CAA § 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2) (1994).
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neutrality stems from the fact that the test focuses on the closeness of the
relationship between the action that the agency did take and its inaction. It does
not, for example, automatically sweep a large number of agency inactions before
the court of appeals simply because the agency has completed a process, as does
the rulemaking cycle approach, or automatically reject any jurisdiction in the
courts of appeals for the inaction, as does the actual final decision approach.
Rather, the effects on agency autonomy and accountability are random because
the test is centered on an independent variable: the relationship between the
inaction and other action which the agency has taken. Thus, the embedded in
final action test neither systemically promotes nor hinders either agency
accountability or agency autonomy.
In sum, the most significant shortcoming of the embedded in final action test
is the inability to define what counts as embedded. Without such a definitive
interpretation, the test lacks predictability for litigants, invites repeated litigation
to determine jurisdiction, and does not serve the policy of assuring timely review.
2. The "Remedy" Test
The principal positive feature of the remedy. 9 test is that a litigant can readily
predict the appropriate forum by considering the type of relief sought from the
court. If the petitioner is asking the court to set aside regulations adopted by the
agency, jurisdiction lies in the court of appeals. In contrast, if the remedy sought
is an order requiring the agency to promulgate new regulations, the district court
has jurisdiction. Thus in terms of predictability, the remedy test is far superior
to the embedded in final action test, which provides little predictability in its
application.
The test also strongly furthers a second albeit less important policy goal:
recognizing limitations on the remedial capabilities of appellate courts. Indeed,
the test is premised on the concept that the remedy sought from the court
determines the court's jurisdiction. It assumes that, if the court must order
additional rulemaking rather than merely set aside rules already adopted, the
court of appeals is unsuited to hear the action. Rather, the litigation is proper
only in the district court, which has the fact-finding capabilities necessary to
fashion an appropriate compliance order.
By establishing the remedy sought by petitioner as the primary determinant of
jurisdiction, however, the test seriously undermines the goal of assuring judicial
economy by virtually ensuring that duplication of judicial efforts will occur.
Consider the following typical scenario: EPA adopts a regulation which both
industry groups and environmentalists immediately challenge. The industry
groups seek to set aside the rule as overly stringent and insufficiently based on
the record, while the environmentalists claim that the rule does not go far
enough, perhaps by failing to cover certain sources. Under the remedy test, the
industry petition is appropriately heard in the court of appeals, because the
remedy that industry petitioners seek is to set aside the rule. In contrast, because
the environmentalists do not seek to set aside the existing rule but only wish to
359. See supra text accompanying notes 118-35.
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extend its reach, the environmentalists' petition must be heard in the district
court.
Assuming that the district court accepts jurisdiction over the
environmentalists' petition,3 6' both courts will have to review the same
administrative record to decide the respective cases, thus resulting in duplication
of judicial efforts. Furthermore, if the district court's decision on the
environmentalists' petition is appealed, the court of appeals will have to consider
that record a second time at a later date. The result is a serious conflict with the
policy goal of conserving judicial resources.
Also, under this scenario the remedy test will jeopardize the goal of assuring
agency accountability. In the case of an allegation, like this one, that a regulation
is insufficient in its scope, the determination of whether the litigation belongs in
the court of appeals or the district court is almost fortuitous. Jurisdiction will
turn on the form of the agency regulation-whether the exclusion is implicit or
explicit-rather than on any substantive difference in the action.
Thus, if the agency expressly exempts certain sources from the requirements
in a regulation, jurisdiction is proper in the court of appeals, for the remedy then
requires that the agency first set aside its existing exemption. In contrast, the
agency might consider and then reject the idea of adopting a broader regulation
that includes additional sources. It might then implement this decision not by
expressly exempting certain sources from the regulation, but by adopting a
narrower definition of included sources and remaining silent about other sources.
In that instance, the petition would not ask that the court set aside the adopted
regulation, but would instead seek to require the agency to expand the regulation
to include additional sources. Jurisdiction over that type of action, however,
would be proper only in the district court under the remedy test.36'
The result is a regime of judicial review which allows the agency, through the
form of its regulation, to manipulate the forum in which any appeal initially will
be heard, a situation hardly conducive to promoting agency accountability. At the
same time, since the challenge to the adopted regulation itself is heard in the
court of appeals, while the challenge to the inaction is heard in the district court,
the goal of ensuring timely review of the agency's decisions is jeopardized, as
that review of related actions is now split between two courts.
360. Under this scenario, the environmentalists claim that, based on the information which
the agency compiled in the administrative record of the rulemaking, the agency's inaction was
a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act. If a district court takes the position that it has
jurisdiction only over suits in which the lack of discretion is evident from the statutory
language itself-not from the evidence in the administrative record-no court would have
jurisdiction over the inaction. In that instance the goal of assuring agency accountability would
be compromised.
361. In the leading case adopting the remedy test, Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources
v. EPA, 618 F.2d 991, 996 (3d Cir. 1980), the court emphasized that "an allegation of
inadequacy of a set of regulations is quite different from an allegation that a needed regulation
was nonexistent" That statement is true if the "needed regulation" is a wholly different set of
regulations covering new types of discharges or emissions. If, on the other hand, the "needed
regulation" concerns the scope of sources covered, the difference between the two sets of
regulations is not nearly as large.
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Finally, the remedy test is neutral in its impact on the policy of recognizing
agency autonomy. It premises jurisdiction on the type of relief that the court is
asked to order, a factor unrelated to the agency's exercise of autonomy.
In summary, the significant advantage of the remedy test is its predictability.
Jurisdiction is easy to predict because, unlike the embedded in final action test,
both the courts and the parties can easily determine whether petitioners seek to
set aside an existing regulation or to require EPA to promulgate a new rule. At
the same time, however, the test can easily result in duplication ofjudicial efforts
and may well invite agencies to structure their rules in a manner that would avoid
direct review in the court of appeals, outcomes at odds with the policy goal of
assuring agency accountability.
3. The "Rulemaking Cycle" Test
The strength of the rulemaking cycle test 62 is that it plainly serves the litigant-
related policies. Because it treats rulemaking-and presumably, other agency
procedures which embody a decisionmaking "cycle"3 63-as final action for
purposes of judicial review, the test is predictable to litigants. Litigants simply
determine whether the cycle is complete before seeking judicial review. The test
also assures timely review of agency decisions by fixing jurisdiction directly in
the court of appeals at the completion of the cycle; litigants need not take the
time-consuming step of first applying to the district court for relief.
Additionally, the rulemaking cycle test promotes agency accountability by
informing the agency that, at the completion of a procedural cycle, a court will
have jurisdiction to review the action that the agency has taken until that point.
The agency thus must recognize that, at the completion of the cycle, it will be
held accountable for its decisions during the rulemaking. If the agency can
complete a rulemaking or other procedural cycle, determine to take no action at
that time, and escape judicial review on the ground that its autonomy must be
protected, the agency can effectively insulate itself from judicial review of its
decisionmaking. If it does, the goal of assuring agency accountability is
subordinated to the goal of protecting the agency's autonomy. The rulemaking
cycle test avoids this possibility.
One difficulty with the test, however, is a possible conflict with the policy of
respecting agency autonomy. If the agency has completed a cycle of proceedings
but has not yet ultimately decided what to do about a particular issue, judicial
review of the agency's inaction arguably could interfere with legitimate agency
362. See supra text accompanying notes 136-56.
363. EPA makes many of its most important decisions within the context of informal
rulemaking. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 309, at 58 (explaining that Congress
demanded that EPA regulate "important aspects of industrial life in fundamental ways," and
this feat "was to be accomplished through informal rulemaking"). Even if the agency is not
engaged in rulemaking, however, it normally will use other procedural steps, such as notice and
comment, before rendering a final decision. The logic of the rulemaking cycle test would apply
to these other procedural devices as well.
[Vol. 72:65
JURISDICTION TO REVIEWAGENCY INACTION
prerogatives. For example, in NRDC v. Administrator,3" the Administrator was
facing difficult scientific and economic questions in evaluating alternative
approaches to reducing acid deposition. At the end of a rulemaking cycle, he took
no action but immediately initiated another preliminary rulemaking proceeding.
Under such circumstances, an extended series of administrative proceedings
might well be appropriate and should be protected from judicial interference.
Proper employment of the rulemaking cycle test, however, would minimize
interference with an agency's legitimate autonomy?65 Use of the test merely
results in the court's jurisdiction over a petition for review; it does not establish
a substantive standard for that review. Rather than protecting the agency's
autonomy by concluding that the courts have no jurisdiction to review the
agency's inaction, a court can protect that autonomy by exercising deference in
reviewing any agency decision, made at the end of a rulemaking, in which the
agency explains why it has not definitively decided what course of action to take.
Review of the Administrator's actions with regard to acid deposition in NRDC
v. Administrator can serve as an example. If the agency had violated an explicit
statutory command to adopt regulations, the court would invalidate the agency's
refusal to act. Absent such a violation, however, as long as the agency clearly
expressed its reasons for its inaction and the record contained substantial
evidence supporting the agency's decision to gather further information rather
than to act, the court would uphold the agency's action. Thus, the court would
interfere only if it appeared that the agency was violating a plain statutory
obligation by refusing to act or if its refusal was arbitrary.
The rulemaking cycle test has conflicting effects on the policy of conserving
judicial resources. It avoids the situation in which both the court of appeals and
the district court review parts of one overall agency action based on the same
administrative record. Under the test, all aspects of the agency's action are
reviewable in the court of appeals at the completion of a cycle of proceedings.
The test also avoids impelling parties to file sequential petitions for judicial
review out of uncertainty as to when and in which court such petitions must be
filed. Instead, they will know that, at a completion of a rulemaking or procedural
cycle, they must seek review at that point or be barred from review at a later
date. " At the same time, however, by potentially subjecting all decisions at the
end of a rulemaking cycle to judicial review, this test increases the jurisdictional
load of the court of appeals.
Finally, because the test authorizes judicial review in the court of appeals at
the completion of a rulemaking or procedural cycle, the court will review the
administrative record detailing the agency's actions during that cycle. The test
does not violate the policy goal of recognizing the limits on the fact-finding
364. 902 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated inpart and dismissed in part by 921 F.2d 326
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
365. See supra text accompanying note 312.
366. It is true that by allowing parties to seek review at the end of a rulemaking cycle, the
test may encourage them to file petitions for review at the end of each cycle rather than filing
a single petition at a later time. But the court's overall workload should not increase greatly;
rather, the substantive amount of review will remain the same, but will be split into discrete
segments rather than reviewed as a whole at a single time.
1996]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
capabilities of an appellate court, as the court is not asked to go outside the
record to find facts.
4. The "Constructive Final Action" Test
As discussed above,367 the constructive final action test is similar to the
rulemaking cycle test. It differs from that test only when, at the conclusion of a
rulemaking, the agency has not acted but indicates that it is still actively
considering action.3 6' Thus, for the most part, the effects of this test on the
policies underlying the review statutes mirror the effects of the rulemaking cycle
test.
In the situation where the two tests do not overlap, however, the constructive
final action test fails to serve two policies. The first is predictability for litigants.
As applied by Chief Judge Wald in NRDC v. Administrator, 369 the key factors in
determining whether the agency has "constructively" taken final action appear
to be the precise status of the agency's procedures, particularly whether the
agency has committed to undertake further specific steps;3 70 whether the agency
actually has decided certain facts or issues;1 7 1 the agency's explanation for its
inaction;372 and the relationship of the agency's inaction to any statutory
deadline.373 Because Chief Judge Wald did not discuss the weight given these
factors, litigants must guess which of them will predominate in arguments over
whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction. The result is a serious lack of
predictability in applying the test in these circumstances.
Secondly, this uncertainty impels litigants to file petitions for review to avoid
later arguments that they waived their right to review by not filing at an earlier
time. Thus, by encouraging the filing of separate, sequential petitions for review,
the test compromises the policy goal of conserving judicial resources.
5. The "Actual Final Decision" Test
The actual final decision test374 unquestionably serves three of the six policy
goals underlying the judicial review statutes. First, the test strongly serves the
policy goal of assuring predictability for litigants. The test is precise: the
367. See supra text accompanying note 159.
368. See supra text accompanying note 160.
369. 902 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated inpart and dismissed in part by 921 F.2d 326
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
370. Id. at 986 (observing that on the visibility issue EPA "remains technically engaged in
at least the foreplay of formal rulemaking" because it had, at the time it completed the initial
rulemaking cycle, published an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking to address visibility).
371. Id. at 986 n.9 (distinguishing Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
on the basis that in the latter case the agency had actually decided not to include strip mines
on a list of sources).
372. Id. at 997 (noting that the agency had deferred indefinitely from taking action on acid
deposition because it lacked adequate scientific understanding of its effect).
373. Id. at 988 (noting that when it refused to act, EPA was already 10 years behind the
statutory deadline established by the CAA).
374. See supra text accompanying notes 165-75.
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agency's decision is not reviewable unless it constitutes action rather than
inaction and is couched in terms of a "final" decision. Thus, lawyers can easily
determine whether judicial review is available.
Secondly, the test strongly supports the policy goal of respecting agency
autonomy. Because it focuses on the agency's own characterization of where it
stands in the decisionmaking process, the test affords the agency maximum
flexibility in structuring the procedures that it believes are necessary to reach a
decision. Agency autonomy-in the sense of freedom from judicial
oversight-also is enhanced because, under this test, all agency inaction is
defined as unreviewable.
Third, the test serves the less important goal of recognizing the limitations on
appellate fact-finding and remedial capabilities. Concerns over these two
appellate functions arise when the agency has not acted, and the court must either
find facts to determine whether it should have acted or remedy agency inaction.
Under the actual final decision test, the court will not find itself in either
position.
The test has mixed results with respect to the goal of conserving judicial
resources. Because the test is predictable, parties will not have to file sequential
petitions for review because of uncertainty over when the court of appeals has
jurisdiction to hear the matter. More importantly, the test deems all forms of
agency inaction as unreviewable. Thus, fewer agency decisions will be subject
to judicial review than under other tests which allow for the possibility that
courts can review agency inaction in some circumstances.
In some instances, however, the test will result in piecemeal judicial review of
a single administrative record. If any part of the agency's decision in a
rulemaking proceeding amounts to inaction rather than to an affirmative decision
to act, that inaction is reviewable-if at all-only in the district court on the
theory that the agency has violated a plain statutory command. If the inaction is
reviewable in the district court, the actual final decision results in piecemeal
judicial review in much the same manner as the remedy test discussed above.
Two courts, rather than one, will address related issues raised in a single agency
proceeding.
At the same time, the actual final decision test plainly does not serve two other
policy goals of the jurisdictional statutes. First, it promotes agency autonomy
almost to the exclusion of the goal of agency accountability. As long as the
agency-for whatever reason-has not rendered an actual final decision, the
court of appeals has no jurisdiction to undertake review. Thus, even under a
worst case scenario where the agency is arbitrarily refusing to act or is employing
attenuated procedures to avoid taking action, the agency will be immune from
judicial scrutiny. The practical effect of the test is to sacrifice accountability
until such time as it suits the agency.
Second, this policy greatly hinders the goal of assuring timely judicial review
so that errors may quickly be brought to the agency's attention. Instead, by
actually allowing the agency to structure its procedures to avoid judicial review




The test which best promotes those policies underlying the jurisdictional
provisions is the rulemaking cycle test. The actual final decision test also
strongly promotes several of the relevant policies, while the other tests are
markedly less effective in carrying out the policies.
Both the rulemaking cycle and actual final decision tests share the feature of
allowing litigators to predict accurately when judicial review will be available.
In addition, the rulemaking cycle test strongly implements the policies of
assuring accountability and timely review. Its principal detriment is its possible
impact on agency autonomy, although judicial deference to the agency's reasons
for structuring its decisionmaking process in a certain fashion can lessen this
impact. Finally, it has a mixed effect on conserving judicial resources.
The actual final decision test in some ways stands in sharp counterpoint to the
rulemaking cycle test. It promotes agency autonomy and ensures that appellate
courts will not become embroiled in fact-finding or enforcing complex remedial
orders. Its principal detriment is its failure to assure agency accountability, and
it also fails'to assure timely review of the agency's decisionmaking.
The other three tests are inferior from the standpoint of implementing the
relevant policies. Despite the number of cases in which courts have cited it
favorably, the embedded in final action test does not strongly implement any of
the relevant policies. Moreover, the uncertainty of the test prevents predictability
among litigants, a significant detriment. The remedy test assures predictability
and, as its name implies, avoids entangling the appellate courts in fact-finding or
implementation of complex remedial orders. However, because the test is
centered on the court's capabilities rather than on the agency's decisionmaking
process, it is indifferent to agency accountability. Nor does the test necessarily
conserve judicial resources or assure timely review.
Finally, the constructive final action test is similar in impact to the rulemaking
cycle test. It is, however, less predictable than the latter test and thus less
efficacious from a policy perspective.
B. Implementing the Legislative Intent
The last step in the analysis is to determine whether the tests are consistent
with congressional intent. Because the rulemaking cycle test and, to a slightly
lesser degree, the actual final decision test are superior from the perspective of
implementing policy, only those tests are analyzed for consistency with
legislative intent.
Here, the outcome of the analysis of the two tests is strikingly different
because of the 1990 Amendments to the CAA. As discussed above,375 the
principal conclusion from the 1990 Amendments is that Congress broadened the
range of agency decisions that would be subject to judicial review. The change
of language from review of final actions to review of final decisions indicates
375. See supra text accompanying note 270.
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that agency inaction also is reviewable in the court of appeals under some
circumstances. Moreover, a steady theme in the history is that Congress was
critical of narrow judicial interpretations which foreclosed judicial review of
agency inaction.
This intent directly conflicts with the actual final decision test. The test was
premised on the idea that the statutory term "final action" literally suggests that
agency inaction is not reviewable at all. If the agency has failed to act, the matter
is unreviewable "no matter how 'close' the agency is to [making] that
decision. 376 In light of the legislative intent, this premise is no longer tenable.
In contrast, the rulemaking cycle test is fully consistent with this legislative
intent. When the agency has completed a rulemaking cycle or other procedural
process, it has "decided" even if its choice is not to take action. The test is thus
consistent with both the language of the 1990 Amendments, which authorizes
review of final decisions, as well as with the legislative intent to broaden review
of agency inaction.
Two other indications of legislative intent are pertinent: (1) Congress's refusal
to authorize review of inaction in the district court on the basis of "review of
abuse of discretion," '377 and (2) the rejection of concurrent jurisdiction.378 The
rulemaking cycle test does not conflict with the first indication of intent. It calls
only for a greater number of cases to be reviewed in the court of appeals, where
review is proper for abuse of discretion, rather than the enlargement of the
district court's jurisdiction to include such matters. Similarly, because the actual
final decision approach disallows any review unless there is a final action, it also
avoids review of agency inaction in the district court for abuse of discretion.
Nor does the actual final decision test conflict with the last indication of
legislative intent, the congressional rejection of concurrent jurisdiction. Once
again, because the test strictly forbids review of agency inaction, there is no
possibility of concurrent jurisdiction with the district court over such inaction.
Application of the rulemaking cycle test does pose a potential conflict with the
congressional intent to reject concurrent jurisdiction. The problem arises in one
situation: where the agency is under an explicit statutory duty to take certain
action but at the end of a rulemaking cycle refuses to do so. Under the
rulemaking cycle test, the court of appeals has jurisdiction to review that refusal.
Because the agency has failed to perform a nondiscretionary statutory duty,
however, the district court also may have jurisdiction over a citizen suit brought
to compel that duty.
The jurisdictional statutes, however, could be interpreted to avoid such
concurrent jurisdiction. Two different interpretations of sections 304 and 307 of
the CAA are possible. First, in this situation, jurisdiction over such failure to
perform a nondiscretionary statutory duty could lie only in the district court.
Thus, if the agency completed a rulemaking cycle and failed to carry out that
376. NRDC v. Administrator, EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Silberman, J.,
concurring and dissenting), vacated in part and dismissed in part by 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
377. See supra text accompanying notes 260-61.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 282-84.
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duty, the court of appeals could not review that failure; instead, a plaintiff would
have to file a separate action in the district court. This interpretation, however,
has effects that are inconsistent with policies underlying the review statutes.
Most obviously, it would fragment jurisdiction over related matters between the
district court and the court of appeals, thus wasting judicial resources.
Furthermore, given a choice between jurisdiction in the district court or the court
of appeals over a purely statutory question, the interpretation violates the policy
goal of assuring timely review of agency action.
The second interpretation, which would vest jurisdiction in this situation solely
in the court of appeals, avoids these problems. The court of appeals would
consider this issue along with other issues raised in the rulemaking, and the
matter would be timely considered because district court review would be
unnecessary.
Accordingly, the courts should interpret the rulemaking cycle test to vest
jurisdiction solely in the court of appeals over allegations that EPA failed to
perform a nondiscretionary statutory duty in addition to allegations of abuse of
discretion in the rulemaking. If that interpretation is adopted, the rulemaking
cycle test is fully consistent with congressional intent. 79
C. Accounting for Statutory Differences Between the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.
The most pertinent indications of congressional intent regarding the
jurisdiction statutes primarily concern the 1990 Amendments to the CAA.3"'
Nothing would prevent a court from using the rulemaking cycle test for that law
and a separate test, such as the actual final decision test, for the CWA. 38' For
several reasons, however, the rulemaking cycle test should be the uniform
approach to both laws.
First, both the CAA and CWA employ the same bifurcated jurisdictional
framework, and the latter's review sections were patterned after the original
provisions in the 1970 Amendments to the CAA. The courts have recognized the
relationship between the two sets of jurisdictional provisions by, in some
379. Under this interpretation, jurisdiction over the failure to perform a nondiscretionary
action would lie solely in the court of appeals while that court reviewed the agency's
rulemaking decisions. If a petitioner failed to petition for review of EPA's failure to perform
a nondiscretionary statutory duty that was at issue in the rulemaking, it could not bring an
action in the district court pursuant to § 304 of the CAA while the court of appeals' action
remained pending.
After the court of appeals decided the case, however, nothing would prevent the petitioner
from later suing in the district court under § 304 alleging a failure to perform a statutory duty.
Unless the petitioner could bring such an action once the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction
expired, the failure to petition the court of appeals would mean that EPA effectively received
immunity from its failure to perform its nondiscretionary statutory duty. There is no indication,
either in the wording of the jurisdictional review provisions or the legislative history, of such
a congressional intent.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 192-258.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 165-76.
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instances, using decisions under one law to support holdings under the other.3"2
This pattern strongly suggests that a uniform approach to their interpretation is
appropriate. Additionally, the same policies underlie the jurisdictional statutes
for both laws and, as discussed in detail above, the rulemaking cycle test best
effectuates those policies.
These reasons strongly suggest that the rulemaking cycle test should be used
for litigation under the CWA as well as for cases arising under the CAA. There
is, however, one significant difference between the framework for judicial
review under the CAA and the CWA. The CWA authorizes direct review in the
court of appeals of a closed set of specifically delineated EPA decisions,
including the grant or denial of a permit and the establishment of effluent
limitations. 3 The courts have held that, if EPA's decision does not fall within
this limited set of decisions, jurisdiction in the court of appeals is unavailable?84
In contrast, the CAA contains a catch-all authorization allowing the courts of
appeals to review "any other final action" taken by the agency."'
This difference means that a broader set of decisions is reviewable in the court
of appeals under the CAA than under the CWA. Other than this difference,
however, no statutory reason exists why the rulemaking cycle test cannot be
applied under both laws. In determining whether agency inaction is reviewable
under the CWA, the question initially would be whether the decision made fell
within the limited set of decisions subject to review. If it did, then the court,
pursuant to the rulemaking cycle test, would determine whether the agency's
inaction should be considered final action subject to review. It would make this
determination by considering whether the agency had completed a discernable
"procedural cycle" in which it had afforded parties the opportunity to present
their views on issues.38 6 If so, then the inaction would be reviewable.
Furthermore, as with the CAA, the deference accorded to the agency would
depend on the alleged illegality. If the plaintiff claimed that the agency's inaction
violated a plain statutory command that did not depend on the agency first
finding that certain facts existed, the court of appeals would exercise the normal
deference accorded the agency's interpretation of a statute.8 7 On the other hand,
if the plaintiff's challenge implicates the agency's scientific fact-finding or
policy choices, the court's review of the inaction would be more deferential, as
the reasons for respecting the agency's decisionmaking autonomy are greater.
382. See supra note 44.
383. CAA § 509(b)(1); 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1994).
384. See, e.g., American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 890 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that EPA
lecision not to object to a state permit was unreviewable as the decision not to object was not
ncluded among the categories reviewable in 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)).
385. CAA § 307(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1994).
386. See supra note 142.
387. See Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (stating that "the
dministrator's [statutory] interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly




Congress intended the bifurcated jurisdictional provisions in the CAA and
CWA to facilitate judicial review rather than to create a "confused class of
circumforaneous litigants." '388 The rulemaking cycle test best effectuates the
congressional policies underlying the review sections and is fully consistent with
the 1990 Amendments to the CAA. Accordingly, this test ought to govern
judicial review under the bifurcated jurisdictional provisions. Its adoption would
finally bring the circumforaneous litigants safely to port.
388. See Maine v. Thomas, 874 F.2d 883, 884-85 (1st Cir. 1989).
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